Concept
Special Relationships
Failure to act: no duty to rescue, special relationships, and undertakings
Special Relationships
The first exception to the no-duty rule rests on a relationship between the defendant and the person in need. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314A lists the relationships that carry an affirmative duty, and its first entry provides that a common carrier owes its passengers a duty to take reasonable action on their behalf.1 The relationship supplies the fact that awareness of another’s need lacks. A passenger who collapses on a train and a stranger who collapses on a sidewalk may draw equal notice from everyone nearby, yet the train’s crew must act for the passenger while the passersby owe the stranger nothing under § 314.
Courts have not hesitated to create affirmative duties where some policy justifies departing from the no-duty rule, and a defendant held to such a duty cannot answer that he simply did not want to get involved.2 In the relationships that qualify, the person in need is typically vulnerable and dependent, and the defendant holds considerable power over that person’s welfare.3 That pairing answers the usual objections to a duty to rescue: that it conscripts strangers and that it has no stopping point. A defendant bound by the relationship is no stranger drafted into service, and those who owe the duty form a small, identifiable group instead of a crowd of onlookers.
Special relationships run in two directions, and this section develops only one. In Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California, the California Supreme Court explained, relying on § 315 of the Restatement, that a duty of care may arise from either a special relation between the actor and a third person that obliges the actor to control that person’s conduct, or a special relation between the actor and the other that gives the other a right of protection. A therapist’s relationship to either Tatiana, the victim, or Poddar, the patient, would suffice.4 The first branch concerns control of a dangerous person and is not developed here. This section takes up the second, the relationship that gives the person in need a right to protection, beginning with the carrier and the innkeeper and then asking how far the list extends. On an exam, a stem that pairs a bystander’s awareness with some relationship should prompt one question first: does the relationship run to the victim, who then has a right to aid, or to a dangerous person whom the defendant must restrain?
Carriers, Innkeepers, and Similar Relations
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314A(1) states the first and most familiar relationship: a common carrier owes its passengers a duty to take reasonable action.5 A common carrier holds itself out to carry the public for a fee, a description that covers trains, buses, airlines, and ships. Section 314A(2) gives the innkeeper a similar duty toward its guests.6 Each provision names the relationship that makes the defendant answerable for a person in need.
These two relationships head the list because of what the passenger and the guest have given up. A rider on a moving train cannot step off, hire a guard, or summon help, and a guest asleep in a hotel room relies on the innkeeper’s control of the doors, hallways, and staff. Both plaintiffs are vulnerable and dependent, and both defendants hold considerable power over their welfare, the pattern courts look for in a duty-creating relationship.7 Both defendants also accepted payment for the passage or the room, so the duty accompanies a bargain they chose to make. The duty falls on an identifiable few, since the carrier owes it to those aboard and the innkeeper to those who rented rooms, and no court need decide which member of a crowd was bound to act.
A carrier acts through its crew. A train conductor who sees one passenger assault another and fails to come to the victim’s aid is a typical case in which courts impose a duty, although the conductor did not cause the assault; the relationship to the victim supplies the duty.8
An exam stem that places several observers at one incident therefore asks you to sort them by their relationship to the victim. Awareness and ability to help are the same for everyone present and decide nothing, which is why the carrier answers for the failure to act and the fellow rider does not.
The list does not stop with carriers and innkeepers. Section 314A also reaches a possessor of land who holds it open to the public, and subsection (4) reaches one who takes custody of another, a rule taken up below.9 Coville v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., a Connecticut appellate decision, quoted comment (b) to § 314A, which says that the listed relations are not exclusive and that the law “appears, however, to be working slowly toward a recognition of the duty to aid or protect in any relation of dependence or of mutual dependence.”10 Courts often impose a duty to aid based on a preexisting relationship between the defendant and the person who needs help, as Restatement (Third) of Torts § 40 recognizes. The relationships they have credited include employer and employee, school and child, jailer and prisoner, and parent and dependent child.11
The reasons behind the first three show the common thread. An employer whose worker is trapped in a factory elevator is uniquely situated to reduce the harm, and the worker is on the premises for the employer’s benefit. School officials who notice a feverish child have taken charge of children knowing that children need protection. A prison guard who ignores an inmate’s repeated complaints of stomach pain has charge of a person whom confinement has stripped of the ability to act for his own protection. In none of these cases did the defendant produce the condition that injured the plaintiff, so the relationship alone supplies the duty.12
Each of these relationships leaves the person in need dependent on a defendant positioned to help. Dependence of that kind is the test a court applies when a claimed relationship appears on no list. The next two subsections define what the carrier’s duty requires, first protection against physical harm and then first aid. The third takes up custody, and the last shows where courts decline to find dependence, as with a witness to an emergency or a neighbor.
