Concept
Compliance Is Only Evidence
Scope of the statutory standard and effect of compliance
Compliance Is Only Evidence
The preceding sections asked when a violated statute can supply the standard of care. The defendant's side poses the mirror question: if breaking a safety statute can establish negligence, does obeying one establish due care? It does not. Under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 288C, compliance with a legislative enactment or an administrative regulation does not prevent a finding of negligence where a reasonable person would take additional precautions.1 Every state admits evidence of the compliance, so the defendant may offer it, but the jury still decides whether the statutory minimum was enough.2 A plaintiff who shows that a careful person in the defendant's position would have gone beyond the legal minimum can therefore recover from a defendant who broke no law.
Violation and compliance do not work as mirror images. In a negligence per se jurisdiction, a defendant who violates a statute aimed at the harm that occurred, and who has no acceptable excuse, loses the breach question: the jury must find that the defendant failed the duty of due care, however carefully the defendant otherwise acted.3 Compliance produces no matching result. Some statutes prescribe only a bare minimum, and compliance with them carries little weight, because reasonable care may require more than meeting the statutory requirement.4 A violation shows that the defendant fell below the floor the legislature set. Compliance shows only that the defendant stayed on it.
The statute fixed one height for every pool, while the reasonable owner's choice turns on who lives next door. The same is true on the road. A driver who holds the posted speed limit through dense fog may be found negligent, because the limit marks the speed at which driving becomes unlawful and does not mark the speed that is safe in every condition.
The common-law system explains why a legislature's minimum does not close the question. Legislatures act against a background of existing common law and know that common-law courts can hold defendants liable for unreasonable conduct resulting in injury, even when the legislature has said nothing on the point. Statutes in this country do not comprehensively prescribe when a defendant will or will not be held liable, as civil-law codes do.5 A defendant who complies has satisfied the legislature, and the common law may still ask for more.
Courts have learned from experience to distrust a fixed rule of conduct that takes the place of judgment. The crossing-accident decision in Goodman laid down such a rule, and it soon proved too harsh and unjust, made recovery in crossing cases virtually impossible, and was unworkable: compliance would often unreasonably delay traffic, might itself be dangerous, and in some situations would not accomplish the desired result.6 Pokora v. Wabash Ry., 292 U.S. 98 (1934), overruled it.7 A rule that compliance with a statutory minimum equals due care would repeat the bargain, trading judgment about the actual situation for a formula written in advance.
The approved specification is evidence of due care, and § 288C reaches administrative regulations as well as statutes. It cannot settle the question, because § 288C asks whether a reasonable person would take additional precautions, and that question looks to the world as it is when the accident happens, with the alternatives then available. Courts already hesitate to adopt an obsolete statutory standard as the measure of negligence per se.8 By the same logic, a specification that has gone stale deserves no special deference when a defendant offers it as proof of care.
The rule reaches manufacturers too. A business that complies with every applicable statute and regulation may still be held liable for negligence, apart from preemption,9 and the Restatement (Third) makes a commercial seller liable for harm caused by defects in the products it sells.10 A manufacturer whose product meets a regulatory standard can offer that fact to the jury, but the fact does not by itself answer the defect question.
Federal preemption is the important exception to the ordinary rule. When Congress says so explicitly, when compliance with both federal and state law is impossible, or when Congress has regulated a field comprehensively, federal regulation can bar the state tort claim outright instead of serving as one item of evidence.11 The next section takes up that doctrine and the other circumstances in which compliance carries more than evidentiary weight.