Concept
Suppliers for Business Purposes
Duty of suppliers of chattels to third persons
Suppliers for Business Purposes
A supplier who furnishes a chattel to get its own work done owes more than a warning. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 392 makes a person who supplies a chattel, directly or through a third person, to be used for the supplier’s business purposes liable to those for whose use it is supplied, and to those the supplier should expect to be endangered by its probable use, for physical harm caused by use in the manner for which and by persons for whose use it is supplied.1 Liability attaches on either of two grounds, which this part of the chapter takes in turn. The usual defendants are not sellers. A contractor furnishes scaffolding for a subcontractor’s crew to stand on,2 and an employer hands its workers their tools and machines. Each furnishes the chattel to get its own work done.
The law asks more of these suppliers because their position differs from a seller’s or a lender’s. A seller parts with the chattel, and the buyer’s purposes govern what happens next. A business supplier keeps its own enterprise at the center: it chooses the equipment, sets the conditions of use, and collects the benefit of the work done with it. The people who use the chattel are typically workers or others on the supplier’s project, who take what they are given and have little chance to examine it. A duty limited to warning about dangers the supplier happens to know of would miss the injuries that occur where nobody looked.
That difference marks the main shift in this part of the chapter. Section 388 rests on the supplier’s knowledge. It requires that the supplier know or have reason to know of the danger, and it contains no clause directing the supplier to look for one.3 Section 392 adds duties that do not wait for knowledge, so the question shifts from what the supplier knew to what the supplier should have done. Four rules do the work:
- Section 391 carries §§ 388 to 390 over to a business supplier who knows or has reason to know that the chattel is dangerous for its intended use.4
- Section 392(a) requires reasonable care to make the chattel safe for the use for which it is supplied.5
- Section 392(b) requires reasonable care to discover a dangerous condition and to inform those who will use the chattel.6
- Section 393 denies the supplier an excuse when a third person who owed an inspection duty could also have found the danger.7
None of these is liability without fault. Section 402A reaches a defective product’s manufacturer and distributors regardless of fault or privity.8 The rules here turn on the supplier’s knowledge or its failure to use reasonable care.
Business Suppliers With Knowledge
Section 391 is a cross-reference rule. A person who supplies a chattel, directly or through a third person, for another to use for the supplier’s business purposes, knowing or having reason to know that it is or is likely to be dangerous for the use for which it is supplied, “is subject to liability as stated in §§ 388-390.”9 The section supplies the trigger, which is business-purpose supply by someone who holds the relevant knowledge, and it borrows every consequence from the three sections before it.
Those sections carry three distinct duties. Section 388 makes a supplier liable for failing to use reasonable care to inform users whom the supplier has no reason to believe will realize the danger.10 Section 389 keeps liable a supplier who knows the chattel is unlikely to be made reasonably safe before use, as against users who are ignorant of the danger or whose knowledge does not make them contributorily negligent, even though the supplier told the person receiving it.11 Section 390 reaches a supplier who furnishes a chattel to someone the supplier knows or has reason to know is likely, from youth, inexperience, or otherwise, to use it in a way that creates unreasonable risk.12 The borrowed rules arrive intact, so the plaintiff must still prove the conditions of whichever section fits the facts. Finding that § 391 applies opens the analysis without finishing it.
Section 391 reaches the ordinary furnishers of equipment: an employer who issues tools to its workers, a contractor who provides machinery for a project. Neither need be in the business of selling the chattel. Earlier in this chapter, supplier status was shown to follow from what a person does with a chattel and not from the label on the transaction, so each already counts as a supplier under § 388. What § 391 adds is a direct statement that the business purpose does not lessen the duties that come with that status.
The reason follows from why the supplier duties exist. A duty to inform closes an information gap, and a supplier’s power to close it is the same whether it sells the chattel, lends it, or issues it to a crew. If anything, the business supplier is better placed, since it chose the equipment and controls its use. A rule that let commercial motive excuse silence about a known danger would favor the party with the most to gain from the chattel’s continued use. Section 391 forecloses that argument: the business supplier owes at least what any other supplier owes.
The trigger works as § 388(a) does. The supplier must know or have reason to know that the chattel is or is likely to be dangerous for the use for which it is supplied.13 The earlier section on knowledge of danger explains what counts. Section 391 contains no clause directing the supplier to look for danger. A business supplier without the knowledge therefore falls outside § 391 but not outside the law, because the analysis moves to § 392, whose duties do not depend on what the supplier happened to know.14
The two contractors supply the same chattel for the same business purpose and differ only in what each knew. That difference decides which rule applies. A common error is to see an employer and a machine and reach for a special workplace rule without asking what the employer knew. The first questions are whether the supplier furnished the chattel for its business purposes and whether it knew or had reason to know of the danger.
Once the trigger is met, the work shifts to the incorporated sections. In the first scene, the crew’s ignorance of the spring and the contractor’s silence satisfy the remaining conditions of § 388. Had the contractor told the crew about the spring in terms that conveyed the danger, § 388 would no longer supply a claim, though §§ 389 and 390 would still apply if their own conditions were met. When the contractor furnishes the chattel through a subcontractor and not directly to the crew, the questions about intermediaries taught earlier come along, and § 393 addresses what happens when the intermediary owed a duty to inspect.15 Section 391 is thus the floor under every business supplier, and § 392 adds duties that do not depend on knowledge.
