Concept
Expert Testimony and Medical Cases
Res ipsa loquitur
Expert Testimony and Medical Cases
The first condition of res ipsa loquitur, that the event be of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of negligence, rests on experience.1 Someone must be able to say, from what has happened in other cases like this one, what an event of this type usually signifies. In an ordinary accident case the jurors say it themselves. As Comment d to § 328D explains, the basis of past experience is usually common to the community and is a matter of general knowledge, which the court recognizes much as it takes judicial notice of facts everyone knows.2 A barrel that rolls out of a warehouse window needs no explanation. Numbness in a leg after surgery does, because a juror cannot tell whether it reflects a lapse or one of the risks that remain when everyone performs carefully.
Two concerns pull against each other in medical cases. A patient who was unconscious during treatment cannot say what happened, and a rule requiring proof of the particular lapse would leave many injured patients unable to reach a jury. Yet many bad medical results come from the underlying illness or from risks that persist despite proper care, and if every poor outcome supported an inference of negligence, providers would answer for results that no care could have prevented. The first condition reconciles the two. It admits the inference only when experience, and not hindsight about a bad outcome, shows that this kind of event ordinarily signals carelessness.
The practical question in a medical case is therefore whose experience supplies the first condition. Sometimes it is the jurors', because the mishap is so plainly careless that no specialized knowledge is needed to see it. Sometimes it must come from a witness who knows how such procedures usually turn out. Section 328D(1) permits the jury to infer that the plaintiff's harm was caused by the defendant's negligence when its conditions are met, and those conditions govern medical cases as they govern any others.3 What changes is the evidence that satisfies the first one.
Common-Knowledge Malpractice
When jurors can see for themselves that a medical mishap does not happen without carelessness, the plaintiff needs no expert. Comment d says as much. Expert testimony may supply the basis of experience where jurors have none, as in some malpractice actions, but in other kinds of malpractice, such as a sponge left in the plaintiff's abdomen after an operation, no expert is needed to tell the jury that such events do not usually occur in the absence of negligence.4 Medical cases therefore sort into two groups: those in which jurors already hold the necessary experience, which this subsection covers, and those in which the experience must be brought in from outside, which the next subsection takes up.
Two considerations explain why the law lets jurors rely on their own experience here. First, the patient was usually anesthetized or otherwise unable to observe the treatment, so the people who know what happened are the providers, and the patient cannot be expected to name the lapse. In Maki v. Murray Hospital, a patient woke after surgery with injuries from a fall that occurred while he was unconscious in the hospital's care. He could not prove how the fall happened, and the court applied res ipsa loquitur in the interest of justice, because common knowledge and experience show that such an injury would not ordinarily have occurred had the responsible party not been negligent.5 Second, requiring an expert to tell jurors what they already understand adds cost without adding information, and the cost is considerable. Experts charge a premium, must study the case, usually prepare a report and sit for a deposition, and their fees accrue whether or not the plaintiff wins, so meritorious claims are sometimes never pursued.6
The mishaps that qualify share a feature: no treatment plan calls for them, so the event itself tells a layperson that someone slipped. The standard example is a foreign object left inside the patient during surgery, whether a sponge, a towel, or a clamp.7 A patient returned to her room unconscious who wakes an hour later with a second-degree burn on the stomach in the exact shape of a hot-water bottle presents the same kind of case. So does a dentist who operates on the wrong side of the patient's mouth because an x-ray was mislabeled, the setting in Pacheco v. Ames.8 Courts did not reach the same conclusion for loss of function in a leg after abdominal surgery, numbness in an arm after a mastectomy, or paralysis of a vocal cord after thyroid surgery.9 A juror can see why a sponge has no business inside an abdomen. The same juror cannot know whether nerve injury after a given operation is a lapse or one of the occasional results of careful surgery, and that is the question the expert-foundation cases address in the next subsection.
