Concept
What the Jury Decides
Judge and jury roles in deciding fault
What the Jury Decides
Section 328C of the Restatement (Second) of Torts gives the jury three jobs in a negligence action, each to be done only “in any case in which different conclusions may be reached on the issue.”1 The jury determines the facts,2 decides whether the defendant has conformed to the standard of conduct required by the law,3 and fixes the amount of compensation for legally compensable harm.4
The qualifier marks the outer edge of the jury’s power. When the evidence permits only one rational conclusion on an issue, the court decides it and the jury has no choice to make. When reasonable minds could differ, the issue goes to the jury, and the jury may decide it for either party. The directed-verdict standard draws the same line from the court’s side: the judge must direct a verdict if, under the governing law, there can be but one reasonable conclusion as to the verdict, and a verdict should not be directed if reasonable minds could differ as to the import of the evidence.5 A court may also let the jury speak first and then ask the same question of its verdict. If that ruling proves to be error, the appellate court can reinstate the verdict without a new trial, because the jury was given its chance to decide.6
The three jobs follow the order in which a verdict is built: what happened, whether the defendant’s conduct measured up, and, once liability follows, how much the harm warrants. Each calls on a different strength of the jury. Fact-finding calls for judging witnesses, breach for applying community standards of care, and damages for valuing a loss. Each gets its own subsection below.
Finding the Facts
A question of fact, in Justice Traynor’s concurring formulation, asks what acts or events have occurred or what conditions exist or have existed. Where the constitution secures a right to jury trial, questions of fact are for the jury and questions of law are ordinarily for the judge.7 The speed of a car, the signal a driver gave, and the condition of a walk are all facts in that sense. The qualifier from the opening still governs, so the jury’s authority reaches only those facts on which the evidence permits more than one conclusion.
Fact-finding has two parts that the court may not take over. The first is credibility: deciding whom to believe when witnesses conflict. The second is weighing: deciding what conflicting evidence, and the inferences drawn from it, add up to. Both belong to the jury as the traditional finder of the facts, and not to the court.8 The Supreme Court says the same of the pretrial stage. On summary judgment the judge’s function is not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to decide whether there is a genuine issue for trial, and there is none unless the evidence favoring the nonmoving party is sufficient for a jury to return a verdict for that party.9 The limit protects the jury at every stage. A judge who picked the more believable witness in order to decide whether a jury question existed would be deciding the fact itself, and the right to a jury on fact questions would shrink to the cases in which the testimony happened to agree.
Watson v. Kentucky & Indiana Bridge & R.R. Co. shows a trial court crossing that line. Gasoline escaped from a derailed railroad tank car and ran into the street, and a man named Duerr struck a match. The vapor ignited and the plaintiff was injured. Duerr testified that he lit the match to light a cigar. Other witnesses testified that he threw it deliberately into the vapor. The trial court directed a verdict for the railroad, which meant it had accepted the second version. The appellate court reversed: when some evidence showed an inadvertent act and other evidence a deliberate one, the jury had to decide which was true.
Because the testimony ran both ways, a verdict for either side would have rested on evidence. The question therefore sat inside the space where different conclusions may be reached. A jury could believe Duerr and find a careless act, or credit the other witnesses and find a deliberate one, and a second jury hearing the same proof might choose differently. That variation is the cost of leaving contested facts to jurors, and the only cure would be to substitute the judge’s preference among witnesses for the jury’s.
The jury’s role as fact-finder ends where the evidence leaves a single reasonable view. Judges sometimes take charge of questions of fact and excuse the party with the burden of establishing a fact from producing formal proof. These hybrid questions, which judges treat as if they concerned law, are the raw material of judicial notice.10 A judge might, for example, tell the jury that a well-known street lay within a local business district, sparing the parties proof of a point no reasonable person disputes. In Watson, two groups of witnesses contradicted each other, so someone had to decide whom to believe. In the street example no witness could be believed or disbelieved, because anyone familiar with the community knows the answer.
The usual error is to invoke this limit too early. The test asks whether a reasonable person could land on the other side, so a judge’s conviction that one side’s witnesses are lying does not make a fact indisputable. Where witnesses contradict each other about what happened, a reasonable person could, and the fact goes to the jury.