Duty to Make Chattels Safe
Section 392(a) makes the business supplier liable if it “fails to exercise reasonable care to make the chattel safe for the use for which it is supplied.”17 The object of the duty is the chattel itself. Section 388 asks what the supplier knew and told users, and a supplier who informed them with reasonable care has satisfied it. Section 392(a) begins earlier, with the condition of the thing, and a warning is only one of the steps reasonable care may involve.
The law asks more here because of what each precaution depends on. A warning works only through events outside the supplier’s control: the user must receive the message, understand it, and be able to act on it. A worker told that a hoist’s brake is unreliable usually cannot repair or replace the employer’s equipment and may have little say over whether to use it, so the warning leaves the danger where it was. A supplier that corrects the condition before handing over the chattel removes the danger at its source, for every later user, without relying on anyone’s response. The correction is also usually cheaper, since one repair, guard, or replacement by the party that owns and controls the chattel takes the place of reaching and persuading each user. The law therefore places the duty on the party best positioned to perform it.
The defendants this subsection reaches are often employers and contractors supplying equipment to do their own work, not manufacturers. For a court’s treatment of § 392 where a chattel was furnished for the supplier’s own benefit, see Heinz v. Heinz, an Iowa decision discussing the section.
Reasonable care under (a) is the ordinary negligence standard applied to the supplier’s treatment of the chattel. It is a different thing from the liability without fault that § 402A imposes on manufacturers and distributors.18 Precautions aimed at the chattel’s condition may include choosing equipment suited to the work, maintaining and repairing it, fitting guards, and withdrawing it from use until it is fixed. A supplier that took the precautions a careful supplier would take is not liable merely because a hidden flaw produced an injury. The subsection also has no clause requiring that the supplier knew of the specific danger, which distinguishes it from § 391, whose trigger is knowledge or reason to know.19 A supplier that never learned of a worn brake can therefore still answer under (a) if a careful supplier would have serviced the hoist as a matter of course. How far the duty reaches into looking for hidden flaws is the subject of § 392(b), taken up next.
The business-purpose trigger decides whether § 392(a) is in the case at all, and it is the fact an exam stem is most likely to vary.
The chattel and the injury are alike in the two scenes, and what differs is whom the supplier’s act benefited. That fact controls which rule applies. The scope limits that governed § 388 carry over: the harm must come from use in the manner for which the chattel is supplied and by persons for whose use it is supplied, or must reach those the supplier should expect to be endangered by its probable use.20 A crew member and a bystander fall within that class, while a worker who takes the hoist home for a weekend job of his own has stepped outside the use for which it was supplied. The usual exam error runs in two directions. One is to treat every supplier as owing a duty to make the chattel safe, when that duty belongs to the supplier acting for its own business purposes and a gratuitous lender owes only the § 388 duty to warn of known dangers. The other is to stop at the observation that a business supplier gave some warning, without asking whether reasonable care to make the chattel safe called for more.
Duty to Discover and Inform
Section 392(b) adds a second ground of liability for a person who supplies a chattel for the supplier’s own business purposes. The supplier is liable for physical harm to those for whose use the chattel is supplied, and to those the supplier should expect to be endangered by its probable use, “if he fails to exercise reasonable care to discover its dangerous condition or character, and to inform those whom he should expect to use it.”22 The subsection gives the supplier two jobs in sequence. The first is to look for danger, and the second is to tell the people who will handle the chattel what the look turned up. Subsection (a) required reasonable care in making the chattel safe, while this subsection requires reasonable care in finding out whether it is safe and in passing along what is found.
The subsection matters because it removes the knowledge condition on which the earlier rules in this chapter depend. Sections 388(a) and 391 attach liability only when the supplier knows or has reason to know that the chattel is or is likely to be dangerous, and neither contains a clause directing the supplier to look.23 Section 392(b) writes the looking into the duty itself. A danger the supplier never learned of can therefore still support liability if a careful supplier would have found it. An exam stem that stresses the owner “never knew” about a defect in equipment furnished for its business is not posing a § 388(a) problem, and the common error is to stop at the supplier’s ignorance when the question under (b) is what reasonable care would have uncovered. The contrast with a seller of someone else’s product is sharp. A seller who neither knows nor has reason to know that the chattel is dangerous is not liable in negligence for failing to find the danger by inspection or test before selling,24 while the business supplier’s duty to discover is part of what it owes.
Each half of the subsection has its own reason, and the discovery half does the more distinctive work. A party that chooses equipment for its own enterprise, controls it, and profits from its use can usually inspect at a small fraction of what inspection would cost the people it hands the chattel to. A worker issued a scaffold plank cannot test the plank, cannot open a machine’s housing, and had no say in what was bought. If liability waited for knowledge, a supplier could shrink its exposure by declining to look, and ignorance would be rewarded. Making discovery part of the duty removes that incentive. The inform half carries the logic of § 388 forward: a danger found in the supplier’s own shop protects no one until the people at risk learn of it, and the supplier is the one who can tell them.