West v. Redlands County Hospital marks the limit of the common-knowledge category. The court refused to apply the doctrine to an injury that was a known, accepted, though rare, risk of the procedure and could occur in the absence of negligence.10 Rarity is therefore not the test. Res ipsa loquitur is reserved for unexplained occurrences that generally do not happen without negligence, a bad outcome alone does not create liability, and if every unfavorable result supported an inference of fault, malpractice law would operate as insurance for medical outcomes.
The foreign-object cases carry a qualification, which James v. Wormuth supplies. A wire had become dislodged inside the patient, and the surgeon decided to leave it there. He testified that finding and removing it would have required a larger incision and a longer time under anesthesia, and that he judged those steps riskier for the patient than leaving the wire in place.11 The patient offered no expert evidence on the standard of practice and relied on res ipsa loquitur, arguing that a foreign object could only be there through negligence. The court accepted that the doctrine applies where an object is unintentionally left in a patient after an operative procedure. It held, however, that this plaintiff had built her case on the surgeon's intentional choice rather than on how the wire first came loose, so she had to prove that the choice departed from accepted community standards.12 Whether it was wiser to risk a longer anesthesia and a larger incision than to leave the wire is a question jurors cannot answer from common knowledge. Expert evidence was therefore required, and without it the dismissal stood. The sponge and the wire are both objects inside a body. What differs is whether the object's presence is an unintended mishap that experience attributes to carelessness or a considered decision whose soundness depends on professional judgment. The first needs no expert, and the second does.
Some legislatures have written the common-knowledge category into statute as part of malpractice reform. Delaware provides a rebuttable presumption of negligence, without expert medical testimony, when the injury is caused by a foreign body unintentionally left in the body after surgery, by an explosion or fire originating in a substance used for treatment, or by a surgical procedure on the wrong patient or the wrong part of the body.13 Nevada's statute follows a similar pattern and adds an unintended burn caused by heat, radiation, or chemicals and an injury to a part of the body not directly involved in treatment.14 Each statute lists the mishaps that qualify, so a plaintiff in such a state who suffers some other complication returns to the common-law analysis and, usually, to the need for an expert foundation. The statutory presumption also carries more procedural force than the permissive inference taught here, a difference this chapter takes up when it reaches the effect of the inference.
Expert-Established Foundation
Some accidents are too technical for jurors to have any common past experience of them. In those cases many jurisdictions permit expert testimony to supply the crucial factual predicate, namely that this kind of accident ordinarily results from negligence, and medical malpractice is the prime example, because neither the court nor the jury has a shared past experience from which to judge the matter.16 The preceding subsection covered mishaps that jurors recognize unaided. This one asks what a plaintiff may do when the mishap lies outside lay experience, and the answer depends on whether the jurisdiction follows the traditional view or the majority view.
The traditional view confines res ipsa loquitur to cases in which the common knowledge of lay jurors is enough to support the inference, so a plaintiff who needs an expert to establish the foundation cannot invoke the doctrine at all.17 The reasoning is that a thing which requires an expert to explain it is hardly speaking for itself.18 Some jurisdictions still enforce the restriction. North Dakota applies res ipsa in medical malpractice cases only when the breach is so plain that a layperson would recognize it, and in Maguire v. Taylor the Eighth Circuit held the doctrine inapplicable to a nerve-damage claim because jurors could not judge from their own understanding whether such damage occurs without negligence.19 A plaintiff in such a jurisdiction whose injury demands expert explanation must prove the defendant's specific negligence directly.