Duty to Protect From Harm
The carrier’s duty under § 314A(1) has two parts, and the first, in clause (a), is a duty to protect passengers against unreasonable risk of physical harm.14 Two qualifiers narrow the clause: the harm must be physical, and the risk must be unreasonable, meaning one that a careful carrier would act to reduce. The court in Coville read § 314A the same way, as recognizing duties of carriers, innkeepers, and possessors of land to protect passengers, guests, and members of the public from “unreasonable risk of physical harm.”15
The relationship settles whether a duty exists, and the standard of care settles what the duty demands. The carrier’s duty is to take reasonable action, which means ordinary care under the circumstances and no guarantee of a safe trip.16 A carrier controls its vehicle, its crew, and the conditions of boarding, so it is better placed than any passenger to anticipate and reduce the dangers aboard, and that control justifies the duty. The control has limits, however. A duty of absolute protection would make the carrier an insurer against every harm, and the law seldom imposes so stringent a burden.17 A common error on exams is to run the two questions together, either by treating the passenger’s injury as proof that the carrier failed or by treating the existence of a duty as if it settled liability.
Clause (a) speaks of risk and does not say whose conduct produces it, so the danger may come from the carrier’s own equipment or employees or from other passengers and outsiders. Duties that arise from relationships such as carrier and passenger or innkeeper and guest extend to protecting the dependent party against harm that third persons foreseeably cause.18 Here the exception departs most sharply from § 314: a stranger who watches a mugging owes the victim nothing, while a carrier whose passenger is attacked must act reasonably against the attacker. Foreseeability is where the reasonable-care standard does its work, since a careful carrier responds to dangers it knows of or should anticipate and need not guard against the unforeseeable.
A train conductor who sees one passenger assaulted by another and fails to come to the victim’s aid is the model case.19 The conductor did not cause the assault, and the relationship alone supplies the duty. A conductor who had a clear chance to intervene or summon help and took no step at all presents a jury with a strong claim that the carrier fell short of reasonable care.
The conductor who watched and the operator who responded faced the same kind of danger, an attack by a third person, so the source of the harm does not separate them. What separates them is each carrier’s response to a danger it could reasonably have addressed. An analysis therefore moves in order: the carrier-passenger relationship establishes the duty, the carrier’s knowledge of the danger fixes what reasonable care required, and liability follows only if the carrier’s conduct fell short of that standard and the shortfall caused the harm.
Duty to Give First Aid
The second part of the carrier’s duty in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314A(1) addresses a passenger who is already sick or hurt. Clause (b) requires the carrier “to give them first aid after it knows or has reason to know that they are ill or injured, and to care for them until they can be cared for by others.”21 Clause (a) looks ahead to dangers the carrier should head off, while clause (b) looks at a passenger whose condition has already arisen, and its text asks nothing about how the condition arose. A heart attack with no link to the carrier’s equipment or crew falls within it as readily as a fall in a lurching car. Two phrases carry the clause and do separate work: the knowledge trigger that starts the duty and the end point at which it stops.
The law puts this burden on a carrier because of what a sick passenger can and cannot do. A passenger who falls ill aboard a moving train or bus cannot step outside to find a physician or flag down an ambulance, and the other riders are strangers who owe the passenger nothing under § 314. The crew is the one group present with the access, the authority over the vehicle, and the means to summon help. As comment (b) to § 314A explains, and as the court in Coville repeated, the duties in the section arise out of special relations between the parties, which create a special responsibility and take the case out of the general rule.22 The duty is also one of reasonable action, as the opening words of § 314A(1) say.23 It asks of the crew what a reasonable crew can do, such as noticing the passenger, giving basic assistance, and getting professional help moving. It does not ask for a diagnosis or a cure.
The knowledge trigger keeps the duty within workable limits. The duty begins when the carrier knows or has reason to know that a passenger is ill or injured. That covers a conductor who watches a passenger collapse and a crew told of the collapse by a fellow rider, and it covers a crew that sees signs from which a reasonable person would infer trouble. Without this limit the carrier would have to detect every hidden ailment among hundreds of riders, which would make it a roving diagnostician. A crew cannot give aid to a condition it has no means of recognizing, so the law ties the duty to what the carrier can perceive.
A passenger who slumps sideways and groans in plain view of the conductor presents the opposite case. The conductor now has facts that a reasonable person would read as illness, so the duty has begun, and walking on without a word breaches it. The same logic reaches relationships beyond carriers. School officials who notice that a child is feverish and make no attempt to get medical care, and a prison guard who ignores an inmate’s repeated complaints of stomach pain, each fail a duty that rests on a relationship to the victim and on knowledge of the need.24 Neither defendant produced the fever or the pain, so the duty comes from the relationship joined to what the defendant knew. An exam stem therefore asks what the carrier’s people saw or were told, and the cause of the illness decides nothing here. A carrier that caused the injury faces a separate rule, taken up later in this chapter.
