Concept
Chattels Unlikely to Be Made Safe
Duty of suppliers of chattels to third persons
Chattels Unlikely to Be Made Safe
A warning to the person who receives a chattel does not always end the supplier's responsibility. Under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 389, a supplier who knows or has reason to know that the chattel is unlikely to be made reasonably safe before the use the supplier should expect remains liable for physical harm that use causes to those whom the supplier should expect to use the chattel or to be endangered by its probable use, so long as they are ignorant of the danger or their knowledge does not make them contributorily negligent. The section says expressly that liability exists "although the supplier has informed the other for whose use the chattel is supplied of its dangerous character."1 The preceding section asked whether a warning given to an intermediary would reach the users. Section 389 covers the opposite failure, in which the warning reaches the intermediary and nothing follows because the chattel goes into use before anyone makes it safe.
A warning protects users only if its recipient acts on it, by repairing the chattel, guarding against the danger, or keeping the chattel out of service. Ordinarily a supplier may count on that response. When the supplier knows or has reason to know that it will not come, the warning is a formality, and the people an unrepaired chattel will hurt are the users, who typically never learned what the supplier told the intermediary. Section 389 keeps the supplier liable to them, so a supplier cannot discharge its duty by handing a warning to someone it expects to ignore it. The section also limits itself by requiring knowledge, a limit taken up after the circumstances that satisfy it.
Buckingham v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. states the knowledge element. A supplier is liable under § 389 only when it knows, or has information from which it should know, that there is a substantial probability the chattel will not be made safe before it is used.2 A remote chance that someone will neglect the repair does not meet that standard. Circumstances that render a safe outcome unlikely include the following.3
- The chattel will be used so soon after it is turned over that it is substantially certain no change will be made.
- The person through whom the chattel is supplied is financially incapable of making it safe.
- That person is notoriously careless.
Each item tracks something an intermediary needs in order to turn information into safety, which is time, money, and care. Where the supplier knows that one of the three is missing, the warning cannot do its work.
The Utah Supreme Court's discussion of a trench case shows the same reasoning at work. Recalling an earlier decision, the court wrote that even if the trench was "capable of being made safe for use," the Restatement underscores the importance of a jury deciding whether Haukos realized the unlikelihood that shoring would be completed before the trench was used by Progressive's employees.4 That a safety step is possible does not answer the question. What matters is what the supplier realized about whether the step would be taken before use.
The section stops short of requiring investigation. A supplier has no duty under § 389 to determine whether the chattel will be made reasonably safe, and liability arises only when the supplier knows, or has information from which it should know, that there is a substantial probability it will not be.5 Section 388(a) is built the same way, conditioning liability on what the supplier knows or has reason to know about the chattel's danger.6 Section 389 is a negligence provision, so it carries all the proof problems of negligence, and it is separate and distinct from the strict liability concepts of topic 5 of the same chapter.7 The plaintiff must therefore prove what the supplier knew about the likelihood of repair.
The plaintiff must also fit the section. Liability runs to those whom the supplier should expect to use the chattel or to be endangered by its probable use, and who are ignorant of its dangerous character or whose knowledge of it does not make them contributorily negligent.8 A user who learned of the danger is therefore not automatically barred. The question is whether that knowledge makes the user contributorily negligent. The Restatement's commentary describes three ways a user can disable himself from bringing an action: voluntarily using the chattel with knowledge of its dangerous condition, failing to make a proper inspection that would have disclosed the defect, and failing to use the precautions obviously necessary to its safe use.9 The ignorance requirement fits the section's evident target, the user who had no chance to protect himself because the warning stopped with the intermediary.
The reliance analysis of the preceding section and § 389 ask different questions. The first asks whether telling the intermediary gives reasonable assurance that the information will reach the users. Section 389 asks whether the chattel will be made safe before the users meet it. A supplier whose warning reliably reaches the users has satisfied the first inquiry and can still face § 389 if the chattel will be used at once and the users' knowledge of the danger does not make their use contributorily negligent. A supplier who knows that a careless intermediary will not repair a chattel is exposed under § 389 even if the intermediary was told everything. The common error is to ask only whether the supplier informed the intermediary and to stop when the answer is yes, but the rule itself imposes liability although the supplier informed the other.10