Concept
Negligent Acts and Manner
Objective reasonable person standard and the actor's circumstances
Negligent Acts and Manner
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 297 divides negligent conduct into two kinds, and the division tells a jury which of two questions it is answering. An act of the first kind involves an unreasonable risk of harm to another even though it is done with all possible care, competence, preparation, and warning. An act of the second kind is negligent only if it is done without reasonable care, competence, preparation, or warning.1 Either kind can describe almost any conduct, because, subject to the limits of duty and scope of liability, any conduct may be negligent under the circumstances.2
The earlier sections of this chapter built the reasonable person and fixed what that figure perceives, knows, and infers. Section 297 puts the figure to work on a particular piece of conduct. The first kind of negligence asks whether the actor should have acted at all. The second asks whether he acted with the care the situation required. The two questions call for different evidence and different arguments. A jury that asked only about precautions could never condemn a dangerous act, since the defendant would answer every complaint by listing the safeguards he used. A jury that asked only whether an activity was worth its risk would overlook the lawful activity performed carelessly. Deciding first which claim is before it lets the jury run the right inquiry.
For the second kind, § 298 supplies the measure of care. The actor must exercise the care that a reasonable man in his position, with his information and competence, would recognize as necessary to prevent the act from creating an unreasonable risk of harm to another.3 The reference to the actor's position brings in his circumstances, and the references to information and competence bring in the knowledge and capacities the law charges to him. An act that is negligent whatever the care never reaches the question of manner, so the discussion starts there.
Risk in the Act Itself
Clause (a) of § 297 describes an act that is negligent "although it is done with all possible care, competence, preparation, and warning."4 The fault lies in the choice to act. The jury asks whether the risk the act creates is justified by what the act accomplishes, and the quality of the performance never enters the question. Skill, preparation, and warnings all come after the decision to proceed, and none of them removes the exposure that the decision creates. A prudent person would have declined the act or put it off, however well he could have performed it.
A test that looked only at the quality of performance would let an actor impose a grave danger on others for a trivial advantage, so long as he was skilled while doing it. Skill lowers the chance that the execution goes wrong, but some dangers belong to the act itself: placing someone in the path of a collision that only luck would avoid, for example. Judging the act directly lets the jury set the risk against the act's value and against what the actor could have done instead, which is the comparison ordinary prudence makes before acting.
The weighing behind that result is Judge Learned Hand's classic formulation: conduct is negligent when the foreseeable probability and gravity of the harm outweigh the burden to the actor of alternative conduct that would have prevented the harm.5 Low probability is therefore no defense by itself. A pedestrian who dashes across a little-traveled highway without looking for traffic may be negligent, even though the statistical chance that she and a fast-moving car reach the same point at the same time is very low, because the potential harm is very great.6 The burden side of the scale counts equally. In one Hand-formula analysis, a railroad faced a $12 million overpass against six likely accidents (two per decade over the overpass's 30-year life, at an average cost of $500,000 each), or about $3 million in injury costs. That analysis suggests the railroad's decision may well be reasonable.7 Falstaff's pass sits at the opposite end, because the harm is grave and the burden of avoidance is only a short wait.
The weighing is done at the time and place of the conduct, because the actor is judged by the risk that was foreseeable then.8 The setting can therefore reverse the answer for the same act.
Both drivers face the same question, whether the act is worth its risk. The clear stretch shrinks the probability of a collision almost to nothing while the burden of avoidance stays high, and so the answer changes. Once the act itself passes that test, the claim moves to clause (b), which asks whether the act was done without reasonable care, competence, preparation, or warning.9 The sorting question on an exam is whether any amount of care would make the act reasonable. If care can cure the risk, as with a driver who slows and watches near a school, the claim belongs under clause (b). If the risk survives all care, as with a pass begun where the road ahead is hidden, the claim belongs under clause (a), and a list of precautions answers nothing.
Care in the Manner
Many acts are worth doing and become negligent only through the way the actor does them. For these acts § 297(b) makes the act negligent only if it is done without reasonable care, competence, preparation, or warning.11 Section 298 measures the care owed: the actor must exercise the care that a reasonable man in his position, with his information and competence, would recognize as necessary to prevent the act from creating an unreasonable risk of harm to another.12 The risk in these cases is of a kind that precautions can bring down to a reasonable level. The jury therefore decides what the actor should have done while acting, because the question whether to act has already been answered yes.
