Concept
Warning of Known Dangers
Duty of suppliers of chattels to third persons
Warning of Known Dangers
A person who hands over a chattel, meaning any item of movable personal property, while knowing that it hides a danger the recipient cannot see usually has a cheap way to prevent the harm: say so. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 388 turns that opportunity into a duty. A supplier who furnishes a chattel for another’s use, directly or through a third person, is liable for physical harm to those the supplier should expect to use it with the consent of the other or to be endangered by its probable use, so long as the harm comes from use in the manner for which, and by a person for whose use, the chattel is supplied.1 Liability then requires three conditions, and a plaintiff who cannot establish one of them has no claim under the section:
- The supplier knows or has reason to know that the chattel is or is likely to be dangerous for the use for which it is supplied.2
- The supplier has no reason to believe that those for whose use the chattel is supplied will realize its dangerous condition.3
- The supplier fails to exercise reasonable care to inform them of the dangerous condition or of the facts that make the chattel likely to be dangerous.4
The three conditions define an information gap. The first confines the duty to suppliers who hold something worth telling, the second to users who probably lack it, and the third excuses a supplier who has told them with reasonable care. The remedy that § 388 itself prescribes is information.
Because the third condition turns on reasonable care, § 388 sounds in negligence. The plaintiff must prove what the supplier knew and that its efforts to inform fell short, but the text asks whether the chattel is dangerous, not whether it is defective. Strict liability under § 402A works differently. It imposes liability on a product’s manufacturer and distributors when a defect causes harm, regardless of their fault or the existence of privity,5 and the defects it addresses usually fall into three categories: manufacturing, design, and warning.6 The two claims are separate, and different proof governs each.
Later Restatement sections apply § 388 to particular suppliers by incorporating it. One who supplies a chattel for the supplier’s business purposes, knowing or having reason to know that it is or is likely to be dangerous, is liable as stated in §§ 388-390.7 So is a seller of a chattel manufactured by a third person who sells it knowing that it is or is likely to be dangerous.8 The rest of this unit takes the elements in order: who counts as a supplier, then each of the three conditions, then how a warning travels through intermediaries, and finally how far the duty reaches in uses and protected persons.
Who Is a Supplier
Every § 388 claim begins with the defendant’s status, and the Restatement defines that status by conduct. Comment c, reproduced in Moody v. Martin Motor Co., reaches any person who, for any purpose and in any manner, gives another possession of a chattel for the other’s use. It also reaches anyone who permits another to use or occupy a chattel while it remains in the giver’s own possession or control, without disclosing knowledge that the chattel is dangerous for that use.9 The label on the transaction (sale, loan, gift, rental) is beside the point. What counts is that the person put the chattel within another’s reach for use.
Defining the term by conduct tracks the reason for the duty. The user’s risk is the same whether the chattel arrived by sale, lease, loan, or gift, and the supplier’s power to warn comes from having put the chattel in someone’s hands while holding information the recipient lacks. A rule keyed to the form of the transaction would let a supplier who knew of a hidden danger escape the duty by lending in place of selling.
Comment c lists four kinds of supplier:
- vendors, lessors, donors, and lenders, whether or not they made the chattel themselves;
- bailors of every kind, whether the bailment is for use, transportation, safekeeping, or repair;
- repairers who deliver a chattel back knowing that their own work left it defective; and
- anyone who lets another use or share in the use of a chattel while it stays in the person’s own possession or control.10
The repairer’s rule appears in § 403: one who as an independent contractor makes, rebuilds, or repairs a chattel for another and turns it over, knowing or having reason to know that the work has made it dangerous for the use for which it is turned over, is subject to the same liability as if he had supplied the chattel.11 Jacoves v. United Merchandising Corp. makes the general point: those who may be liable as suppliers include not only lenders and donors but also sellers.12
Classification disputes seldom matter under this definition. Courts have held, for example, that a bank that “rents” a safe-deposit box stands in a bailment relationship with its customer and not in a lease, because access by the customer’s identification and one of two keys does not transfer the exclusive possession of premises that a lease requires.13 A § 388 claim need not wait on that kind of question, because comment c reaches the supplier whatever the arrangement is called. Lessors, in any event, answer under ordinary negligence principles for defective products that injure lessees and others, and Restatement § 408 makes a lessor liable to lessees and others foreseeably endangered by the lessor’s failure to exercise due care to make a leased product safe.14 Warranty law took more doctrinal effort: most courts extended Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code to leases only by one route or another, whether as disguised sales, by analogy, or on policy grounds.15
The Restatement’s Illustration 1 shows several of these features at work. A sells B a shotgun that B says he will give to his son C as a birthday present. A tells B that the gun was made by the S Company, whose product is known to be of the highest character, but A knows that the Y Company made it and that Y notoriously puts out an inferior gun. B gives the gun to C, and it explodes in C’s hands because of defective construction. A is liable to C.16 A is a supplier although A did not make the gun, because a vendor qualifies whoever made the chattel. A supplied the gun to C without ever dealing with C, because it reached C through B. And A’s false assurance left B and C with no reason to suspect the gun, while A’s own knowledge of the maker supplies the first condition. Supplier status explains why A is a proper defendant; the remaining conditions decide whether A is liable.
