Concept
Children as Actors
Children, mental condition, and physical disability
Children as Actors
Section 283A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts gives children a yardstick of their own: a child must conform to the conduct of a reasonable person of like age, intelligence, and experience under like circumstances.1 The rule is the exception built into the general standard, which holds every actor to a reasonable person under like circumstances unless the actor is a child.2 The exception adjusts the measure and leaves children inside negligence law. Children are generally liable for their torts, so a young defendant is still compared with a standard and can still fall short of it.3
The law relaxes the adult measure because children as a class are expected to be more or less incapable of meeting adult standards of behavior.4 Two limits keep the allowance tied to that reason. A child may be so young that the question is whether negligence is possible at all, which makes age a threshold issue as well as an ingredient of the standard. And a child who takes up an activity that adults ordinarily perform, such as driving a powered vehicle, exposes the public to the same danger whoever is at the controls. This unit takes up the reasonable child standard first, then the threshold question of capacity, then the adult activities exception.
The Reasonable Child Standard
Section 283A names three personal traits, age, intelligence, and experience, and writes them into the yardstick. The adult test works differently. It takes no account of the actor's own limits of judgment, because the reasonable person standard is a legal judgment and not a moral assessment of the individual.5 The child standard stays objective: jurors compare the child with a hypothetical figure and do not ask what this child sincerely believed. Yet the figure is tailored to the kind of child the defendant is, so courts call the standard partly individualized. The comparison group is other children in similar circumstances.6
Each trait does separate work. Age sets the baseline, since what a six-year-old can foresee and control differs from what a fourteen-year-old can. Intelligence adjusts for the child's actual mental development, and experience adjusts for familiarity with the danger or activity at issue. Under the majority rule, a child's capacity depends on age, intelligence, and experience measured against other children in similar circumstances,7 which means that more may be expected of a child with superior intelligence or experience.8 A child with four seasons of youth hockey is measured against a reasonable child with that background. The phrase “under like circumstances” carries over from the adult rule, so the setting of the conduct, whether a crowded rink or a dark street, stays in the comparison.
A child who falls short of the standard is liable like anyone else, because the allowance changes the measure and does not excuse the child.9 A ten-year-old who sets fire to a neighbor's shed while experimenting with matches may well have fallen short of what a reasonable ten-year-old would do. That conclusion is a legal judgment about conduct and not a moral condemnation of the child.10 Most jurisdictions apply the same age-based standard to a child plaintiff's contributory negligence, a point the next subsection develops.11
Once the judge has settled which standard governs, whether the child met it is ordinarily a question for the jury. When no concrete, self-applying rule makes reasonableness more specific, the law offers only a process for resolving negligence cases, which is submission to the jury, and different juries may resolve similar facts differently.12 A ten-year-old's attempt to jump onto a moving train, as in Norfolk and Portsmouth Belt Line R.R. Co. v. Barker, is the kind of conduct a jury measures against what a reasonable child of that age would do. If the evidence permits only one conclusion, that the child acted unreasonably in view of the child's estimated capacity, the judge may direct a verdict against the child, as would be done for an adult.13 The directed verdict keeps the child standard from becoming a license for jurors to excuse any young defendant out of sympathy.
Two reasons support the lower yardstick, and they come from different parts of the problem. The first concerns learning. The Supreme Court of Washington, in the snowmobile case discussed later in this unit, repeated an earlier decision's warning that “it would be a monstrous doctrine to hold that a child of inexperience—and experience can come only with years—should be held to the same degree of care in avoiding danger as a person of mature years and accumulated experience.”14 Adult care would charge a child with foresight that only years can supply. The second reason concerns how other people behave around children. Children are readily identifiable on sight, so others can frequently adjust their conduct to allow for “childish” behavior. Children also seldom engage in the high-risk activities of adults, and their small size and subjection to adult supervision keep the magnitude of the risks they create below an adult's.15 Tying the standard to intelligence and experience as well as age keeps the allowance matched to these reasons, since a child whose capacity has developed further has a weaker claim to it. The second reason also marks the allowance's limit, because others cannot adjust for a child they cannot recognize. The adult activities subsection picks up that point.
On an exam, identify the actor as a child, then ask what a reasonable child with this actor's age, intelligence, and experience would have done in the same setting. A detail such as years of training or unusual maturity signals that more is expected of this child. If the facts give only the child's age, still apply the child standard. Do not slide into the adult measure, and do not conclude that a child cannot be negligent, unless the child is very young or is engaged in an adult activity, as the next two subsections explain.