The clause names several distinct ways in which a performance can fall short. Negligence may lie in how the actor does the act, in a lack of competence, in a lack of preparation, or in a failure to warn or instruct when the circumstances require.13 The familiar forms are the inattentive driver, the operator who takes on a task beyond his skill, the worker who starts a job without checking what it demands, and the owner who stays silent about a hidden hazard. Each omitted step is a precaution that costs the actor something, which is why the clause treats the absence of any one of them as the fault. Whichever form the facts suggest, § 298 supplies the same yardstick for deciding whether the precaution was required.
The phrase "his information and competence" returns the actor's own situation to the analysis, but the measuring stick remains a reasonable man. That figure is placed in the actor's position and given the information and competence the law charges to the actor. Information includes what the actor actually knows and observes, because the reasonable person always takes that into account.14 It includes the common knowledge about people, animals, and things that every actor is expected to have.15 It also reaches facts that a prudent person would have ascertained in performing a duty to another, or on whose existence he would have governed his conduct.16 Competence supplies a floor and permits an addition: the attention, perception of the circumstances, memory, knowledge, intelligence, and judgment of a reasonable man, plus any superior capacities the actor himself has.17
This reading is the only one consistent with the rest of the chapter. If "his information and competence" meant whatever the actor personally had, an actor who knew little would owe little care, and the objective standard would collapse into a subjective one. Tying the phrase to a reasonable man in the actor's position keeps the inquiry on what was knowable to someone situated as the actor was. The same anchor guards against hindsight, because the risk counts only as foreseeable at the time and place of the conduct.18 The jury does not ask what the accident later revealed, only what a prudent person holding the actor's information would have seen as necessary beforehand.
Does a dangerous activity such as dispensing gasoline call for a higher standard of care? The law answers that it calls for a greater amount of care under the same standard. Reasonable care in dispensing gasoline demands more care than dispensing ice cream sodas, because the risk of explosion is high, yet the standard is the same. The extra care is simply what the reasonable person would do in those circumstances.19 The figure who measures the attendant at the pump is the one who would measure a soda-fountain clerk, and only the circumstances differ.
The difference shows in jury instructions. An accurate instruction tells the jury that if dispensing gasoline involves a high risk of explosion, and a reasonable person in the defendant's circumstances would have known or should have known of that risk, the defendant had to exercise a high level of care commensurate with the risk of the activity.20 The heightened care depends on what a reasonable person in the defendant's circumstances would have known, which is the "his information" limb of § 298 at work. An instruction suggesting a different, higher standard of care misstates the law. The two instructions sound alike, and a jury may take away only that the defendant had to be very careful, but a verdict reached under the inaccurate one can be reversed for legal error.21
The move away from "highest degree of care" wording confirms the point. Arizona, in Nunez v. Prof. Transit Mgt. of Tucson, 229 Ariz. 117 (2012), moved from a heightened duty to exercise the highest degree of care practicable to the ordinary negligence standard. Another decision cited alongside it describes a common carrier as subject to the same duty of care as any other potential tortfeasor, namely reasonable care under all of the circumstances of the particular case.22 Whatever the label, more danger demands more care, so the safest description on an exam is the gasoline instruction's: one standard, scaled by risk.
The amount scales because a precaution is the price of keeping an acceptable activity acceptable. The foreseeable probability and gravity of the harm fix the magnitude of the risk, and the risk is unreasonable when that magnitude outweighs the burden of the alternative conduct that would have prevented it.23 A modest precaution against a hazard that can level a service station is worth far more than the same precaution against a spilled soda. A fixed level of care would either leave the pump under-protected or burden the soda counter with pointless caution. One yardstick remains, and the risk decides how much the reasonable person would do.
Neither attendant is held to a special rule for gasoline. Each is compared with a reasonable person who knows what the community knows about gasoline vapor, and that shared knowledge is what makes the first attendant's soda-fountain casualness unreasonable. An attendant on his first day who had never been told about vapors would be measured the same way, because the knowledge charged to him is the community's and not his own training.24 Information that actually reaches an attendant can raise the bar further, since conduct is judged in light of what the actor actually knows and observes.25