The phrase “directly or through a third person” extends supplier status along chains of distribution. The supplier need not place the chattel in the user’s hands. It is enough that the supplier furnishes the chattel for others’ use and should expect it to reach them, and the duty then runs to those the supplier should expect to use it with the consent of the other or to be endangered by its probable use.17
Both scenes settle only the threshold question. Whether telling the retailer or the subcontractor would have discharged the duty is taken up below under intermediaries, and the knowledge, user-awareness, and reasonable-care conditions must still be proved. Supplier status opens the analysis; it does not decide it.
The category has one built-in limit, and comment c shows it in the case of rides. A driver who lets another travel as a passenger or guest is a supplier of the car, but only to the extent that the harm is caused by the dangerous condition of the car and not by the manner in which it is operated.18 The limit follows from what the supplier rules do. They address a chattel’s hidden condition, which a warning can disclose, while a driver’s misjudgment at the wheel is a different fault that no advance warning could disclose. A driver who knows the brakes are failing and gives a ride without saying so has supplied a dangerous chattel and answers under § 388. A driver whose brakes are sound but who takes a curve too fast has created a danger through operation, and a passenger’s claim for that harm lies outside the supplier rules.
Knowledge of Danger
The first condition asks what the supplier knew, because a warning can pass along only what the supplier holds. Section 388(a) requires that the supplier “knows or has reason to know that the chattel is or is likely to be dangerous for the use for which it is supplied.”20 Two phrases carry the weight. The danger is measured against the use for which the chattel is supplied, so a chattel safe for one purpose may be dangerous for the purpose the supplier had in view. And certainty is not required: it is enough that the supplier knows the chattel is likely to be dangerous.
The shotgun illustration shows how little certainty suffices. The seller knew that the gun came from a maker that notoriously puts out inferior guns, and the gun later exploded in the buyer’s son’s hands because of defective construction. Nothing in the illustration suggests that the seller inspected this gun or knew of its particular flaw. Knowing the maker’s record was enough, and the seller was liable to the son.21
Knowledge takes two forms. Actual knowledge means the supplier has the information and has drawn the conclusion that the chattel is or is likely to be dangerous. Reason to know means the supplier holds information from which it should know of the danger, whether or not it drew the inference. In Buckingham v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., the court described the parallel knowledge requirement of § 389 in the same two parts: liability arises when the supplier knows or has information from which it should know. The court added that § 389 is a negligence provision, that it requires knowledge of the product’s dangerous condition and does not require that the product be defective, and that it therefore carries all the proof problems of negligence.22
Reason to know closes an obvious loophole. If the duty attached only to suppliers who had actually concluded that a chattel was dangerous, a supplier could avoid it by ignoring the complaints, test results, and reports sitting in its own files. Asking what the supplier should know from that information makes the supplier answer for the pieces it holds. Both routes still depend on information the supplier actually has.