The end point is the second teaching point. The carrier must care for the passenger “until they can be cared for by others.”25 The carrier bridges the gap between the moment the need appears and the moment other help arrives, and once others can take over it has done what the law asks. The duty therefore does not last until the passenger recovers, and it does not last until the journey ends. A crew can give first aid and summon help but cannot supply ongoing medical treatment, so the duty runs only as long as the carrier is the only help available.
The two points work together on a fact pattern. Ask first whether the crew knew or had reason to know that the passenger was ill or injured, because without that the duty has not begun. If it has begun, ask what a reasonable crew would have done, and ask whether anyone else had taken over care by the time of the alleged failure, because after that point the duty is gone.
Custody of Another
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314A(4) extends the special-relationship exception to one who “is required by law to take or who voluntarily takes the custody of another under circumstances such as to deprive the other of his normal opportunities for protection,” and it places that person “under a similar duty to the other.”27 The similar duty is the carrier’s: a duty to take reasonable action to protect the person against unreasonable risk of physical harm and to give aid when the person is hurt or ill.28 Two routes lead to custody. The law may impose it, as when a jailer holds a prisoner, or the defendant may assume it by choice, as when someone takes charge of a person too intoxicated to manage alone. On either route the last clause of the rule carries the weight: the custody must leave the other person without the ordinary means of self-protection.
That condition supplies the reason for the duty. A person in danger can ordinarily leave, call out, find a neighbor, or hire help, and the people nearby remain free to step in. Custody removes the first set of options by restraining the person, and it tends to remove the second by placing the person beyond the reach of anyone except the custodian. The custodian is then the only one positioned to protect, so the law requires the custodian to supply the protection that the custody took away. Both objections to a general duty to rescue lose their force here, because a custodian is no stranger conscripted off the street and the duty falls on one identifiable person.
The prison cases make the logic plainest. The duty owed to prisoners rests on the jailer’s having taken charge of the prisoner and deprived him of the ability to act for his own protection, so a guard who ignores an inmate’s repeated complaints of stomach pain owes the inmate aid although the guard did not cause the pain.29 Custodians and the parents of dependent children appear on the same list of relationships that give rise to affirmative duties.30 The voluntary route reaches the person who takes charge of an intoxicated individual. The treatise on which the court in Coville relied concluded that such a person “is regarded as entering voluntarily into a relation which is attended with responsibility.”31
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services marks the limit by applying the same logic to a state agency in a due process case. The agency had once taken temporary custody of a boy, Joshua, and later returned him to his father, who then harmed him. The petitioners argued that a special relationship existed because the State knew of the danger and had proclaimed, by word and by deed, its intention to protect him.32 The Supreme Court rejected the argument and held that the State had no constitutional duty to protect Joshua. The harm occurred while he was in his father’s custody, and his father was in no sense a state actor. The State had played no part in creating the danger and had done nothing to make him more vulnerable to it, and by returning him it left him no worse off than if it had never acted. A State does not become the permanent guarantor of a person’s safety by having once offered him shelter.33
Put the jailer beside the agency and the hinge is restraint. Each knew of the danger, and each may have wished to help. The jailer’s control cut off every route to help except through the jailer, while the agency’s control had ended before the harm occurred, so its knowledge and its public promise created no custodial duty. A custodial duty tracks the restraint, which also means it ends when the custody ends: once the State returned Joshua to his father, its earlier custody no longer altered the analysis.34 A stem that says only that the defendant knew of the danger or promised to help has therefore not yet described custody. The question is whether the defendant held the other person in a way that cut off that person’s normal means of self-protection.
DeShaney is a constitutional decision and supports the tort rule only by analogy. The Court itself observed that a State that voluntarily undertakes to protect a child from a danger it did not create may acquire a duty under state tort law, and it cited the undertaking rule of Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323 for that possibility.35 The absence of custody therefore closes only this door. Whether a defendant who promised or began to help owes a duty on that basis is the subject of the undertaking sections later in this chapter.
Ad Hoc and Disputed Relationships
Comment (b) to Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314A says that the listed relations “are not intended to be exclusive,” and that the law “appears, however, to be working slowly toward a recognition of the duty to aid or protect in any relation of dependence or of mutual dependence.”37 The comment invites an argument that a relationship outside the list should carry a duty, and its word “slowly” counsels caution. The carrier, innkeeper, and custodian cases involve relationships that existed before the emergency and put the defendant in control of the victim’s safety. This section asks what courts do when a claimed relationship lacks one of those features. Many courts hesitate, a few find a duty on facts that show a closer dependence, and the results can be predicted from the kind of dependence the plaintiff can prove.
