Concept
Undertaking to Aid Another
Failure to act: no duty to rescue, special relationships, and undertakings
Undertaking to Aid Another
A person who has no duty to help can acquire one by starting to help. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323 states the rule: one who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to another that he should recognize as necessary for the protection of the other’s person or things is liable for physical harm resulting from his failure to use reasonable care in performing the undertaking, if one of two further conditions is met.1 The phrase “gratuitously or for consideration” treats the volunteer and the paid helper alike, so the absence of a fee gives no shelter. Earlier exceptions found the missing ground for a duty in a special relationship or in the defendant’s own harmful conduct; this one finds it in the defendant’s decision to begin.
The rule looks perverse at first, because a would-be helper who does nothing owes nothing while one who tries and fumbles owes damages. The rationale answers the objection. A person who attempts a rescue has given up the right to be left alone and may have kept others from stepping in, so requiring that person to rescue carefully, if he rescues at all, costs him little liberty.2 The decision to begin remains his own; § 323 governs only how he performs once he has begun.
Two conditions keep the duty narrow. The plaintiff must show either that the failure to use reasonable care increased the risk of the harm, or that the harm was suffered because the plaintiff relied on the undertaking.3 Those limits keep a casual offer of help from becoming a tort by itself. Liability attaches only when the volunteer’s carelessness made the plaintiff’s position worse or when the plaintiff changed course in reliance on the promise. This section defines an undertaking first, then takes up each condition.
What Counts as an Undertaking
An undertaking is a commitment to act, and a defendant can make one in words or in conduct. Marsalis v. LaSalle shows the first. A customer was bitten or scratched by a cat in the defendant’s store and asked him to keep the cat confined and under observation until it could be determined whether the animal had rabies. He agreed, took no special precautions, and the cat escaped. The customer then took rabies shots and suffered a severe reaction that proper confinement would have spared her.4 The court reasoned that the defendant perhaps owed her nothing at the outset, but once he agreed to restrain the cat and keep it under observation he was bound to use reasonable care in doing so.5 It stated the principle broadly: one who voluntarily undertakes to care for or assist an ill, injured, or helpless person must use reasonable care and prudence in what he does.6
Conduct that shows commitment can carry the same message as words. A city that always provides crossing guards for children walking to school has undertaken to continue that protection until it gives notice to the contrary, and a public entity that runs a 911 service undertakes to use reasonable care in operating it, at least when assurances are given to a specific victim who is in significant contact with the system.7 A city whose dispatcher acts affirmatively, undertakes a duty no statute imposes, or enters into a special relationship with the victim may be held responsible for negligence even though no statute creates a special duty to that victim.8 In Indian Towing v. United States, the Coast Guard negligently allowed a lighthouse light to go out and a barge ran aground; the Supreme Court allowed the claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act, observing that one who undertakes to warn the public of danger and thereby induces reliance must perform that good Samaritan task carefully.9 Private defendants undertake by conduct too. A landlord who agrees to repair a tenant’s defective lock, or who voluntarily makes repairs negligently, may owe reasonable care for that reason, and so may a landlord who undertakes to provide security, whether gratuitously or by contract.10 In each example the defendant’s conduct, and not any spoken promise, told the plaintiff that protection was being supplied.
The rule reaches the unpaid helper because help that is promised and then botched endangers the plaintiff whether or not anyone paid for it. A neighbor who promises a ride to a medical appointment strands the passenger as completely as a paid driver would. Judge Cardozo recalled in Moch the old learning that “one who assumes to act, even though gratuitously, may thereby become subject to the duty of acting carefully, if he acts at all.” The hand once set to a task, he added, may not always be withdrawn with impunity, though liability would fail if the hand had never been applied at all.11 Another court states the same point more simply: one who gratuitously undertakes a service he has no duty to perform must act with reasonable care in completing the task assumed.12 Prosser and Keeton acknowledge a trend toward extending liability where a person by his or her conduct assumes a duty to protect another.13
Three boundaries limit the duty: it runs to the person helped, it extends only as far as the task undertaken, and it covers only physical harm.
The duty runs to the person helped. Section 323 makes the volunteer liable “to the other,” the person for whom the services were undertaken. That tracks a rule courts developed early in the history of negligence: no action could be founded on the breach of a duty owed to someone other than the plaintiff.14 Cardozo applied the same caution in Moch. A coal dealer who undertakes to supply fuel to a shop, he reasoned, would otherwise answer to the shop’s customers when fuel ran short, and liability would be “unduly and indeed indefinitely extended.”15 A later section asks when an undertaking to one person can reach another.