A corollary follows: § 388 does not require a supplier to inspect or test a chattel to find out whether it is dangerous. The text of subsection (a) asks what the supplier knows or has reason to know and contains no clause telling the supplier to look. The Buckingham court read § 389 the same way, holding that the supplier has no duty under that section to determine whether the chattel will be made safe and is liable only when it knows or has information from which it should know.23 Where the Restatement wants a supplier to look, it says so. The rule for chattels supplied for the supplier’s own business purposes adds liability for failing to exercise reasonable care to discover the dangerous condition and to inform those expected to use the chattel,24 while a seller of a chattel made by someone else, who neither knows nor has reason to know of the danger, is not liable for failing to discover it by inspecting or testing before sale.25
The reasons follow from what a warning is. A warning conveys information, so a supplier with none has nothing to convey. A duty to investigate every chattel before handing it over would turn a fault-based rule into a guarantee of safety. The condition is also easy to misread as asking whether the chattel was dangerous. It asks whether the supplier knew or had reason to know, and the difference decides cases in which a real danger lay hidden from everyone.
Knowledge is measured when the supplier parts with the chattel. In Brown v. Superior Court, a drug case, the California Supreme Court agreed that a manufacturer’s knowledge should be measured at the time the drug is distributed, because that is when the manufacturer relinquishes control of the product.26 The same logic fits § 388(a). A supplier is judged by what it knew or had reason to know when it acted, and a danger first identified years after supply gave the supplier nothing to disclose at the time.
The sharpest conflict over risks no one could foresee arises under strict liability. Section 402A defined liability in explicitly no-fault terms, so that on its face it appeared to leave no room for a defense based on the manufacturer’s best efforts, and “state-of-the-art” evidence that a risk was unforeseeable seemed directly contrary to strict liability.27 Section 388 faces no such tension, because the supplier’s knowledge is an element the plaintiff must prove.
Users Unaware of Danger
The second condition turns from the supplier to the users. Section 388(b) requires that the supplier “has no reason to believe that those for whose use the chattel is supplied will realize its dangerous condition.”29 Together, the first two conditions locate the information gap: the supplier holds a fact about danger, and the users probably lack it. Where users will see and appreciate the risk themselves, a warning tells them nothing new, and § 388 imposes no duty to give one.
Requiring warnings of every danger users can see would add cost without adding safety, and it would bury the warnings that matter. Subsection (b) therefore lets a supplier rely on users to notice what any user would notice.
The Restatement’s commentary, as the court quotes it in Glittenberg v. Doughboy Recreational Industries, applies this idea to conditions that can be seen. A supplier need not inform users of a condition that a mere casual looking over will disclose, unless the circumstances of supply make it likely that even so casual an inspection will not be made.30 The measure is the ordinary glance a user will give, not close study. The circumstances clause matters because a defect may be visible in theory and unseen in practice, as when a chattel is handed over in the dark or in a hurry. Courts have usually meant by “obvious danger” a condition that would ordinarily be seen and whose danger would ordinarily be appreciated by those expected to use the product.31 Both halves matter, because a condition plain to the eye satisfies only the first half if its significance escapes ordinary users.
Some jurisdictions have codified a version of the limit. In Olson v. U.S. Industries, the court quoted a products-liability statute providing that a manufacturer’s duties do not include warning or safeguarding against patent, open, or obvious risks which a reasonable user should have realized.32 The question asked differs slightly from § 388(b). The statute looks to what a reasonable user should have realized, while subsection (b) looks to what the supplier has reason to believe users will realize.
Appreciating one effect of a chattel does not amount to appreciating every effect, and Alder v. Bayer Corp. shows the consequence. Technicians who worked with a machine in a mammography suite felt chemical irritation and later alleged serious long-term injury from the exposure. The court reasoned that the supplier arguably had no reason to believe the technicians realized the machine’s dangers in that setting, since they had used it for years elsewhere without problems, and that their awareness of the irritation they felt did not, without more, presuppose an understanding of the potential for serious, long-term, irreversible harm.33 The court also relied on comment b, under which a supplier is liable a fortiori if by word or deed it leads users to believe a chattel safer than the supplier knows it to be, and it found a triable fact question on whether the supplier’s conduct had that effect.34 The dangerous condition that counts is the one that produced the injury. A user who knows a chattel will sting the eyes has learned nothing about whether it can cause permanent damage.