Age and Capacity for Negligence
Age does two jobs in negligence law. Inside the standard, it is one of three traits that tailor the yardstick to the child. Ahead of the standard, it can decide whether the child may be found negligent at all, because the reasonable-child comparison in § 283A assumes a child old enough to be held to some standard of care.17 Jurisdictions answer that threshold question in two ways.
A minority of states answer it with fixed age brackets. In its fullest form, the scheme has three tiers. A child under seven is incapable of negligence as a matter of law. A child from seven to fourteen is presumed incapable, though proof of actual capacity can rebut the presumption. A child over fourteen is presumed capable, though proof of incapacity can rebut that presumption in turn.18 The middle-tier presumption weakens with each year of age, as the Pennsylvania court observed in Kuhns v. Brugger, a case about a twelve-year-old who injured a cousin while playing with a gun.19 The numbers vary by state. In Price v. Kitsap Transit, the Washington Supreme Court declined to abandon a conclusive presumption that children under six are incapable of negligence, so that state's floor sits at six.20 Every cutoff is one jurisdiction's rule and never a national line.
The brackets have a shaky pedigree. Their multiples of seven were borrowed from rules of criminal responsibility, which were themselves derived from ancient mythology, and there is little justification for their use.21 Their appeal is administrative, since a fixed line spares the court from litigating each child's maturity. The cost is that a line treats every child of a given age as having the same capacity, although children differ widely in their ability to see danger. That mismatch explains the modern trend toward leaving capacity to the jury in each case,22 an approach that fits the reasonable-child standard, where intelligence and experience already count.
The brackets matter most when the child is the plaintiff, because the presumptions sometimes apply only to a minor's contributory negligence.23 Where contributory negligence is a complete defense, a finding that the child was careless can defeat the whole claim, and a rule of incapacity preserves it. In Tyler v. Weed, a boy of six years and eight months was permanently injured by a negligent driver, and a jury rejected his claim because of his own contributory negligence. Michigan's high court reversed, holding that the question should not have gone to the jury because a child under seven cannot be contributorily negligent; Baker v. Alt later overruled that decision.24 Under the majority rule, the question is instead whether the child's conduct fell below that of other children of similar age, intelligence, and experience in similar circumstances.25
Courts that reject brackets and decide capacity case by case still treat very young children as incapable of negligence as a matter of law. Iowa had rejected per se age rules, yet in Mastland, Inc. v. Evans Furniture, Inc. it held that a child under three who started a fire by playing with a cigarette lighter in his crib was incapable of negligence.26 Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm § 10(b) draws the line at five, and the Utah Supreme Court adopted it in Nielsen v. Bell, where a four-year-old threw a toy that seriously injured his babysitter's face.27
The floor follows from what negligence means. A finding of negligence says the actor fell short of what a reasonable person of the actor's kind would have done, and a toddler cannot appreciate risk, so no reasonable child of that age could be found to have fallen short. A jury could give only one answer, and so the judge supplies it. The floor also differs from the brackets: it reaches only the earliest years, and it carries no long middle zone of rebuttable presumption above it. Past the floor, the child is capable of negligence and the dispute turns to whether the child met the reasonable-child standard, as in Barker, where a ten-year-old was injured trying to jump onto a moving train. Under the traditional brackets, the same ten-year-old would be presumed incapable, and the party asserting negligence would first have to overcome that presumption.
The age of majority marks the upper end of the special treatment. Tort law applies the statutory age of majority, which is eighteen, and a person at or above that age is held to adult standards.28 Some places end the allowance earlier. One court presumed a twenty-year-old as capable as an adult in Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. Brown, and Indiana applies the adult standard to everyone over fourteen in Penn Harris Madison School Corp. v. Howard.29 Those results are local and should not be stated as the general rule. They share a rationale, however: the allowance rests on developing capacity, and it loses its basis as capacity matures.
On an exam, start with the child's age and the jurisdiction's rule on capacity, before any reasonable-child comparison. If the facts name the jurisdiction's rule, apply it. If they do not, state the majority approach, which is case-by-case capacity with a floor for very young children, and note that a minority uses brackets. Check also whether the child is the plaintiff, since the bracket presumptions sometimes operate only on contributory negligence.