The duty also extends only as far as the task undertaken, so the first step in an undertaking problem is to identify what the defendant committed to. In Beers, a church extended an open invitation to a campout and planned two meals and a devotional, and a thirteen-year-old attendee was badly hurt when she jumped from a bridge a mile away at an uninspected spot. The Idaho court held that those acts did not amount to assuming a duty to supervise her jumping, so no duty arose.16 Marsalis sits on the other side of the line. The defendant had agreed to confine and observe the cat, and the harm came from his failure to do that very thing; yet the court recognized that the plaintiff could not recover for the original bite or scratch, which preceded his promise.17
Section 323 reaches only physical harm. Its closing words make the defendant liable for “physical harm resulting from” the failure to use reasonable care, and the services must be ones the defendant should recognize as necessary to protect the other’s person or things.18 A favor carelessly performed that costs only money therefore falls outside the section.
An exam stem that describes a promise, a program, or a pattern of conduct thus raises two questions in order: what did the defendant commit to, and does the plaintiff’s injury come within that commitment? Once both answers are yes, the plaintiff must still satisfy one of the two conditions, beginning with increased risk.
Increased Risk
The first condition, § 323(a), requires that the volunteer’s failure to use reasonable care increased the risk of the harm.20 A plaintiff who shows only a promise and a poor performance has proved an undertaking and a breach, but not yet that the performance left him worse off. The condition corresponds to the first of the grounds on which courts usually justify liability in undertaking cases: the defendant increased the danger. The other two grounds, that the defendant misled the plaintiff into a false sense of security or deprived him of help from other sources, belong to the reliance condition.21
Everything turns on the baseline. Courts that follow the Restatement compare the plaintiff’s risk with a world in which the defendant never undertook anything, not with a world in which the defendant performed carefully.22 The second comparison would erase the condition, because a defendant who fails always leaves the plaintiff more exposed than a defendant who succeeds would have. The first asks the question that separates misfeasance from nonfeasance: did the defendant make matters worse than they would have been had the defendant stayed out? Students most often go wrong by setting the plaintiff’s actual position beside the position good performance would have produced and reading the gap as increased risk.
A promise to repair a malfunctioning traffic signal shows the baseline at work. A defendant who promises the city to fix the signal and never acts has left the intersection exactly as dangerous as before, so drivers who collide there have no claim on the undertaking unless the defendant committed some negligent affirmative act or another condition is met.23 The promise may have changed what others expected, but a change in expectations belongs to the reliance condition. A plaintiff whose only complaint is that promised help never came, and who was no worse off for the promise itself, therefore needs reliance.
Increased risk can come from an act or from words. An undertaking that actively creates a risk is itself an affirmative act of negligence and supports liability.24 Words can do the same work. Suppose one of two day-care workers tells the other that he will take a comatose child to the emergency room, and then does not. The assurance created the risk that the other worker would stand down, and the child, being comatose, relied on nothing; yet the risk to her increased because of the undertaking and its nonperformance.25 That is why increased risk is a separate path from reliance. It reaches infants and unconscious persons, who could never have known of the undertaking, let alone relied on it.
The condition also limits liability to harms that result from the risk the undertaking was meant to protect against.26 In a New Jersey case, a band had contracted to play at the defendant’s place of business, where the defendant had also agreed to provide helpers to unload the band’s equipment. The defendant supplied no helpers, so the plaintiff loaded the equipment himself, slipped, and was injured.27 The missing helpers were a cause in fact of the injury, because without that breach the plaintiff would not have been carrying the equipment. But the undertaking concerned moving equipment, not avoiding falls, so liability grounded on it was inappropriate. Without this limit, but-for causation would suffice, and a promisor would answer for every harm that followed a broken promise, whatever the promise was for.
Reliance on the Undertaking
The second condition, § 323(b), makes the volunteer liable if “the harm is suffered because of the other’s reliance upon the undertaking.”29 The increased-risk clause asks what the defendant’s carelessness did to the plaintiff’s situation; this clause asks what the plaintiff did because of the defendant’s promise or practice. The word “because” makes reliance causal. It is not enough that the plaintiff trusted the defendant or felt reassured: the trust must have changed the plaintiff’s conduct, and the changed conduct must have led to the injury. The clause matters most to the plaintiff whom the baseline leaves without a claim, the one whose helper promised and never acted. That helper made things no more dangerous than silence would have, yet the plaintiff may be worse off than silence would have left him, because the promise displaced protection he would otherwise have arranged.