The commentary adds an exception that keeps visibility from settling the question. A condition may be readily observable and yet be one that only persons of special experience would realize to be dangerous. When the supplier has that experience, knows the condition involves danger, and has no reason to believe the users share it, the supplier must inform them of the risk it knows and has no reason to suppose they will realize.35 Seeing a condition is not the same as understanding it.
Subsection (b) is one of two places where the user’s awareness enters the analysis, and the second works differently. The Restatement’s commentary recognizes that a user may bar a claim by contributory negligence, whether by voluntarily using the chattel with knowledge of its dangerous condition, by failing to make a proper inspection that would have disclosed the defect, or by failing to use the precautions obviously necessary to its safe use.36 Subsection (b) asks what the supplier had reason to believe when it supplied the chattel; contributory negligence asks how the particular user behaved. The two can come apart, because a user who knew of a danger is not always careless in using the chattel anyway. Section 389 draws the same line when it protects users who are ignorant of the chattel’s dangerous character or whose knowledge of it does not make them contributorily negligent.37
Reasonable Care to Inform
The third condition asks what the supplier did about the gap. Section 388(c) is met when the supplier “fails to exercise reasonable care to inform them of its dangerous condition or of the facts which make it likely to be dangerous.”39 The text sets a task and a standard. The task is to inform, and it fixes the content: the dangerous condition itself or the facts that make the chattel likely to be dangerous. The standard is reasonable care, and it fixes the effort owed in getting that content to the users.
The standard judges the supplier’s conduct, not the outcome. A supplier that takes the steps a careful supplier would take to get the information to users has satisfied the condition even if a particular user never reads, understands, or heeds it. The supplier controls what it says and how it says it, while whether an individual user listens is outside its control, and a rule that made suppliers answer for that would convert a fault-based provision into a guarantee of safety. Liability without fault is the work of § 402A, and a user who ignores an adequate warning is handled by the contributory negligence rules discussed above.
How much effort counts as reasonable depends on the stakes and the cost. When the danger is serious and the precaution is a few words on a label, the balance is lopsided, and the supplier cannot defend silence as economy. In Moran v. Faberge, Inc., the court treated the cost of a warning as undisputedly of minimal consequence, which left a different question: when does the responsibility to warn arise? It began from § 388.40 Once cost drops out, the dispute moves back to the earlier conditions, whether the supplier knew of the danger and whether users would realize it on their own.
Reasonable care also governs what the warning says. A warning must carry the fact that makes the chattel dangerous, and words that address something else do not inform. Alder shows the point. The court found that the supplier’s warning arguably fell short of informing the technicians of the facts that made the machine “likely to be dangerous,” and a factfinder could find those facts included disclosure of the specific, serious, long-term effects of chemical exposure, since that was the real danger and the one behind the alleged injuries.41 The court did not declare the warning inadequate as a matter of law. It found a triable issue as to adequate warning.42 Utah law, the court added, goes beyond the Restatement’s language by augmenting the supplier’s duty to inform with a duty to use reasonable care to safeguard against the danger, so that a jury could also find a breach in a failure to take reasonable measures to prevent the exposure.43 That added duty comes from Utah law and not from § 388, which asks only whether the supplier informed. A practical test follows from the text: ask whether the words on the chattel tell the user what the danger actually is.
In both scenes a user was hurt and the supplier put words on the chattel. What separates them is what the words said. Whether informing a purchaser, an employer, or another go-between counts as informing the person who handles the chattel is a separate question, taken up next.
Warning Through Intermediaries
Section 388 reaches a supplier who acts “directly or through a third person,” so the duty to inform users does not lapse because a middleman stands between the supplier and the people who will handle the chattel.45 Comment n, reproduced in Humble Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Gomez, collects the standard cases: a wholesale dealer who sells to a retailer goods meant for the retailer’s customers, a contractor who furnishes scaffolding for a subcontractor and the subcontractor’s workers, and a borrower who takes a lent automobile to carry family and friends. In each, the question is whether the supplier has exercised the reasonable care it owes to the eventual users by informing the third person through whom the chattel is supplied of its actual character.46 This is the question the preceding section left open: whether informing a purchaser, an employer, or another go-between counts as informing the person who handles the chattel.
