Concept
Repairers and Rebuilders
Duty of suppliers of chattels to third persons
Repairers and Rebuilders
A repairer sells nothing, yet the Restatement holds the repairer to the standards that govern people who do. Under § 403, an independent contractor who makes, rebuilds, or repairs a chattel for another and turns it over, knowing or having reason to know that the work has made the chattel dangerous for the use for which it is turned over, is subject to the same liability “as if he supplied the chattel.”1 Under § 404, an independent contractor who negligently does the same work is subject to the liability imposed on negligent manufacturers.2 An independent contractor is a person who does a job under its own control and by its own methods, as a mechanic or machinist does, and not an employee working under the customer’s direction. The two sections divide along a familiar line: § 403 asks what the contractor knew about the effect of its work, and § 404 asks how carefully it worked.
The repairer’s position explains why the law reaches it. A reseller who neither knows nor has reason to know that a product made by someone else is dangerous owes no duty to test it before selling.3 A repairer differs because its own hands changed the chattel, and only the repairer knows what it did. The owner cannot see inside the reseated fitting or the rebuilt assembly, so the owner takes the chattel back in reliance on the job and lets others use it. A passenger or bystander has even less chance to examine the work than the owner has. The law therefore measures the repairer by the standards it applies to those who supply and make chattels, although no product was sold, and it keeps both rules fault-based, because repair is a service and not a sale of a product.
Repairers With Knowledge
Section 403 applies when four things are true. The defendant is an independent contractor. It made, rebuilt, or repaired a chattel and turned it over to the person who ordered the work. Its work made the chattel dangerous for the use for which it was turned over. And it knew or had reason to know that fact. When all four are present, the section supplies the consequence by borrowing it: the contractor answers as a supplier would, so the supplier conditions decide what the plaintiff must prove next.
Those conditions come from the supplier rule. One who supplies a chattel “directly or through a third person” for another to use is liable for physical harm to those the supplier should expect to use the chattel with the other’s consent, or to be endangered by its probable use, if the supplier knows or has reason to know that the chattel is or is likely to be dangerous for the use for which it is supplied, has no reason to believe that those who will use it will realize the danger, and fails to exercise reasonable care to inform them.4
The opinion in Moody v. Martin Motor Co. quotes the Restatement’s first version of § 403, which reached a contractor “knowing that his work has made it dangerous for the use for which it is turned over” and made the contractor “subject to liability as stated in §§ 388 and 390.”5 The court illustrated the liability that results with a sale. A sold B a shotgun that B meant to give his son C, told B that the gun came from a maker of the highest reputation, and knew that it came from a maker that notoriously turned out inferior guns. The gun exploded while C was using it because of defective construction, and A was liable to C.6 The illustration involves a sale, but the point carries over. A repairer that returns a chattel it knows to be dangerous because of its own work holds the fact that matters, the owner has no reason to suspect it, and the harm falls on someone the repairer may never have met.
The knowledge requirement ties the duty to fault. A warning conveys information, and a repairer with no reason to suspect that its work failed has none to convey. A duty to disclose what the repairer could not see would turn a rule about knowledge into a guarantee that every repair is perfect. The rule aims at the repairer who knows and says nothing, because neither the owner nor later users can find the danger themselves.
Knowledge reaches the repairer by two routes, as it does under § 388: the repairer either “knows or has reason to know” that the chattel is dangerous for the use for which it was returned.7 Actual knowledge means the repairer saw the work fail and drew the conclusion. Reason to know means the repairer holds information from which a reasonable person would infer the danger, whether or not the repairer drew the inference. In a shop that information usually sits in the work itself: a part that would not seat, a torque reading that came out wrong, or a bench test the unit failed. Section 403 has no clause directing the repairer to go back and check its own work, so a repairer that never looked, and held nothing pointing to trouble, falls outside it. That repairer is not cleared. Section 404 makes a contractor who negligently repairs a chattel liable as a negligent manufacturer would be, and it asks what care the work required, whether or not the repairer ever learned of the flaw.8
Both shops rebuilt the same cylinder and sold nothing; what differed was what each knew when it returned the hoist. A stem that stresses that the repair caused the accident tempts a quick turn to § 403, but causation by the work is only the setting, and the trigger is the repairer’s knowledge or reason to know. The opposite slip is to apply § 403 whenever a shop notices something wrong with a chattel. The section asks whether the repairer’s work made the chattel dangerous, so a flaw the shop saw in a part it never touched does not trigger it, and a claim on those facts needs another basis.