The standard is reasonable care, so the duty does not guarantee that every flaw will be found. The question is what inspection a careful supplier would make of this kind of chattel. That depends on the chattel and the harm a missed flaw could cause, so a scaffold or a lifting device calls for a more searching look than a push broom. A supplier that made the inspection a careful supplier would make, and found nothing, has not breached the duty even if a hidden flaw later injures someone. Products law supplies a parallel. A seller is responsible for an injury only if the defect was in the product when it left the seller’s control, and evidence of rigorous quality-control procedures can leave a plaintiff unable to prove that it was.25 Evidence that a business supplier made the inspection a careful supplier would make plays a comparable role under (b), because it goes straight to whether the supplier met the standard.
The chattel and the injury are the same in both scenes, and the outcomes differ because of what each supplier did and what a reasonable look would have revealed. The second contractor gains nothing from saying it was unaware of the crack, since finding out is what the duty requires. Had the second contractor looked, found the crack, and said nothing, it would still be liable under the inform half, because discovery that never reaches the people at risk leaves the gap open. Had it found the crack and replaced the plank, it would have made the scaffold safe, which is what subsection (a) asks.
When the supplier furnishes the chattel through a subcontractor or another third person who could have inspected it, the discoverability of the danger by that person does not relieve the supplier. That rule appears in § 393, which the next section takes up.26
Inspection by Intermediaries
A business supplier that delivers a chattel through a third person who was also obliged to inspect it will often argue that the other party’s duty excuses its own failure to look. Section 393 rejects that argument. One who supplies through a third person a chattel to be used for the supplier’s business purposes is liable under §§ 391 and 392 “although the dangerous character or condition of the chattel is discoverable by an inspection which the third person is under a duty to the person injured to make.”28 The supplier is typically a contractor or employer furnishing equipment for its own project, and the third person is a subcontractor or other go-between whose workers will use the chattel. The inspection duty at issue belongs to that go-between and runs to the injured person, as when a subcontractor owes its own employees a duty to look over the equipment they are told to use.
Section 393 removes an excuse and creates no ground of liability of its own. The plaintiff must still bring the case within § 391, by showing that the supplier knew or had reason to know the chattel was or was likely to be dangerous for its intended use, or within § 392, by showing that the supplier failed to use reasonable care to make the chattel safe or to discover its dangerous condition and inform those expected to use it.29 A supplier that made the inspection a careful supplier would make, and found nothing, has met § 392(b) no matter who else might have looked. What § 393 forecloses is a single move: the claim that someone else was also responsible for looking, so the supplier need not have. Because the section speaks of supply “through a third person,” it governs only chattels that pass through an intermediary, and a chattel handed directly to the users raises no such argument.30
The reason for the rule becomes clear when you remove it. Without § 393, each party in a chain could answer a claim by pointing to another’s duty to inspect. The supplier would say the subcontractor should have looked, and the subcontractor could assume that a supplier with every reason to check its own equipment had done so. The injured worker would be left with a claim against no one who had actually looked. The excuse would also work best where it does the most damage. An injury from a discoverable flaw usually means the intermediary failed to inspect, so a rule excusing the supplier whenever the intermediary had a duty to inspect would excuse it whenever the intermediary had failed. Section 393 treats the intermediary’s inspection as a second safeguard standing beside the supplier’s own.
A related point appears in a trench case that a later opinion recounts, though that case arose under § 389 and not § 393. The court had analogized the digging of a trench to the manufacture of a chattel, with associated duties under § 389, and it wrote that “even if the trench was ‘capable of being made safe for use,’ the Restatement underscores the importance of a jury deciding whether Haukos realized the unlikelihood that shoring would be completed before the trench was used by Progressive’s employees.”31 The possibility that someone else would make the trench safe did not by itself end the inquiry into the digger’s responsibility. Section 393 makes a related point for business suppliers.
A supplier with no business purpose stands differently, and the difference shows where § 393 stops. When such a supplier passes a chattel through a third person, § 393 does not apply, and the question under § 388 is whether informing the third person was reasonable care toward those who will use the chattel. The Restatement comment on that question gives as examples a wholesaler selling to a retailer, a contractor furnishing scaffolding to a subcontractor whose servants will use it, and a person lending an automobile for the borrower to carry family and friends.32 The earlier section on warning through intermediaries explains how courts weigh that question.
The two rules do different work. The comment asks whether telling the intermediary about a known danger was reasonable care toward the users. Section 393 answers a different claim, that the intermediary’s duty to find the danger excuses the supplier’s own failure to look. A business supplier’s control over the chattel and benefit from its use justify the firmer rule, so the intermediary’s inspection duty does not excuse it.33 The usual exam error takes two forms. One treats the go-between’s duty to inspect as a defense in a business-supply case. The other applies § 393 to a lender or seller with no business purpose, or reads it as imposing liability without checking that the supplier met the knowledge or reasonable-care conditions of §§ 391 and 392.