The comment’s first move is to deny that notice to the intermediary settles the matter. Giving the third person all the information necessary to safe use does not always relieve the supplier, because it is merely a means of conveying that information to the users. The question remains “whether this method gives a reasonable assurance that the information will reach those whose safety depends upon their having it.”47 Because chattels move through all sorts of third persons under an infinite variety of circumstances, the comment weighs factors and does not state a formula.
The factors balance two pressures. Every handoff carries some chance that the information will be dropped. Against that risk, “[m]odern life would be intolerable unless one were permitted to rely to a certain extent on others’ doing what they normally do, particularly if it is their duty to do so.”48 A rule forcing every supplier to warn every end user in person would be unworkable, while a rule allowing unlimited reliance would let a supplier discharge a grave duty with a note to anyone. The comment’s answer is that the reliance a supplier may place on an intermediary shrinks as the danger grows.
The first step does the most work, so an answer about whether a distributor’s notice to a dealer protected the dealer’s customers should begin with how bad the harm would be if the notice went astray. Comment n contrasts two suppliers. If a chattel, used in ignorance, risks no more than comparatively trivial harm, the supplier may treat the third person’s being an ordinary, normal person, to whose discredit the supplier knows nothing, as sufficient assurance that the information will be passed on.49 If the chattel, used in ignorance, carries a grave risk of serious harm to users and those nearby, the supplier may be required to take precautions to bring the information home to the users that it would be unreasonable to demand for a less dangerous chattel. The supplier may then have to go further than telling the third person, or run the risk of liability if the information is not brought home to those the supplier should expect to use the chattel.50 The magnitude of a risk reflects both the chance of harm and its seriousness, so a small chance of grave injury can outweigh a large chance of a trivial one.
An intermediary may also have its own reasons to stay silent. If it would rather have end users think the product safe, the supplier can have a duty to warn the end users directly.51 The burden of a direct warning is often slight, as when the chattel is to be used in the presence or vicinity of the person supplying it, so that he could easily give a personal warning.52 The same logic applies when the maker can easily affix a warning to the product itself. If an intermediary passes the warning along ninety-nine times in a hundred, but the one user left uninformed faces serious injury or death, and a label on the product would cost almost nothing, relying on the intermediary alone is unreasonable however sophisticated or dependable that intermediary is.53
Two defenses that appear often in modern products cases grow out of this comment. In Roney v. Gencorp, the court observed that comment n is commonly cited as the basis for the sophisticated user defense.54 Under the closely related sophisticated intermediary defense, a supplier satisfies the duty by giving an adequate warning only to the intermediary, but the defense is generally available only where the supplier shows that it used reasonable care in relying on the intermediary to warn the end user. That showing requires weighing the purpose for which the product is to be used, the magnitude of the risk, the burden of providing direct warnings, and the intermediary’s reliability as a conduit.55 Those are comment n’s factors under a different name. Drug cases show the same channel at work: a manufacturer fulfills its duty to warn if it provides adequate warning to the physician.56 The label “sophisticated” records a conclusion that reliance was reasonable, and a defendant who proves only that the intermediary or user was large or experienced has established one fact bearing on reliability while the defense still demands the full showing.
The question that governs both scenes is whether the supplier had reason to rely on this intermediary to carry this information about this risk, and the intermediary’s status as sophisticated does not answer it. The factors also assume that the supplier’s task is to get information to users, and a separate rule applies when information alone cannot solve the problem. Notice to an intermediary helps users only if the intermediary acts on it, and § 389 addresses the case in which the supplier knows it will not. A supplier who knows or has reason to know that a chattel is unlikely to be made reasonably safe before it is put to its expected use remains liable for physical harm to those the supplier should expect to use the chattel or to be endangered by its probable use, and who are ignorant of its dangerous character or whose knowledge does not make them contributorily negligent, although the supplier has informed the other for whose use the chattel is supplied.57 The chapter takes up that rule next.