Most courts, and the trend, now treat res ipsa as a separate doctrine that permits circumstantial proof whenever its prerequisites are satisfied by any available means, expert testimony included.20 In Mireles v. Broderick, where a patient developed nerve damage in her arm after a bilateral mastectomy, the court reasoned that the central question is whether a factual predicate supports the inference that the person in control failed to use due care, and that the common-knowledge exception to the expert-testimony rule may inform that question without limiting it.21 New York joined the majority in States v. Lourdes Hospital, and in Sides v. St. Anthony's Medical Center the Missouri Supreme Court collected cases showing that a vast majority of jurisdictions let expert testimony establish the doctrine's requirements in malpractice actions.22
The majority view follows from what the first condition asks. The condition looks for a basis in experience for concluding that events of this kind do not ordinarily occur without negligence, and it does not say whose experience counts. A surgeon's or an engineer's experience can therefore do the work that a juror's everyday experience does in the falling-barrel case. The objection that the thing no longer speaks for itself overlooks what the expert supplies, which is only the general proposition about what such events signify. The expert need not identify the defendant's particular lapse. It is enough to testify that the adverse result would not have occurred had the defendant exercised ordinary care, and the inference that this defendant was negligent remains circumstantial.23 The practice also reaches beyond malpractice. In Newell v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., the Seventh Circuit, applying Indiana law, allowed a plaintiff to present expert testimony that a particular elevator failure would not ordinarily happen in the absence of negligent maintenance.24
On an exam, the exact content of the expert's opinion usually decides the case, because two opinions that sound alike carry opposite legal weight.
The first opinion proves only rarity, and rarity does not make negligence the probable cause, because a known, accepted risk can materialize even when care is proper.25 The second opinion supplies what the first condition requires. If the jury believes it, the jury may find that negligence is the more probable explanation for an injury of this type and infer that it occurred here.26
The foundation can itself be contested. Suppose the surgeon answers with an expert who testifies that the loss of sensation can result from the underlying medical problem, poor post-surgical nursing care, unavoidable surgical abrasion of the nerve, or negligence, so that the experts disagree about whether negligence is the likelier explanation.27 Section 328D(2) assigns the court the task of deciding whether the jury may reasonably draw the inference, and the plaintiff's expert, if believed, supplies a reasonable basis for it.28 Section 328D(3) then leaves the decision whether to draw the inference to the jury wherever different conclusions may reasonably be reached.29 The contest between experts is a credibility question, and the court should not resolve it on a motion for a directed verdict. The jurors are the factfinders, so they decide the foundation facts as well as the ultimate issue of negligence. If they conclude that the accident does bespeak negligence attributable to the defendant, they may infer that the defendant was negligent. If they agree that negligence is not the more probable explanation, they should find for the defendant.30
Expert testimony can help satisfy the first condition, but it does not make the doctrine self-sufficient. In Sides, the court denied the exclusive use of res ipsa loquitur to a patient who contracted E. coli bacteria during surgery, because res ipsa would not suffice where expert testimony was needed to establish the elements of the defendant's negligence.31 A plaintiff in that position must still bring the expert proof the claim requires, and the doctrine cannot stand in for it.
Plaintiffs also face a pleading choice on which the courts divide. A plaintiff with no liability expert is likely to lose if the court rules res ipsa inapplicable, so plaintiffs commonly invoke the doctrine alongside whatever expert testimony they have.32 Where expert testimony does not make res ipsa unavailable, the usual practice is to plead in the alternative: specific acts of negligence shown by the expert, and res ipsa for those acts whose manner of occurrence remains unclear, as in Reilly v. Straub, an Iowa decision.33 Other courts hold that pleading specific acts of negligence forecloses res ipsa, because the principal evidence is no longer circumstantial. In Gilbert v. Middlesex Hospital, a patient with a sponge left inside her after childbirth introduced a medical expert to prove that the physicians were negligent, and the Connecticut appellate court held that she was not entitled to a res ipsa instruction, because the doctrine requires the plaintiff to rely only on circumstantial evidence.34 The two rules reflect different views of what res ipsa is for. Iowa treats it as a way to fill gaps in proof that remain after the plaintiff has proved what the plaintiff can. Connecticut treats it as a substitute for direct proof that is unavailable once direct proof is offered. The decisive fact in Gilbert was an expert's direct proof of the physicians' negligence, which differs from an expert who merely supplies the first condition. A later section returns to the question of when specific proof displaces the inference.