Concept
Good Samaritan Statutes
Failure to act: no duty to rescue, special relationships, and undertakings
Good Samaritan Statutes
A bystander who ignores an injured stranger owes nothing, because realizing that action is needed does not by itself create a duty to act.1 A bystander who stops to help stands differently. Section 323 makes the helper liable for failing to use reasonable care in performing an undertaking, if the carelessness increased the risk or the victim relied on the undertaking. Section 324 makes one who takes charge of a helpless person liable for failing to use reasonable care while in charge, or for dropping the aid and leaving the person worse off than before.2 These rules fit ordinary negligence principles, yet they are said to stifle charitable impulses and deter would-be rescuers. Many states answered with Good Samaritan acts that relieve physicians, and certain others, of liability for negligence when they give emergency medical aid.3 This section covers what those statutes protect, what they leave out, and how they differ from statutes that impose a duty to help.
Immunity for Emergency Helpers
The statutes leave the no-duty rule in place and change the payoff for the person who chooses to help. Without one, a bystander faces an uneven choice: doing nothing carries no liability, while acting invites a claim under § 323 or § 324 if the help goes badly. A statute removes that risk for negligence when the aid is emergency aid.4 Immunity pitched at ordinary negligence fits the problem, because the mistake a volunteer is most likely to make, working fast and without equipment over a stranger, is a lapse of ordinary care. A rule that forgave only conduct a court later found reasonable would add nothing to the protection the common law already gives.
Coverage is the first thing to check. The statutes the source describes protect physicians and certain others, not every passerby, so the class a statute names decides who may invoke it.5 Two people who stop at the same wreck and make the same mistake can therefore end up on opposite sides of the immunity.
A description of a good-faith helper therefore does not finish the analysis. The stem must also say who the helper is and whom the statute covers.
What the Immunity Leaves Out
The immunity has two boundaries, and each has its own rationale. The first is the degree of fault. A shield against liability for negligence does not cover conduct worse than negligence, and statutes of this type are commonly drafted to leave gross negligence and recklessness outside the protection, so the text of the controlling statute decides the point. The reason is the statutes' purpose, which is to remove the fear of being sued over an honest mistake made while helping. Conscious disregard of a known danger is no honest mistake, and nobody has reason to encourage it.
The second boundary concerns defendants who already owe a duty to help. The statutes are justified by the need to encourage would-be rescuers who owe the victim nothing, and that reasoning has little force for someone who is already bound to act. The point is an inference from the statutes' purpose, and the wording of the particular statute controls. A court reasoning from that purpose would most plausibly decline to treat a statute as a shield for a defendant who was performing an existing duty.
The clearest source of an existing duty is the defendant's own conduct. An actor who knows or has reason to know that his conduct, whether tortious or innocent, has left another helpless and in danger of further harm must use reasonable care to prevent that further harm.7 The duty is one of reasonable care, not a guarantee of rescue, in keeping with the law's usual reluctance to demand absolute protection.8
The same inquiry reaches other sources of duty. A carrier's crew attending a collapsed passenger, or a jailer attending a prisoner, performs an obligation the relationship imposes. On the reasoning above, such a person is in the usual case not the stranger the statute was drafted to encourage, though again the statute's text controls.
Public helpers raise a related point. Apart from immunities, a public entity ordinarily has a duty to take reasonable affirmative steps to protect a plaintiff when it undertakes to provide assistance by promise or conduct that induces the plaintiff's reliance.9 A city's 911 dispatcher may likewise be treated as acting affirmatively, as undertaking a duty, or as entering a special relationship with the caller, so that the city answers for negligence even though no statute imposes a special duty to that victim.10 These defendants help because they have undertaken to, not because they are strangers with no obligation, so the volunteer rationale fits them poorly. Whether a particular immunity applies is a separate question from whether a duty exists.
On an exam, ask whether the defendant stood in a relationship to the victim, had caused the harm, or had made an undertaking before the helping started.
Bad Samaritan Statutes
A Good Samaritan statute can never supply a duty, because it only lowers the price of helping. A few states have gone further and imposed a duty to help by statute, typically requiring a person at the scene of an emergency to give reasonable aid when that can be done without danger to himself. Such statutes are the exception, and a fact pattern will say so if one applies. Absent one, § 314 governs the bystander who does nothing, and knowing that help is needed creates no duty.12
The law's reluctance to impose broad affirmative duties has a practical side. A sweeping duty would create intrusive relationships among people who want only to be left alone, and one source pictures the busybody next door arriving weekly with a list of hazards you must abate for your own good.13