Concept
Judge Decides Relevance
Statute or regulation as the source of the standard of care
Judge Decides Relevance
The judge, not the jury, decides whether a statute supplies the standard of care. Section 285 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts lists, among the sources of a standard of conduct, one “adopted by the court from a legislative enactment or an administrative regulation which does not so provide.”1 The verb carries the rule. A frequently quoted formulation calls the decision to adopt the standard “purely a judicial one, for the court to make,” and says that a court adopting a legislative standard acts “to further the general purpose which it finds in the legislation, and not because it is in any way required to do so.”2 Section 286 builds the same allocation into its text: “The court may adopt” an enactment as the standard when its purpose is found to be, exclusively or in part, to protect a class of persons that includes the plaintiff, to protect the particular interest invaded, and to protect that interest against the kind of harm and the particular hazard involved.3 A definition of tort broad enough to cover every wrong is so general as to be almost meaningless, so a statutory case turns on narrower tests, and § 286 is one of them.4
A criminal statute or police regulation becomes the civil standard “only because the court accepts it.” The decision about what that standard should be “still rests with the court,” and the statute matters in a negligence suit only for the standard of conduct the court takes from it.5 When the court declines, the ordinary rule governs: without such a standard, the case goes to the jury, which decides whether the defendant acted as a reasonably prudent person would in similar circumstances.6 And if the judge finds a statute irrelevant to the case, the jury is not to consider the defendant’s violation of it on the negligence question.7 For an illustration, see Roberts v. State.
A theater seat collapses and injures a patron. A statute requires theater owners to inspect their exits and wiring each year. The owner skipped the inspection, and the patron offers that omission as proof of negligence. The owner replies that the statute guards against fire, not against failing furniture. The tempting mistake treats that dispute as a question of fact. A judge who tells the jury that, if it finds the statute was meant to protect patrons from injuries like this one and finds that the owner violated it, the violation establishes negligence, has handed the jury a question that belongs to the court. The court decides whether the statute’s purpose reaches this plaintiff and this harm, and the jury has no part in that decision.
The correct sequence runs the other way. The judge first decides, as a matter of law, whether the inspection statute was meant to protect patrons against a collapsing seat. If the answer is no, the jury does not weigh the missed inspection on the negligence question, and the patron must persuade it under the general reasonably prudent person standard, for example by showing that a careful owner would have repaired the seat.8 If the answer is yes, the court adopts the statute as the standard, and the missed inspection goes to the jury as a violation of it.
The jury keeps a role that matters even after the judge adopts a statute. A tenant falls in a dark apartment hallway, and a statute requires landlords to keep hallways lit. The court decides that the statute protects tenants against this kind of fall and adopts it as the standard, but the landlord testifies that the bulb was never out. The violation establishes negligence only if the light was out, and whether it was out is a factual issue for the jury. The judge should not direct a verdict for the tenant, even in a jurisdiction that applies negligence per se.9 The judge decides what the statute means and whether it governs this plaintiff’s claim. The jury decides what happened.