Concept
Taking Charge of a Helpless Person
Failure to act: no duty to rescue, special relationships, and undertakings
Taking Charge of a Helpless Person
Section 324 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts turns a bystander into a defendant at one precise moment: when he takes charge of someone who cannot protect himself. The section reaches one who, being under no duty to do so, takes charge of another who is helpless adequately to aid or protect himself, and it makes that actor liable for bodily harm caused in either of two ways.1 The first is a failure to use reasonable care to secure the other's safety while the other is within his charge. The second is his discontinuing aid or protection, if doing so leaves the other in a worse position than when he took charge.2
Nothing short of taking charge creates the duty. Realizing, or having reason to realize, that one's action is necessary for another's aid or protection does not of itself impose a duty to take that action.3 Section 324 therefore opens with the words "being under no duty to do so," which mark it as a rule about volunteers. A defendant already bound by a pre-existing relationship answers under the relationship rules covered earlier, while the actor in § 324 owes nothing until he steps in.
Section 324 sits beside the undertaking rule of § 323, and the two sections ask for different facts. Section 323 limits a volunteer's liability to two situations: the failure to use care increased the risk of harm, or the plaintiff suffered harm because he relied on the undertaking.4 Section 324 asks instead whether the other person was helpless and whether the actor took charge. Its text makes neither increased risk nor reliance a condition of liability, so helplessness and charge do the limiting work that those two conditions do in § 323.
The usual explanation for the duty looks at what the rescuer's intervention does. A volunteer who renders assistance is still a risk creator, and he presumably should not be licensed to mishandle the victim with impunity.5 Taking charge of a helpless person also resembles taking custody of another under circumstances that deprive him of his normal opportunities for protection, and the law imposes a similar duty on one who voluntarily takes such custody.6
Courts keep the duty narrow for a reason. In a case about whether neighbors owed one another a duty to protect, a court observed that such a duty might marginally reduce injuries but would create potentially intrusive relationships among people who may want only to be left alone, with the busybody next door arriving weekly with a list of hazards to abate.7 That worry shows why § 324 waits for an act of taking charge and does not attach to mere proximity or awareness.
The routes to liability overlap, so a fact pattern rarely fits only one of them. A city whose 911 dispatcher takes a call may be regarded as acting affirmatively, as undertaking a duty the statute does not impose, or as entering into a special relationship with the victim, and on any of those grounds may be held responsible for negligence.8 Jurisdictions that have not adopted § 324 can reach similar results through the general principle that one who gratuitously undertakes an act is liable for performing it negligently, as a court applying Connecticut law observed.9 When a stem involves a volunteer, check § 324 first and the neighboring rules second.
The two clauses of § 324 govern different moments. Clause (a) tests how the rescuer treats the victim while the victim is in his charge. Clause (b) tests what the rescuer's departure does to the victim's position.
Care While in Charge
Clause (a) rests on three facts, and each does separate work. The absence of any pre-existing duty places the actor among the volunteers. Taking charge marks the moment a bystander becomes a rescuer. Helplessness identifies the plaintiff whose condition makes the rescuer's care matter. When all three are present, the law asks of the actor what it asks of anyone whose conduct can hurt another, which is reasonable care.10
The duty is ordinary reasonable care for as long as the helpless person remains within the actor's charge. A bystander who drags an injured driver from a wrecked car in a way that any reasonable person would see risks worsening the injuries has breached it, though had he walked on he would have owed nothing under § 314. The rescuer's liability also has a limit built into the text. It covers bodily harm caused by his failure to use care, so injuries the collision inflicted before he arrived are not his, and a rescuer who acts reasonably does not insure the victim's recovery.
Because the duty depends on the plaintiff's condition, helplessness is the element most likely to decide a case. The Second Restatement asks whether the person is helpless adequately to aid or protect himself, which turns on capacity and not on how the person came to be impaired. The Third Restatement's § 44 states the same duty and adds an express requirement of peril: the actor must take charge of another who reasonably appears to be imperiled and also helpless or unable to protect himself or herself.11 The added word ties incapacity to a danger the person cannot meet, and it judges the rescuer by how the person reasonably appeared at the time.