The hesitation has a structural explanation. Each recognized relationship pairs a prior connection with control: a carrier controls the vehicle, an innkeeper the premises, a custodian the person held. That pairing meets the objections to a duty to rescue, because the defendant accepted the relationship and the group who owe the duty is small and identifiable. A relationship that begins only when someone witnesses an emergency has neither feature. The witness had no earlier connection to the person in peril and no control over that person or the place of the peril. Recognizing such a relationship would also swallow the no-duty rule, because every bystander who realizes that help is needed is by definition a witness.
Proximity alone fails for the same reason. A duty founded on neighborliness would create potentially intrusive relationships between abutters who may want only to be left alone.38 Cilley v. Lane, Fiala v. Rains, and Carter v. Abbyad are among the decisions in which courts have been cautious about treating ad hoc relationships as triggers of duty. In Cilley, the court declined to recognize a “witness to an emergency” relationship, because no such relationship existed beforehand and the witness had no control over the person in peril or the premises where the peril arose.
The caution reaches defendants who did more than watch. In Beers v. Corporation of President of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, Heidi was hurt jumping from a bridge a mile from a church campout. The court found that the church’s only affirmative acts were an open invitation to attend, the planning of two meals, and a devotional, and that these did not amount to assuming a duty to supervise her at the bridge on which she could reasonably rely.39 An invitation brings a person into the defendant’s activities, but it does not put the person in the defendant’s charge. The court also framed the question as whether the church had assumed a duty on which Heidi could rely, which is the undertaking inquiry taken up later in this chapter.
Courts that do find a duty point to a closer dependence. At least one court has imposed duties on persons engaged in a joint venture to assist each other, based on their relationship, and Farwell v. Keaton, a Michigan decision, is the example.40 The reasoning tracks the comment’s phrase about mutual dependence. People who set out together each rely on the other for help if something goes wrong, and that reliance forms before the emergency, between the very parties to the lawsuit. The defendant is no stranger drafted by circumstance, because the defendant joined the venture, and those who owe the duty are just the participants. The same rationale would support a duty to assist the other venturer, though perhaps not a duty to act to protect an outsider who is later injured.41
Podias v. Mairs finds a duty on a different foundation. An intoxicated teenage driver struck a motorcyclist, Podias, at night, and two other teenagers in the car left him helpless in the road and made numerous cell phone calls, none to summon help; he died when another car ran over him. The trial court granted summary judgment for the passengers on the ground that they owed no duty, and the appeals court reversed, resting mainly on a theory of concert of action. In its view the passengers had acquiesced in the conditions that helped create the initial risk and in the conditions that then further endangered the victim, so they were more than innocent bystanders and bore some relationship not only to the primary wrongdoer but to the incident itself. The court disclaimed any rule of general application, and it stressed that the passengers had both the opportunity and the ability to help prevent an obviously foreseeable risk of severe and potentially fatal consequences.
The two decisions find a duty for different reasons. Farwell looks to the relationship between plaintiff and defendant and finds a mutual undertaking. Podias involved no relationship between the passengers and the victim, a stranger on the road, so it looks instead to the passengers’ closeness to the wrongdoer and the incident and to their ability to help. A reading that preserves the no-duty rule treats such defendants as more than passive bystanders, as participants in the events that created and then worsened the peril. That reading explains why cautious courts do not take either case as a general invitation: a defendant who only watched, with no prior tie to the victim and no part in the events, stays where § 314 leaves every bystander.
A city’s 911 service shows how far these categories blur. A city whose dispatcher handles an emergency call may be regarded as acting affirmatively, as undertaking a duty that no statute imposes, or as entering a special relationship with the victim, and on any of those grounds it may be held responsible for negligence even though no statute by its terms creates a special duty to that victim.42 Special relationship is thus one of several overlapping routes. Two of the others, affirmative conduct and the assumption of a duty, are the undertaking doctrines developed in later sections, and a careful exam answer argues them in the alternative.
Singh’s freedom from liability follows the principle that a stranger’s medical training makes the stranger a competent rescuer without imposing a duty to aid.43 An exam stem that places a skilled bystander and a companion at the same scene is therefore sorting them by relationship to the victim, and skill and awareness are the same for both. Because courts decide these claims by asking what kind of connection the parties had, the analysis runs best in sequence.
On a fact pattern, begin from the cautious position, because courts have been slow to add relationships to the § 314A list. Then argue the closer cases where the facts supply a prior mutual undertaking or the defendant’s involvement in the incident.