Concept
Duty From the Actor's Own Conduct
Failure to act: no duty to rescue, special relationships, and undertakings
Duty From the Actor's Own Conduct
The no-duty rule shelters the bystander, and it stops sheltering the person whose own conduct left the victim helpless. Under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 322, an actor who knows or has reason to know that his conduct, whether tortious or innocent, has caused bodily harm that leaves another helpless and in danger of further harm must use reasonable care to prevent that further harm.1 What the rule adds is the actor's causal role in the victim's helplessness. Bare awareness that someone needs help is nonfeasance, and liability for mere nonfeasance ordinarily is not imposed.2
The common law already separates the defendant who merely fails to rescue from the defendant who negligently placed the plaintiff in danger to begin with, and the second may be liable for negligently failing to rescue.3 Section 322 carries that reasoning to the actor who caused the harm without negligence. Even if Freud was not negligent, his risk-creating conduct for his own purposes placed Adler in a position of danger, and requiring Freud to go to Adler's aid 'is simply requiring [a person] to minimize the consequences of risks which society gives him a privilege to create.'4
Take Freud, driving without negligence, who hits Adler, a pedestrian, and knocks him into the street. Section 322 requires Freud to take reasonable steps to protect Adler from further injury.5 A second motorist who passes, sees Adler lying in the road, and drives on has broken no duty, because a mere failure to rescue ordinarily brings no liability.6 Both drivers saw Adler, and both could have helped. Only one of them injured him, and that fact alone turns a stranger into someone bound to act.
Fault in the original event is not the test. A separate duty to render aid exists whether the original misconduct was intentional or innocent, and whether or not it was the legal cause of any further harm.7 In Maldonado v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., the court reached that conclusion by working from the comments to § 322.8 The breadth of the rule is a development. The First Restatement limited the duty to persons 'made helpless by tortious conduct,' while the Second and Third Restatements both treat innocently placing another in peril as giving rise to a duty of care.9 The commentary offers several possible explanations for the change, among them the growing number of automobile accidents and a shift from fault toward risk creation and cost avoidance as the bases of liability.10
The duty is one of reasonable care to prevent 'further harm,' which the comments read broadly. It includes new harm arising from the dangerous position in which the actor's conduct left the victim, any increase in the original harm that results from the failure to give assistance, and any protraction of the harm that prompt attention would have prevented.11 Courts have framed the duty in terms of control. One opinion concluded that 'an affirmative duty arises to render reasonable aid and assistance to one who is helpless and in a situation of peril, when the injury resulted from use of an instrumentality under the control of the defendant.'12 The standard stays reasonable care. The actor must do what a reasonable person would do to summon help or protect the victim, and he does not guarantee that the victim recovers.
The victim's own carelessness does not excuse a failure to aid. The comments say it is immaterial that the accident was caused by the injured person's contributory negligence as well as by the actor's misconduct, even though that negligence may leave the victim unable to recover for the original injury.13 The duty answers a separate failure that comes after the first harm, and fault in causing the first harm does not touch it.
The rule builds a knowledge requirement into its text. The duty arises only when the actor knows or has reason to know that his conduct has caused harm leaving another helpless and in danger of further harm.14 A driver who feels the impact and watches a figure crumple in the mirror has reason to know. A driver with nothing to suggest that anyone was hurt has not received the notice the rule requires.
Section 321 supplies a companion duty one step earlier in time. An actor who does an act and later realizes or should realize that it has created an unreasonable risk of physical harm to another must use reasonable care to prevent the risk from taking effect.15 In Montgomery v. National Convoy & Trucking Co., the stalled trucks were not the result of any negligence by the defendants, but a hill hid them from approaching drivers until it was too late. The defendants were held liable for the plaintiff's collision with one of the trucks because they negligently failed to warn approaching drivers of the danger.16 The two sections divide by timing. Section 321 asks the actor to head off a risk before anyone is hurt, and § 322 applies once the actor's conduct has already injured someone who cannot help himself.
Affirmative conduct can ground a duty outside the car-crash setting as well. A city whose 911 dispatcher may be regarded as acting affirmatively, as undertaking a duty the statute does not impose, or as entering into a special relationship with the victim may be held responsible for negligence on any of those grounds, even though no statute by its terms imposes a special duty to that victim.17 The undertaking and special-relationship theories belong to the sections that follow, and what they share with § 322 is the defendant's own act.
Exam stems often say that the defendant 'did nothing' after an accident. That stem is a § 322 problem whenever the defendant's own conduct, or an instrumentality under the defendant's control, caused the injury. Fault in the original event matters to the claim for the original harm, and it does not decide whether a duty to aid exists. What decides it is whether the defendant knew or had reason to know that the victim was helpless and in danger of more harm.