Concept
After MacPherson
Foreseeable and unforeseeable plaintiffs
After MacPherson
Cardozo wrote MacPherson as a principle, not as a rule about wheels or about Buick. The danger principle stays fixed, he said, but “the things subject to the principle do change. They are whatever the needs of life in a developing civilization require them to be.”1 Courts took him at his word. In negligence, the maker’s duty came to reach everyone foreseeably injured by its products, and the privity defense disappeared. In warranty, which rests on the sale itself, privity fell more slowly and, in many places, only for some kinds of loss.
Privity Falls in Negligence
In a negligence action against a manufacturer, the absence of contractual privity is no defense. The maker owes due care to any foreseeable plaintiff, including users, consumers, and bystanders, and not just the immediate purchaser.2 That rule applies the general negligence principle of Restatement (Second) of Torts § 281: an actor is liable for invading another’s interest when the actor’s conduct is negligent with respect to that person or to a class of persons within which the person is included.3 Nothing in that formulation asks whether the actor and the victim ever made a bargain. Once duty rests on foreseeable physical harm, the plaintiff’s place in the chain of sale says nothing about whether the maker’s carelessness endangered that plaintiff.
Suvada v. White Motor Co. records what the rule replaced. When the question first reached Illinois in 1912, the court in Davidson v. Montgomery Ward & Co. adopted a “general rule” that a contractor, manufacturer, or vendor is not liable, regardless of negligence, to third parties with whom it has no contractual relations. Three exceptions applied: negligence concerning an article imminently dangerous to human life or health; an owner’s negligence injuring a person invited on the premises; and the sale, without notice, of an article whose imminently dangerous qualities the seller knew.4 The old regime was a rule of no liability with carve-outs, and it protected contractors and vendors as well as manufacturers.
Courts now hold that a manufacturer owes a duty of care to all those who may foreseeably be injured by its products, and virtually all follow MacPherson.5 Getting there took decades. One jurisdiction after another adopted the rule, the last being Maine in 1982.6
What must a plaintiff with no contract against the maker still prove? Nearly everything else. Ending the privity defense did not make recovery automatic, because the plaintiff had to show not only that a defect caused the injury but that the product was defective when it left the manufacturer’s possession.7 MacPherson itself shows the difficulty: the wheel came from a maker of component parts, and the car had been driven on rough country roads for a year and might have been damaged through heavy use.8 Nor did the change multiply defendants. With pre-packaged, mass-produced goods, the retailer was often a mere conduit and had not been negligent, so in the typical case MacPherson gave the plaintiff a right to sue the only party who could possibly be found liable for negligence.9
The burden of proving negligence was one target of the next major development, which sought not to adjust the negligence rule but to replace it. In Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno (Cal. 1944), Justice Traynor, concurring, suggested that courts hold manufacturers liable without fault when defective products cause personal injury. He offered three reasons: manufacturers can absorb or pass on the cost as a cost of doing business, liability deters the marketing of defective products, and injured persons, who know little of the manufacturing process, should no longer have to prove negligence.10
A duty of care is not a guarantee of safety. A manufacturer is not under a duty to make its automobile accident-proof or fool-proof, nor to render a vehicle “more” safe where the danger is obvious to all, and requiring cars in which it would be safe to collide would be a legislative function, not an aspect of judicial interpretation of existing law.11
Once privity is out of the way, a negligence case turns on breach, and Ford Motor Co. v. Zahn shows what that proof can look like. The defect lay in the face of a car ash tray, which was supposed to have rounded corners to prevent injuries. The manufacturer’s witness testified that ash trays passed “through roughly seven inspectors,” yet for the face of the ash tray the inspection was a sampling operation: “We don’t look over each one individually.” The defect went undiscovered even though, by the same witness’s account, he could feel it very easily with his finger.12 Evidence of that kind bears on whether the maker took reasonable care to find defects before the product left its hands.
Warranty Privity Contrast
MacPherson ended the privity defense in negligence,14 but a warranty claim stands on different footing because it rests on the contract of sale. Courts sort the privity problem there into two directions. Vertical privity runs up and down the chain of distribution, from component suppliers through manufacturers, wholesalers, and retailers to the buyer, and it asks who can be sued. Horizontal privity runs sideways from the purchaser to family members, guests, employees, and bystanders who want the benefit of the purchaser’s warranty, and it asks who can sue.15
The vertical bar became a serious obstacle once retailing left the maker’s hands. Until the industrial revolution, consumers often bought directly from the people who made the goods. As manufacturers spun off the retail function to third-party dealers, consumers typically contracted only with retailers, and a warranty claim against the manufacturer ran into the privity requirement. A buyer could satisfy it only where the dealer was the manufacturer’s agent.16
The privity defense fell first in food and drink cases, and Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc. carried the point to a defective car. Speaking for the New Jersey Supreme Court, Justice Francis wrote: “We see no rational doctrinal basis for differentiating between a fly in a bottle of beverage and a defective automobile. The unwholesome beverage may bring illness to one person, the defective car, with its great potentiality for harm to the driver, occupants, and others, demands even less adherence to the narrow barrier of privity.”17 That reasoning echoes Cardozo’s observation in MacPherson that “the nature of an automobile gives warning of probable danger if its construction is defective.”18
The holding closes both privity gaps. An implied warranty of merchantability chargeable to either an automobile manufacturer or a dealer extends to the purchaser, members of the purchaser’s family, and other persons occupying or using the car with the purchaser’s consent, because those persons must be considered within the distributive chain.19 The court reached that result partly through history. Warranty actions had once sounded in tort, in deceit, and the warranty remained “a curious hybrid of tort and contract,” so relaxing rigid privity came easily for third persons who, in the reasonable contemplation of the parties to a warranty, might be expected to use or consume the product.20 Dean Prosser called the decision the “fall of the citadel of privity.”21
The retreat has been uneven. Finding the vertical privity requirement outmoded and bad policy, many courts have abandoned it in personal-injury cases, some in property-damage cases, and a few even for economic loss. Because implied warranty claims lie in contract, however, many courts still require it.22 The pattern follows the type of loss: the further a claim sits from personal injury, the likelier a court is to keep the requirement.
The shortcut that MacPherson ended privity is correct for negligence only. For an implied-warranty claim against a remote seller, first classify the harm as physical injury or economic loss, then identify which direction of privity is missing, the defendant’s (vertical) or the plaintiff’s (horizontal), and apply the jurisdiction’s rule for that kind of loss.