Once § 403 applies, the supplier rule asks two more questions. Did the repairer have reason to believe that the users would realize the danger?9 And did it use reasonable care to inform them?10 The owner is the natural person to tell, and a plain statement that the hoist will not hold a load and should stay out of service usually satisfies the duty when only the owner will be exposed. Where the owner’s family, employees, or passengers will share the use, the test remains reasonable care to inform them, and telling the owner suffices only if it was a reasonable way to reach them.
Informing the owner may not end the matter. Suppose the owner says the chattel must go back into use that afternoon whatever the shop advises. The repairer then has reason to know that the chattel is unlikely to be made reasonably safe before use, and under § 389 it stays liable, despite having informed the owner, to users who are ignorant of the danger or whose knowledge does not make them contributorily negligent.11
Negligent Repair
Section 404 makes an independent contractor who negligently makes, rebuilds, or repairs a chattel for another subject to “the same liability as that imposed upon negligent manufacturers of chattels.”13 The rule is short because it borrows its content, as § 403 does, but it asks a different question. Section 403 turns on what the contractor knew; § 404 asks whether the contractor used reasonable care in the work, so a repairer that never learned of the flaw it left behind can still answer under it. The pair mirrors the manufacturer rules, where one section gives a maker who knows of a danger the liability of a supplier and another imposes liability on a maker who fails to use reasonable care.14
To learn what a plaintiff must prove, follow the cross-reference. The Restatement version quoted in Moody v. Martin Motor Co. made a negligent repairer liable as negligent manufacturers are “under the rules stated in §§ 395 to 398.”15 Section 395 asks whether the maker failed to use reasonable care in making a chattel that, unless carefully made, it should recognize as involving an unreasonable risk of physical harm. It protects those who use the chattel for a purpose the maker should expect and those the maker should expect to be endangered by its probable use.16 The manufacturer rules also apply although someone else was under a duty to inspect the chattel, so a repairer cannot answer a claim by saying that the owner or another person was obliged to check the work.17 And because the cross-reference reaches the design rule, a contractor that builds a chattel under its own plan or design must use reasonable care in adopting a safe one.18
One standard governs because careless repair puts a hidden defect into circulation just as careless manufacture does. The repairer alone controlled how the work was done, and everyone who later meets the chattel has less chance than the repairer to catch the mistake. Holding the repairer to the manufacturer’s standard also spares the injured person the near-impossible task of proving that someone else should have found the error.
Section 395 ties the duty to the unreasonable risk the chattel would carry if carelessly made, so the care owed rises with the danger a mistake would create. A contractor who reseats a hoist’s load chain owes closer attention than one who tightens a drawer pull. The protected class follows § 395 as well. It is defined by whom the repairer should expect to use the chattel or be endangered by its probable use, not by who signed the repair order, so a passenger or a person on the road may recover for harm caused by lawful use of the chattel in the manner and for the purpose for which it was turned over.19
The two technicians did the same kind of job on the same kind of machine. What decides the outcome is whether the contractor’s own work fell short of reasonable care and whether the injury came from that work. Section 404 does not make a repairer the guarantor of everything that later goes wrong with the chattel.
Section 404 also marks the outer limit of repair liability, because repair is a service and not a sale of a product. A lessor, who likewise puts a chattel in others’ hands without selling it, answers in ordinary negligence: § 408 asks whether the lessor failed to use due care to make the leased product safe for lessees and others foreseeably endangered.20 Repairers fit the same pattern, since their liability rests on knowledge or want of care and not on a sale. A charge for parts on the bill does not change that. Most courts hold that a plumber who supplies a gasket while installing a gas stove is not primarily “engaged in the business of selling such product” and is therefore not liable under § 402A.21 A rebuilder that sells what it rebuilt, instead of returning a customer’s chattel, raises seller questions that § 404 does not answer.
Because § 404 imports the manufacturer’s negligence liability, it also imports the manufacturer’s proof problem. The plaintiff must show that the contractor’s care fell short, and the lapse is usually hidden inside work the plaintiff never saw. The plaintiff can invoke res ipsa loquitur, which lets a jury infer negligence from an accident of a kind that ordinarily does not occur without it, but the jury may still deny recovery if it accepts the defense that even careful work leaves an occasional defect.22 A repairer’s records of what it did and how it tested the result are the natural evidence of due care, which is why the second technician fares so much better than the first.
Read together, §§ 403 and 404 give an injured plaintiff two routes into a repair case, and the facts choose between them. A repairer that noticed its work failing and returned the chattel in silence falls under § 403. A repairer that worked hurriedly or sloppily and never noticed falls under § 404. A repairer that both knew and was careless is exposed under each, and the plaintiff needs only the route the proof best supports. The usual exam error is to hunt for what the repairer knew when the stem describes carelessness, or to answer a negligent-repair stem in strict liability because the plaintiff was badly hurt.