Intended Uses and Protected Persons
The opening clause of § 388 sets limits that operate before the three conditions come into play. The supplier is liable to “those whom the supplier should expect to use the chattel with the consent of the other or to be endangered by its probable use,” and only for physical harm caused by use “in the manner for which and by a person for whose use it is supplied.”59 A claim must therefore pass three screens. Was the harm caused by a use of the kind for which the chattel was supplied? Was the user a person for whose use it was supplied? And is the plaintiff someone the supplier should have expected to use the chattel with the consent of the other, or to be endangered by its probable use? A claim that fails any screen falls outside the rule, however clearly the supplier knew of a hidden danger and however little it did to disclose it.
Each limit has a reason. The use limit ties the duty to a risk the supplier could address, and subsection (a) already measures danger against the use for which the chattel is supplied.60 Nearly any chattel can hurt someone who handles it in some peculiar way, so a duty reaching every conceivable use would turn a fault-based rule into insurance. The person limit rests on foresight. A supplier can judge risks and arrange warnings only around people it has reason to anticipate: the one it hands the chattel to, those that person will let use it, and those in the path of its use.
The words describing the manner for which a chattel is supplied can be read two ways. On the narrow reading, the supplier answers only for the uses it had in mind when it handed the chattel over. On the broad reading, it answers for any use it should reasonably have anticipated. Moran v. Faberge, Inc. took the broad view. The court conceded that, strictly speaking, the words suggest responsibility only for the uses the supplier intended, called that impression misleading, and observed that most courts and legal authors agree that the duty to warn of latent dangers goes beyond the precise use the producer contemplated and extends to all reasonably foreseeable uses.61 The court spoke of a manufacturer’s duty, but it was construing § 388’s words, and § 388 governs every supplier. The broad reading also fits the information gap the duty exists to close, since the hazards users are least likely to know about arise in ordinary uses the supplier never planned. Other Restatement rules word the limit differently, with the negligent-manufacture rule speaking of lawful use in a manner and for a purpose for which the chattel is supplied and the negligent-design rule speaking of probable use, but each confines responsibility to normal or expectable uses.62
Moran also quotes the other side of the line. A maker may assume that its product will be put to normal use, for which it is intended or appropriate, and is not liable when the product is safe for all such uses and harm results only because it is mishandled in a way the maker has no reason to expect or is used in some unusual and unforeseeable manner. A shoemaker is therefore not liable to a customer who insists on wearing shoes a size too small, and the maker of a bottle of cleaning fluid is not liable when the purchaser splashes it into his own eye.63 The working test asks whether the use falls within the range a reasonable supplier would anticipate, whether or not the supplier intended it.
The screen also works against plaintiffs, as Monsanto Co. v. Reed shows. The court there noted that in many jurisdictions courts have declined to find a duty of care running from the supplier of goods to salvage-yard workers who allege injury while scrapping and dismantling chattels.64 The result follows from the text of § 388. A chattel supplied for one purpose is not supplied to be scrapped, and a worker who dismantles it for salvage is not a person for whose use it was supplied. Because the clause screens the claim out, the knowledge, awareness, and reasonable-care conditions never come into play, and a court can resolve the case without asking what the supplier knew.
The clause that identifies protected persons has two halves, because a chattel injures people in two ways. The first covers those the supplier should expect to use the chattel with the consent of the other, the person to whom it was supplied, such as the family members or employees that person lets use it. The second covers those endangered by the chattel’s probable use even though they never touch it. Comment d confirms the reach: one supplying a chattel to be used or dealt with by others is liable not only to those for whose use the chattel is supplied but also to third persons in whose vicinity the supplier intends or should expect it to be used.65 The class is defined by what the supplier should expect, and the plaintiff’s label does not control. The Monsanto court quoted Lloyd for the point that it is of no particular significance whether a plaintiff used a lawn mower as a guest on the premises or as a borrower at some other place, so long as the mower had been provided to him for the use to which he was putting it when he was injured.66
Foreseeability is necessary but not sufficient. It marks which uses and which plaintiffs count, and the plaintiff must still satisfy the knowledge, user-awareness, and reasonable-care conditions of § 388 for that use. The supplier need not have foreseen the precise way the accident happened. It is enough that the supplier should have foreseen the general type of risk that caused the harm, as in an exploding soda bottle case where the plaintiff was hurt not by the glass but by a fall as he tried to clean up the spill.67