Concept
Circumstantial Proof of Negligence
Res ipsa loquitur
Res Ipsa Loquitur
Circumstantial Proof of Negligence
Most negligence plaintiffs prove their case directly. They offer a misassembled tool, a video of the accident, an eyewitness, or an expert's analysis to show what the defendant did, and they argue that the defendant skipped a precaution it would have been reasonable to take.1 Some plaintiffs have no such evidence. They know that something went wrong, but not what the defendant did or failed to do, so they must prove negligence circumstantially. Circumstantial evidence is proof of one fact that makes another, relevant fact more likely: dog prints in fresh snow make it more likely that a dog has recently passed by.2
Two supermarket falls show how far a small fact can carry a plaintiff.
Okafor loses because his evidence shows a hazard and nothing about what the store did. The ruling does not find that the store was careful. It concludes only that a jury would not be warranted in drawing any inference, one way or the other, about whether the store was negligent.3 Wei's browning peel is closer. Sometimes a very small bit of circumstantial evidence is so thin that an inference built on it would be impermissible speculation, and only evidence sufficient to support a reasonable inference of negligence goes to the jury. Trial judges make that assessment, subject to appellate review.4 Even a plaintiff who passes that test has not won, because when an inference of negligence is merely permissible, an inference of no negligence is permissible too.5
Res ipsa loquitur, the thing speaks for itself, names one particular form of this circumstantial proof. To the extent the doctrine identifies a distinct class of cases, they are cases in which circumstantial evidence shows that the defendant was probably negligent in some way, without showing in which way.6 A 300-foot skid mark on a street with a 25-mile-per-hour limit falls outside that class, because it is circumstantial evidence of one specific lapse, speeding.7 The doctrine does not substitute for evidence. It describes what counts as legally sufficient circumstantial evidence of negligence.8
The doctrine takes its name from Byrne v. Boadle, where a barrel of flour fell from a window above the defendant's shop and injured a pedestrian. The plaintiff could not say what Boadle's employees had done to let the barrel loose. Most people would nonetheless infer that Boadle or his employees must have done something negligent for it to get loose, even without knowing what.9
The circumstances in that case supported two inferences, and both rest on experience rather than on any witness. The barrel came from the defendant's premises, which points to Boadle or his employees. And a jury could find that barrels ordinarily fall out of second-floor windows because of negligence,10 and therefore that the defendant failed in some way or other to take reasonable precautions to prevent the barrel from falling.11 Neither inference names a particular untaken precaution. That gap makes this a res ipsa case rather than an ordinary one.
Common experience justifies the inference. Most people would likewise infer that a platform collapsed because of faulty construction, or that a brick fell because of negligence, and the doctrine lets juries draw the inference that most of us would draw anyway.12 In the usual case the past experience behind the inference is common to the community, and the court recognizes it much as it takes judicial notice of facts everyone knows. The parties' evidence can also supply that experience, and expert testimony that such an event usually does not occur without negligence may afford a sufficient basis for the inference.13
The doctrine is built for mystery. It applies when the circumstances of an accident are unknown, and where direct evidence reveals with specificity how the accident happened, there is neither need nor room for a doctrine that allows plausible guesses.14 The section on limits returns to how far that point reaches.
The traditional statement is Restatement (Second) of Torts § 328D: the factfinder may infer that harm to the plaintiff was caused by the defendant's negligence when the conditions it lists are met.15 In most jurisdictions, meeting those conditions means only a permissible inference, and the jury remains free to find for the defendant even if the defendant introduces no evidence that it was not negligent. A few jurisdictions instead treat the doctrine as creating a presumption of negligence that actually has weight.16 Restatement (Third) § 17 compresses the test into one question: whether the accident is of a type that ordinarily happens as a result of the negligence of a class of actors of which the defendant is the relevant member.17 Many states, however, still track the Second Restatement's requirements, so the next sections take its conditions one at a time.18