Reliance has three parts, and the plaintiff must be able to point to each. He must have known of the undertaking, since no one can count on a promise or practice that never reached him. He must have had a genuine choice whether to arrange other protection. And he must have given that protection up, or never sought it, because the undertaking seemed to cover the need.30 A school crossing guard provided every morning shows all three. When a child is struck in a crosswalk that has always been guarded and is unguarded that day, parents who knew a guard was regularly provided, and who would have taken the child to school themselves had they known the guard would be withdrawn, have shown reliance and may recover for the negligent failure to provide the guard, as in Florence v. Goldberg.31
Reliance in fact is the link between the undertaking and the injury. It shows that the defendant’s failure was a factual cause of the harm, since the plaintiff acted differently than he would have without the undertaking. A plaintiff who would have been exactly as exposed with or without the promise cannot say the promise caused anything; he stands where every bystander stands under the no-duty rule. Reliance is therefore an independent route and not a variation on increased risk. The comatose child recovers without relying on anyone because the assurance raised the risk, while a plaintiff who did rely may recover even though the defendant’s lapse added no danger of its own. Unless the parties stand in a categorical relationship such as carrier and passenger, where the duty exists without it, the plaintiff must show reliance in fact.32
Marsalis shows the clause working on a private promise. The customer who asked that the cat be confined and observed knew of the promise because she had requested it. The court acknowledged that she might have had some other way to have the cat confined and examined, but found that she “unquestionably and in good faith relied upon defendant to carry out the agreement which he voluntarily made, thus foregoing such other possible available protection.”33 Knowledge, a choice among alternatives, and a decision to give them up are all present. The court also quoted an earlier Restatement formulation, which spoke of leading the other “in reasonable reliance upon the performance of such undertaking.”34
The failing cases show what happens when one part of reliance is missing. A plaintiff who saw the hazard did not rely on anyone to remove it. In Zima v. North Colonie Central School District, a plaintiff who saw ice could not have relied on the defendant’s clearing or sanding it, and in Wiseman v. Hallahan, a plaintiff who fell on ice on a public walk at the defendant’s building had not relied on the defendant’s custom of clearing it and could not recover for the lapse that day.35 A practice also reaches only as far as the practice itself. In Paulson v. Andicoechea the defendant had customarily cleared snow but had not done so after the last snowfall, and the court held that his past conduct showed an undertaking only for the days he actually cleared.36 The first two cases fail on knowledge and choice; Paulson fails on the scope of the undertaking.
Public undertakings test the requirement hardest, because a government that runs an emergency service deals with thousands of callers it has never met. In a New York case, Amalia DeLong dialed 911 and was told, “Okay, right away.” The complaint writer who took the 14-second call recorded her address as 219 Victoria instead of 319 Victoria; when the dispatcher found no such address, no one followed up, the call was treated as a fake, and she was fatally stabbed.37 The duty arose from three facts taken together: the city’s holding out of the 911 number as one to call in need of help, her placing the call in reliance on that holding out, and her further reliance on the assurance of an immediate response. Establishing the system alone would not have created it.38 In Riss v. City of New York, by contrast, the court found no legal responsibility for the city’s failure to furnish police protection despite Linda Riss’s repeated pleas. The DeLong court left that holding intact while distinguishing situations in which authorities undertake responsibilities to particular members of the public.39
The 911 case also confirms that reliance can carry a claim the increased-risk clause would defeat. The defendants argued that failing to fulfill an undertaking to provide police protection creates liability only if the police conduct increased the risk. The court disagreed. It had no direct evidence of reliance but found strong circumstantial evidence: instead of summoning help from the village police or from her neighbors, one of whom was a police captain, she waited for the response to her call, and instead of leaving by the front door with her baby, where she would have been safe, she stayed in the house.40 Reliance in fact, then, may be proved by what the plaintiff did not do after hearing the assurance.
Courts differ on how much a caller must show. The common formulation is that a public entity providing 911 service undertakes to use reasonable care in operating it, at least when assurances are given to a specific victim who is in significant contact with the system.41 The approaches diverge from there:
- Washington requires more. In Cummins v. Lewis County the court found no special relationship where the caller did not identify himself, received no assurance of help, and engaged in no dialogue with the operator.42
- Arizona reasons more broadly. In Hutcherson v. City of Phoenix the court held that by creating a 911 system the city accepted an obligation to act reasonably in handling emergency calls.43
- Maryland, in Muthukumarana v. Montgomery County, found no special relationship unless the operator’s response went beyond what is generally made to other members of the public.
- New York applies the reliance requirement stringently against public entities and requires direct contact, and some states displace tort liability altogether with statutory immunity.44
A public warning service works the same way. In Indian Towing, those who plan around a warning that has always been supplied depend on it, and the careless failure of the warning exposes them to the harm they would otherwise have guarded against.45 The reasoning resembles the crossing guard’s.
Under § 323(b) the person who relied and the person harmed are the same. A later section takes up undertakings that benefit third persons, where they may differ.