Judging Breach
Judging breach means measuring the defendant’s conduct against the standard the court has supplied, and the jury does the measuring whenever the evidence leaves room for more than one rational answer.12 The court usually gives the jury only a short general definition of negligence and the reasonable-person test, and leaves the jury to apply its common experience to the evidence.13 Justice Traynor thought the standard of conduct was in principle a question of law, yet he acknowledged the practice: “In the field of negligence it is common practice for the jury to determine not only the facts but the standard of conduct to be applied within the compass of the rule that the conduct prescribed must be that of a reasonably prudent man under the circumstances.”14
The measuring is done defendant by defendant. In a textbook problem, Hahn and Whiting worked on the same job and agreed that Whiting would turn off the power. The analysis concludes that the facts do not indicate Hahn was negligent, since she was not responsible for cutting off the power, and that she is not liable for Whiting’s negligence simply because she was working on the same job with her. Otherwise employees would answer for the torts of any co-worker.15
Within each defendant’s case, the measuring is a balance. The foreseeable probability of harm and its foreseeable gravity combine to fix the magnitude of the risk. It may be negligence to dash across a little-traveled highway without looking, even though a collision is statistically unlikely, because the potential harm is so great. Failing to repair a hole in a rarely used sidewalk might not be negligence, though the same failure on a heavily traveled one would be. Gravity includes both the extent of the damage and the relative societal value of the protected interest, so people count for more than property.16 On the other side of the scale sits the burden of reducing or eliminating the risk by alternative conduct. The relevant considerations include the social value of the activity of which the conduct is a part, the utility of the conduct as a means of carrying it out, the feasibility of safer conduct, its relative cost in money, time, or effort, its relative utility as a means to the same end, and its relative safety.17
Occasionally the balance can be put in numbers. In Hand-formula terms, a railroad weighing a $12 million overpass against the accidents it would prevent might assume two injuries a decade, an average injury cost of $500,000, and a thirty-year life for the overpass. The expected injury cost of $3 million then compares with $12 million to avert the six likely accidents, so the railroad’s decision may well be reasonable. In social terms, the investment may exceed what society, through tort law, is willing to require.18 But common sense tells us that in a lot of cases there is no numerical test. Despite the lack of a scientific gauge, courts often say that this kind of issue presents a question of fact for the jury about whether the defendant behaved reasonably.19
Several reasons support leaving the weighing to jurors. One is the irreducible variety of circumstances surrounding any harm: because of it, an individualized determination of what reasonable care requires usually gives a more precise measure of reasonable conduct than a categorical one.20 Another is that the attributes of the reasonable person, and the factors that make a risk unreasonable, are matters of common sense and community values.21
Undisputed facts do not end the jury’s role. In a Supreme Court case over a child injured on a railroad turntable, no one contested the facts, the jury found negligence, and the Court rejected the railroad’s argument that the judge should have taken the case from the jury. On such facts, it said, “it is a matter of judgment and discretion, of sound inference, what is the deduction to be drawn from the undisputed facts.”22 Negligence is a deduction from the facts, and where that deduction is a matter of judgment, the choice belongs to the jury.
The supermarket spill shows the other side of the line. A customer knocks over a bottle of cooking oil in a busy aisle, and the next shopper slips on it within a minute and a half. A sympathetic jury might call the market unreasonable for not cleaning up and return a verdict for the shopper. A judge may nonetheless grant the store’s renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law, on the ground that it would be unreasonable to require anyone to clean a spill in a supermarket aisle within 90 seconds.23 The facts were uncontested in both cases, so a factual dispute cannot explain who decided. The difference lay in how much room the facts left for judgment. The turntable facts left room for more than one sensible deduction about care, so the deduction was the jury’s to draw. The ninety-second interval left room for one, so the court could take the question. Breach is a jury question by default and a court question only where the evidence permits a single conclusion.
Evidence of custom comes to the jury as one more input to the balance. In a suit over a fire that spread from a condemned house a wrecking company had left unsecured during salvage, testimony established that the neighborhood was frequented by “vagrants” and that the industry’s custom was to lock and board up buildings during salvage to keep trespassers out.24 Testimony like that bears on both sides of the scale: it shows the risk was real, and it shows that safer conduct was feasible and customary. Trimarco v. Klein shows how much attention such proof can draw. A jury awarded the plaintiff $240,000 for personal injuries, a sharply divided Appellate Division reversed on the law and dismissed the complaint, and the Court of Appeals described its primary concern as the role of the plaintiff’s proof on custom and usage.25 Custom is evidence on the question of reasonable care, not a replacement for it, and the jury weighs it with everything else.
Foreseeability appears in both the court’s work and the jury’s, and the two uses do different jobs. In determining duty, as one California court explained in quoting Ballard v. Uribe, a court does not ask whether a particular plaintiff’s injury was reasonably foreseeable in light of a particular defendant’s conduct. It asks more generally whether the category of negligent conduct at issue is sufficiently likely to result in the kind of harm experienced that liability may appropriately be imposed. The jury, by contrast, considers foreseeability in two more focused, fact-specific settings. It considers the likelihood of injury in deciding whether this defendant’s conduct was negligent in the first place, and it considers foreseeability in deciding whether the negligence was a proximate cause of the injury.26 The Third Restatement’s Proposed Final Draft goes further and rejects any role for foreseeability in deciding whether a duty exists. Whatever the allocation, whether this defendant’s own conduct fell short remains for the jury when reasonable minds could differ.
Assessing Damages
After liability, the jury’s third job is to determine the amount of compensation for legally compensable harm.28 The qualifier that opens § 328C applies here as it does to the first two jobs.
The phrase “legally compensable harm” divides the work between court and jury. The court decides which harms the law compensates and conveys the rule through its instructions. At the close of the evidence the judge describes the rules of tort law the jury is to apply, and in a negligence case those rules include the ones governing the assessment of damages.29 Within that boundary the jury turns the evidence of the plaintiff’s loss into a dollar figure, a judgment about the value of the harm that § 328C leaves to the jury.
The jury announces its decisions in a verdict, and the form of the verdict determines how much of its work the court can see. In most cases the jury returns a general verdict, stating only whether it finds for the plaintiff or defendant and, if for the plaintiff, the amount of damages. In most states, however, the court has discretion to ask for a special verdict, in which the jury answers specific questions posed by the instructions about whether each element of the plaintiff’s case, and any available defense, was proved.30 A general verdict shows only the winner and the amount. A special verdict shows how the jury resolved each element. The instruction and verdict-form choices are taken up with the procedural tools below.