Concept
The No-Duty Rule
Failure to act: no duty to rescue, special relationships, and undertakings
Duty to Act and Rescue
The No-Duty Rule
Section 314 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts sets the baseline for this chapter: “The fact that the actor realizes or should realize that action on his part is necessary for another’s aid or protection does not of itself impose upon him a duty to take such action.”1 The rule pulls apart two things that feel connected. Awareness that someone needs help is a fact about what the actor knows, while a duty is a conclusion the law reaches only when something more is present. Each section that follows searches for that something more, whether a relationship, a prior act, or an undertaking, that turns a bystander into a person who must act.
The classic illustrations remove every fact that might make a duty seem natural. A sunbather who watches a child going under the waves has no duty to dive in, to throw a life ring, or even to notify a nearby lifeguard. A bystander who watches a blind man walk into a busy street has no duty to call out a warning.2 Easy rescue does not change the answer. The rule holds even when rescuing costs the defendant little or nothing and the danger to the plaintiff is great, so a bystander owes nothing to a drowning stranger even if a life preserver or a nearby pole would do the job.3 Students often read those facts as the missing element of a duty. They supply the moral case for helping, and the moral case leaves the rule untouched.
Courts have said bluntly that a moral duty and a legal duty are different things. One judicial statement of the rule observes that the priest and Levite who passed by on the other side were not, it is supposed, liable at law for the suffering of the man who fell among thieves, although they morally ought to have relieved it. The same passage describes a person who sees a two-year-old on a railroad track with a car approaching and could rescue the child with entire safety. If he does nothing, he may justly be styled “a ruthless savage and a moral monster,” yet he is not liable in damages for the child’s injury or indictable under the statute for its death.5 Anger at a bystander’s inaction is a reason to want a duty. It is not evidence that one exists.
Proximity adds nothing. In a society that puts a premium on individualism, a court is very unlikely to transform neighborliness into a legally enforceable duty. Becoming a neighbor is not like taking charge of a pupil or running a train service, and people hardly expect to have assumed any degree of care for neighbors they may like, loathe, or ignore.6
The rule grew out of the early common law’s distinction between action and inaction, between misfeasance and nonfeasance. One who injured another by a positive act was held liable without great regard even for fault. Courts busy with the more flagrant forms of misbehavior paid little attention to someone who merely did nothing, even when another suffered serious harm from the omission, and liability for nonfeasance was slow to win recognition.7 The next section examines where the line between the two falls.
Two practical objections to a duty to rescue explain why courts have kept the rule. The first is that such a duty is hard to bound. How great an effort would a defendant have to make? Would a non-swimmer have to dive in after a drowning child? Which bystanders on a crowded beach would be bound? Would a bystander have to subordinate an important interest of his own, such as visiting a seriously ill relative, to help at an accident scene?8 The second is the slippery slope. Courts see the no-duty stance in one-person-to-one-person cases as a defense against stepping onto a slope toward liability under a general standard of reasonable behavior under all the circumstances. They therefore hold the bright line even in the low-cost, low-risk case where recovery would be most appealing.9
Neither objection is likely insurmountable: most European countries impose a limited duty to aid, as does Vermont. Yet most American courts have not rejected the no-duty rule outright. They have nibbled away at it by carving out exceptions.10 A statute drafted to answer the objections might read: one who fails to interfere to save another from impending death or great bodily harm, when he might do so with little or no inconvenience to himself, and death or great bodily harm follows from his inaction, shall be punished criminally and shall compensate the injured party or, in case of death, the widow and children.11 Absent such a statute, § 314 supplies the answer.
The rule withholds only an affirmative duty to act for another’s benefit. A defendant whose own conduct creates the danger can still owe reasonable care, and sometimes the best way to exercise that care is to rescue. One who negligently places the plaintiff in danger may be held liable for negligently failing to rescue. The line runs between mere failure to rescue, which is nonfeasance and ordinarily draws no liability, and negligently creating the danger in the first place, which is misfeasance. Even a stranger who owes no duty at all is liable for conducting a rescue negligently if he chooses to undertake one.12
The rest of the chapter maps the routes around § 314: special relationships, the actor’s own conduct, undertakings to aid another, taking charge of a helpless person, undertakings that benefit third persons, and interference with another’s rescue. An actor who undertakes services to one person, knowing or having reason to know that the services will reduce the risk of physical harm to a third person, owes the third person reasonable care in conducting the undertaking if further conditions are met.13 The routes also overlap. A city’s 911 dispatcher may be regarded as acting affirmatively, as undertaking a duty no statute imposes, or as entering a special relationship with the victim.14 On any of those grounds the city may answer for negligence even though no statute by its terms imposes a special duty to that victim.15 On an exam, test for an exception first. If none fits, the answer is no duty.