The inquiry is context-specific. A person who is drunk in a chair at home may be neither imperiled nor helpless, while the same person behind the wheel of a car would be both.12 The chair presents no danger that sober judgment is needed to avoid, whereas the driver's seat presents many. Where a complaint alleges enough facts to raise a factual issue about whether the defendant owed a duty under the circumstances, a court will not, as a matter of law, preclude the application of § 44.13
Taking charge is narrower than it first sounds. The rule requires that the rescuer take charge of the helpless person with the intent of providing assistance in confronting the then-existing peril.14 Being nearby, keeping someone company, or even knowing that the person is drunk does not meet that description, because none of those is an assumption of responsibility for the person's safety, and § 314 already treats awareness alone as insufficient.15
In Boxer v. Shaw, the court found on the undisputed evidence that Boxer was not "helpless." His car was being repaired, but that fact did not make him helpless, and his blood alcohol level was below the legal limit. Family testimony showed that he was in the midst of a nasty divorce and very upset, but a person who is distraught about a situation is not "helpless" without additional evidence of actual impairment.16 Emotional upset and a lack of transportation are circumstances, and the element requires a person who cannot meet the danger in front of him.
A stem that says only that the defendant was with the plaintiff, drove the plaintiff, or knew the plaintiff was drunk has not supplied the facts § 324(a) needs. Look for an impaired or injured person who could not meet the danger in front of him and a defendant who stepped in to deal with that danger. The duty described here lasts only while the person remains in the defendant's charge. What a rescuer owes when he lets go of that charge is the subject of clause (b).
Discontinuing Aid
Clause (b) of § 324 governs the rescuer who lets go. It makes a person who took charge of a helpless victim liable for bodily harm caused by "the actor's discontinuing his aid or protection, if by so doing he leaves the other in a worse position than when the actor took charge of him."18 The clause asks one comparative question: is the victim's position after the rescuer leaves worse than it was when the rescuer took charge? It does not ask whether the rescuer could have done more, whether his training made him unusually able to help, or whether the victim still needs help. A victim left exactly as he was found has no claim under this clause.
The comparison follows from the no-duty rule. A stranger who never stops owes the victim nothing, so a rescuer who helps for a while and leaves has done no worse than a bystander could have. The alternative would be a duty to keep aiding the victim for an uncertain period. The intrusiveness that worried the court in the neighbor case would be far greater if starting to help locked the rescuer into an open-ended relationship with the victim.19 A duty without an end point would also teach bystanders that the safest course is never to begin. Clause (b) therefore lets the rescuer stop and reaches him only when his stopping has made the victim's situation worse.
The two drivers did the same thing in one respect: each helped and then drove away. The legal difference lies in what the departure did to the victim's position. Arguments that the first driver, if he was a physician, should have done more would read the worse-position condition out of the clause, because every departure by a capable rescuer would then go to a jury on whether he could have helped further. A plaintiff may also argue that a rescuer's presence caused other passersby to move on. That argument fits clause (b) only if the victim's chance of aid really fell after the rescuer took charge, and the plaintiff must prove that fall.
The Third Restatement keeps this limit and adds a second one. Under § 44(b), a rescuer who discontinues aid must use reasonable care to refrain from putting the other in a worse position than existed before he took charge. If the other reasonably appears to be in imminent peril of serious physical harm at the time of termination, the rescuer must "exercise reasonable care with regard to the peril before terminating the rescue."20 The added clause reaches a victim whose peril was already present and has not changed, who is no worse off than before and so has no claim under the Second Restatement. The moment of departure is also the point at which a modest step, such as a call or a handoff to someone else, costs the rescuer little and may matter greatly to the victim. The clause asks only for reasonable care regarding the peril before the rescue ends, so it does not require the rescuer to stay until the victim is safe.
To analyze a stem in which a helper stops, first fix the victim's position at the moment the helper took charge. Then ask what the departure did to that position. If the position is unchanged, the Second Restatement imposes no liability for the departure, however much more the helper could have done and however skilled the helper was. Where the jurisdiction follows the Third Restatement, add the imminent-peril question. The usual exam error is to treat the departure itself as the breach, or to argue that a skilled rescuer was unreasonable not to do more, when the clause asks only whether leaving made the victim's position worse.