Concept
Interfering With Another's Rescue
Failure to act: no duty to rescue, special relationships, and undertakings
Interfering With Another's Rescue
Two sections of the Restatement (Second) of Torts reach a defendant who stands between a victim and someone else's help. Section 326 makes one who intentionally prevents a third person from giving another aid necessary to prevent physical harm liable for the physical harm caused by the absence of the aid the third person was prevented from giving.1 Section 327 reaches one who knows or has reason to know that a third person is giving or is ready to give such aid and who negligently prevents or disables that person from giving it; the liability is for the same harm.2
Neither section asks whether the defendant owed the victim a duty to rescue. The defendant may have been a stranger with no obligation to act, and the sections still apply, because liability rests on what the defendant did to the helper and not on what the defendant failed to do for the victim. A bystander who only watches leaves the victim where the emergency left him. A defendant who blocks or disables a helper takes away aid that someone else stood ready to give.
The sections divide on the defendant's state of mind. Section 326 requires that the interference be intentional. Section 327 requires negligent interference, but only from a defendant who knew or had reason to know that aid was being given or was about to be given. The intentional rule comes first.
Intentional Interference
Section 326 has four working parts. The defendant must act intentionally; the act must prevent a third person from giving aid; the aid must be necessary to prevent physical harm; and the defendant answers for the physical harm that the missing aid would have averted.3 Nothing in the text requires that the defendant owe the victim a duty to rescue, stand in any relationship to the victim, or have caused the emergency. The defendant could have remained a bystander with no obligation to act, and the choice to obstruct someone else's rescue is the added fact that creates liability.
The intent requirement attaches to the prevention. The question is whether the defendant meant to stop the third person from giving aid; the text does not ask whether the defendant wished the victim harm. Interference that is merely careless belongs to § 327, taken up next.
The last clause limits what the defendant owes. Because the defendant answers only for physical harm caused by the absence of the aid that was prevented, the plaintiff must connect the harm to the missing help. A blocked call that would have brought paramedics in time to stop a condition from worsening makes the defendant answerable for the worsening. Harm that no timely aid could have averted was not caused by the absence of aid, and a defendant who did not cause the original injury does not answer for it.
Halloran and Brandt saw the same worker, knew the same facts, and did equally little to help, so awareness and inaction cannot be what separates them. What separates them is what each did to the help that was available: Halloran destroyed it, and Brandt left it alone. Section 326 reaches the defendant who acts on the helper, not the one who merely fails to join in.
Negligent Interference
Section 327 is § 326's careless counterpart. The defendant need not have meant to stop the helper, but the text adds a condition that § 326 does not need: the defendant must know or have reason to know that a third person is giving, or is ready to give, aid necessary to prevent physical harm.5 Without that knowledge, the defendant has no reason to connect careless conduct with a rescue. With it, ordinary negligence in preventing or disabling the helper is enough, and the defendant answers for the physical harm caused by the absence of the aid that was prevented. As under § 326, the defendant may owe the victim no duty to rescue.
In Soldano v. O'Daniels, a patron from Happy Jack's tried to get the police called for an endangered person, and the bartender prevented him from using the bartender's own phone.6 The court rebuffed the defendant's argument that it owed the plaintiff no duty to aid or assist. It agreed with Prosser that the common-law rule denying a duty to rescue violates “common decency” and is “revolting to any moral sense,” yet it did not impose a duty to rescue. It held that the defendant, while not required to rescue, was required “to permit the patron from Happy Jack's to place a call to the police or to place the call himself.”7 Read against the text of § 327, the patron's request told the bartender that a call for aid was ready to be made, and the refusal to permit the call is the prevention.
The holding is contested. Eric J. v. Betty M., 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d 549, 560 (Ct. App. 1999), criticized Soldano for not distinguishing between “[i]nterference and refusal to allow one's property to be commandeered, even for a good purpose.”8 The critique draws its line between acting on the helper and declining to supply a resource. A defendant who smashes a helper's phone has removed something the helper already had. A defendant who declines to lend his own phone has withheld something the helper never held, which resembles the bystander's refusal to join in. The commentary adds two questions: whether it should matter that the bartender prevented the patron only from using the bartender's own phone and did not block anyone else's, and whether Soldano should instead be governed by the doctrine of private necessity, as in Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation Co.9
Both groundskeepers were careless, and neither owed the climber a duty to rescue, so neither fact separates them. Knowledge does: Odell cut off a rescue that Odell knew was in progress, and Wren could not have recognized that aid was within reach.
A stem in which the defendant seizes, blocks, or destroys the helper's means of giving aid fits the section directly, and liability follows once knowledge and negligence are shown. A stem in which the defendant merely declines to lend his own phone or other property calls for both positions. Soldano required the defendant to permit a call, and Eric J. criticized that result for blurring interference with a refusal to allow one's property to be commandeered. Do not present Soldano as the settled view of every court.
Emergency-call cases run on different theories and should not be filed under these sections. A city may answer in negligence for its 911 dispatcher's handling of a call because the dispatcher may be regarded as acting affirmatively,10 as undertaking a duty not imposed by statute,11 or as entering into a special relationship with the victim,12 even though no statute by its terms imposes a special duty to that victim. Each of those theories looks to the city's own relationship with the victim. Sections 326 and 327 look instead to what the defendant did to someone else's help.