Concept
Events Ordinarily Caused by Negligence
Res ipsa loquitur
Events Ordinarily Caused by Negligence
Res ipsa loquitur lets a jury conclude that an unexplained accident more than likely happened because of negligence.1 The first condition asks whether the kind of event that hurt the plaintiff gives a jury any reason to draw that conclusion. Under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 328D, the event must be of a kind that ordinarily does not occur in the absence of negligence.2 The elements together establish that the accident probably resulted from someone's negligence and that the negligent actor probably was the defendant.3 This condition supplies the first of those inferences, that someone was probably careless. The conditions that follow tie that someone to the defendant.
The Restatement's commentary requires a basis of past experience that reasonably permits the conclusion that such events do not ordinarily occur unless someone has been negligent.4 The requirement keeps true accidents out of the doctrine. Many mishaps are no one's fault, the inevitable result of imperfect people using imperfect machines in an uncertain world, and confining res ipsa to events where someone probably was negligent excludes them.5
The measure is probability, not certainty. A plaintiff need not eliminate every alternative explanation. Terrorism could explain a vanished airliner, and an undiscoverable defect could explain a tank-truck accident. But the plaintiff's burden is to show that the more probable cause was negligence, and in cases like these a jury could reasonably find that it was.6 The inference also need not point to any particular lapse. In a bottling case, the bottler may have failed to detect a defect in one bottle, or it may have overcharged a sound one. If negligence in either process is more probable than the sum of the non-negligent possibilities, the condition is satisfied.7
Rarity is not the test. An event can be unusual and still happen most often without anyone's fault. The Restatement's own examples are the tire that blows out and the man who falls down stairs. Standing alone, neither permits a conclusion of negligence in inspecting the tire or building the stairs, because common experience is that such events all too frequently occur without negligence.8 Product accidents work the same way. Commentary lists a motor home that catches fire, a vehicle that goes off a slippery highway, an escalator that malfunctions, an airbag that fails to deploy, and an underground gas tank that springs a leak as events that may well occur through no one's negligence, so a court may conclude that res ipsa does not apply.9
A surgical hypothetical shows how easily rarity gets mistaken for negligence. Suppose a patient has reduced sensation in a leg after thigh surgery, and an expert testifies that such numbness does not ordinarily follow carefully performed surgery of that type. The testimony shows only that the result is uncommon. It leaves open that the numbness is one of the occasional outcomes that occur despite due care, and if so, negligence is not the probable explanation. Testimony that this numbness does not occur after such surgery unless the surgeon was careless would supply the missing link. Expert testimony that an event usually does not occur without negligence can supply a sufficient basis for the inference.10
Other events point toward carelessness by their nature. The commentary lists objects falling from the defendant's premises, the fall of an elevator, the escape of gas or water from mains or of electricity from wires or appliances, the derailment of trains, and the explosion of boilers. For each of these, the conclusion that someone was negligent is at least permissible.11 In each, common knowledge suggests that someone's careless conduct is the likely explanation, though negligence is not the only conceivable one.12
An escalator case shows how specific evidence moves the answer. A handrail stopped suddenly while the escalator kept moving, and the court held the first requirement met, because a handrail probably would not stop that way unless someone had been negligent.13 The malfunction was undisputed, and a sudden stop could foreseeably cost riders their balance, so the evidence supported an inference that someone had probably been negligent in operating or maintaining the escalator.14 Proof of nothing more than an injury on the escalator would not have sufficed, because that fact alone does not make it likely that anyone other than the riders was negligent.15 The proof of a specific malfunction carried the inference, not the bare fact of an accident.
Vehicle accidents show how fine the line can run inside a single category. A vehicle that goes off a slippery highway appears on the commentary's list of events that may occur through no one's negligence.16 In Sullivan v. Crabtree, by contrast, a truck swerved across the highway on a clear afternoon, left the road, and overturned, and the driver could not say why. The court held the doctrine applicable, because when a motor vehicle without apparent cause runs off the road, the normal inference is that the driver was negligent. A two-vehicle collision, however, rarely if ever qualifies. Fault in a collision may lie with the plaintiff, with the defendant, or with neither driver, as when brakes fail on a borrowed car or a car skids on undetectable ice.17 Anyone who assumes that the defendant's car caused the crash and that the plaintiff contributed nothing has already assumed the defendant's fault and has no need for res ipsa.18
Day-care cases show how the victim's own capacities change the probabilities. Take two hypotheticals. A three-year-old comes home with a broken arm and no explanation. Toddlers are more enthusiastic than careful and can be hurt under attentive supervision, so experience does not make negligence the likelier cause. A five-month-old comes home with the same injury. An infant that age can hardly move alone, so it is far more probable that someone dropped the child or left the child unattended. A real case supplies a firmer anchor. In Ward v. Forrester Day Care, Inc., a 25-month-old placed in a nursery for supervision and care suffered a severe skull fracture, and no one explained it. The court held that this evidence supported a ruling as a matter of law that the plaintiff had made a prima facie case that the injury would not have occurred but for someone's negligence. Evidence of exposed pipes on a drinking fountain in the play area and of inadequate supervision gave the jury a factual basis to find that the injury more probably than not resulted from negligence.19
Whether the condition is met is a question of law for the court.20 In the usual case the basis of past experience is common to the community and is general knowledge that the court recognizes much as it takes judicial notice of facts everyone knows.21 Where jurors lack that common fund of knowledge, the parties' evidence can supply it, and expert testimony that such an event usually does not occur without negligence may be a sufficient basis, and may be essential to the plaintiff's case.22 The medical setting receives its own section below.