Adult Activities Exception
Section 283A supplies the default for a minor defendant: the conduct of a reasonable person of like age, intelligence, and experience under like circumstances.31 The Restatement withholds that allowance when the child is engaged “in an activity which is normally undertaken only by adults, and for which adult qualifications are required.”32 The exception follows from the premises that justified the allowance. A lower yardstick works because the people around a child can see a child coming and take extra care, and because children ordinarily pursue pastimes that create modest risks.33 When a child takes the controls of a powerful machine, neither premise holds.
Robinson v. Lindsay shows the exception at work. A thirteen-year-old was driving a snowmobile that belonged to the defendant Lindsay and towing the plaintiff on an innertube when the plaintiff's thumb caught in the tow rope and was severed.34 The jury returned a verdict for the boy, but the trial court ordered a new trial because it had failed to instruct the jury on an adult standard of care, and the only issue on appeal was whether a minor operating a snowmobile is held to that standard.35 The Washington Supreme Court said yes and affirmed. The boy had operated snowmobiles for about two years, and he was driving a 30-horsepower machine at ten to twenty miles per hour, although it could reach sixty-five.36 Because he was operating a powerful motorized vehicle, he was held to the standard of care and conduct expected of an adult.37 His two years of experience would count as one of the traits that tailor the child standard, but under the exception it did nothing to restore the child's yardstick.
The exception answers a circularity problem. Under the child standard, a defendant is compared with other children in like positions, so a child engaged in a dangerous activity could answer any claim by saying that other children similarly situated would not have taken more care. The carelessness of the comparison group would then set the limit of the child's duty, an injustice that courts created the exception to avoid.38
Courts draw the line in more than one way. Some ask whether the activity is normally one for adults only, as the Minnesota Supreme Court did in Dellwo v. Pearson, which applied the adult standard to a twelve-year-old operating a motorboat.39 Washington looked to the danger an activity poses. Traditional childhood activities are not generally considered capable of resulting in “grave danger to others and to the minor himself if the care used in the course of the activity drops below that care which the reasonable and prudent adult would use,” and children remain free to enjoy them without being held to an adult standard.40 The Washington court also quoted the Dellwo court's skepticism about “a rule that would allow motor vehicles to be operated to the hazard of the public with less than the normal minimum degree of care and competence,” given that powerful vehicles are readily available and frequently operated by immature individuals.41 The two framings agree on powered vehicles. They diverge only when an activity is dangerous but not typically adult, or typically adult but not very dangerous.
Each premise of the child standard fails when the child operates a powered machine. The allowance depends on others being able to adjust to the child, and they can adjust because children are readily identifiable on sight.42 Motorists, boaters, and pilots generally cannot tell that an approaching operator is a child, so the extra self-protective care the allowance presupposes never becomes available.
The word “adult” in the exception labels a kind of activity and does not say that the activity is limited to adults. The better reading treats the exception as an application of the general rule that whoever engages in a hazardous activity requiring special skill, experience, training, or education is judged by the standards of reasonable competence for that activity, for the protection of the public, regardless of age.43 Asking whether the activity is lawful for a minor therefore asks the wrong question.
Courts have applied that reasoning activity by activity, and the results cluster around power and speed. The adult standard has been applied to children driving automobiles, motorboats, motorcycles, and motor scooters.44 Other courts have reached the same result for a minor operating a tractor and for one riding a gasoline-powered minibike.45 The child standard has been kept for building an outdoor fire, a game of monkey-in-the-middle played with a set of keys, deer hunting, and downhill skiing, and for bicycle riding, as in Williams v. Gilbert.46 The bicycle and the minibike make the contrast cleanest. A pedal bicycle is a traditional childhood activity that children remain free to enjoy without an adult yardstick, and an engine adds speed and a capacity for grave harm that the rider's age does nothing to reduce.47
The Third Restatement sharpens the formulation. Section 10(c) applies the adult standard to a child engaged in a “dangerous activity that is characteristically undertaken by adults,” and comment f places the use of firearms in that category.48 That wording ties the test to danger and to what adults characteristically do, so firearms, which an older deer-hunting decision left under the child standard, now point toward the adult yardstick. Courts still divide at the margins. A teenager playing golf was held to the adult standard in Neumann v. Shlansky, while downhill skiing kept the child standard in Goss v. Allen, although a golf ball and a skier at speed can each injure a bystander.49 The activity lists are collections of decisions and not a uniform national catalogue, so an answer about a borderline activity should argue from danger to others and from adult character and should not rely on a remembered roster.