Concept
The Balancing Test
Risk-utility factors in judging unreasonable conduct
Risk-Utility Balancing in Negligence
The Balancing Test
A defendant who causes harm is not liable for that reason alone. Courts impose strict liability only in certain kinds of cases, and fault remains the most common basis of tort liability.1 Negligence therefore needs a way to say when a risk crosses the line into fault, and Restatement (Second) of Torts § 291 draws that line by weighing. Where an act is one that a reasonable person would recognize as involving a risk of harm to another, the risk is unreasonable, and the act negligent, if the risk is of such magnitude as to outweigh what the law regards as the utility of the act or of the particular manner in which it is done.2
The rule has a trigger and a comparison. The trigger is a risk that a reasonable person would recognize, since an unrecognizable risk gives the court nothing to weigh. The comparison sets the magnitude of that risk against the law's valuation of the conduct, and the conduct is negligent only when the risk is the heavier side.
The comparison has two possible targets: the act itself and the particular manner of doing it. Asking about the act tests whether the activity is worth its danger at all. Asking about the manner tests whether the actor added danger that the activity's purpose does not require. Few people doubt that hauling freight is a legitimate business, so the dispute often concerns how the hauling was done.
The truck driver's case shows why the existence of risk cannot be the test. Nearly every useful activity puts others in some danger, and a rule that condemned all foreseeable danger would condemn driving along with it. A careful driver still creates a small chance of a fatal collision, and the law accepts that chance because driving is useful. The question in every case is whether the conduct earns the risk it creates.
The next case shows that a small risk does not protect conduct that earns nothing.
That risk is unreasonable because the shooting has no utility to set against it. The law of recklessness makes the same point: if there is no social utility in what the actor is doing, he may be reckless though the chance of harm is less than 1 percent.4 Recklessness is the more culpable state, so a risk that small, attached to conduct that does no good, is unreasonable for negligence purposes as well. The driver and the shooter both create small risks, so the difference between them lies on the utility side of the scale. The driver earns a large credit and the shooter earns none, and the credit counts only for what the law regards as useful, not for what the actor happens to prize.
The sections that follow take the two sides of the scale in turn. The utility side has three factors: the social value the law attaches to the interest the conduct advances or protects, the chance that the conduct will in fact advance it, and the chance that a less dangerous course would advance it adequately.5 The risk side has four: the social value of the interests imperiled, the chance that the conduct will invade an interest of the other person or of a class to which that person belongs, the extent of the harm likely to follow, and the number of persons whose interests are likely to be invaded.6 The weight of the risk depends on two of these together, because the foreseeable likelihood of harm and the foreseeable seriousness of that harm, in combination, determine its magnitude.7 Because the weights are foreseeable ones, what the actor knew or should have known matters, a point taken up under Foresight and Knowledge.
One feature governs every factor: the balance judges conduct, not state of mind. An actor can be anxiously concerned for the safety of others and still be negligent if the conduct creates an unreasonable risk, and in such cases legal fault and moral blame diverge.8