Concept
Roles of Judge and Jury
Res ipsa loquitur
Roles of Judge and Jury
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 328D splits a res ipsa trial between judge and jury. Subsection (2) makes it the court's function to determine whether the jury may reasonably draw the inference of negligence or whether it must necessarily be drawn.1 Subsection (3) makes it the jury's function to determine whether the inference is to be drawn in any case where different conclusions may reasonably be reached.2 The two rules give the judge control at both ends of the range and the jury everything between. If no reasonable jury could draw the inference, the court directs a verdict for the defendant. If no reasonable jury could refuse it, the court may direct a verdict for the plaintiff. Wherever reasonable people could go either way, the jurors decide.
The division follows the ordinary pattern of a jury trial: the court rules on the legal sufficiency of the evidence, and the jury determines its weight.3 Section 328D applies that pattern to one inference, and each half guards against a different error. A court that sent every res ipsa case to the jury regardless of the evidence would let verdicts rest on speculation. A court that resolved the question whenever it found the inference unpersuasive would take from jurors the work they exist to do: weighing conflicting evidence, judging credibility, and applying the community's own experience of how accidents happen. The word reasonably in both subsections joins the two roles. It directs the judge to ask what reasonable jurors could conclude, not what the judge would conclude, and so leaves the choice among permissible conclusions with the jury.
The court rules first, so its role comes first.
The Court's Threshold Role
Section 328D(2) gives the first ruling to the judge, who determines whether the inference may reasonably be drawn by the jury or whether it must necessarily be drawn.4 The ordinary ruling asks whether the plaintiff's evidence would permit a jury to draw the inference, and a negative answer ends the case before any juror weighs anything. The exceptional ruling asks whether the inference is so strong that the jury may not reject it. Either way, the court's ruling settles whether the jury will face the question at all.
The ordinary ruling is the familiar one on the legal sufficiency of the evidence. The plaintiff carries the burden of production, and the court decides whether that burden is met. If reasonable people could disagree on each element, the defendant's motion for a directed verdict at the close of the plaintiff's case is denied. If the evidence is legally insufficient on any element, the motion is granted.5 In a res ipsa case the elements at issue are the foundation facts taught in the earlier sections: that an event of this kind ordinarily reflects negligence, that other responsible causes are sufficiently excluded, and that the negligence, if any, falls within the defendant's duty. The judge does not find those facts. The judge determines whether the jury reasonably could conclude that they are proved. If the evidence would let the jurors find them probably true, the jurors must be given the chance to do so and then to decide whether to infer negligence.6 Only evidence sufficient to support a reasonable inference of negligence sends the issue to the jury, and appellate courts review the trial judge's assessment.7
Defendants press the motion by arguing that the plaintiff has produced no proof of a specific negligent act, and a judge may refuse to submit any claim that lacks credible evidence on an element.8 The argument misses the point of the doctrine. The inference need not be of any particular negligence. It suffices that, among the several causes possible while the instrumentality was under the defendant's control, the possibilities for negligence outweigh the non-negligent ones.9
The judge's ruling draws on community experience. The past experience that supports the inference is usually common to the community and a matter of general knowledge, which the court recognizes much as it takes judicial notice of facts everyone knows.10 A 1932 Montana decision involving Murray Hospital shows the method. A patient woke after surgery with injuries from a fall while unconscious in the hospital's care and could not prove how the fall happened, and the court applied res ipsa because common knowledge and experience show that such an injury would not ordinarily occur without negligence.11 When common experience does not carry the inference alone, the parties' evidence can supply the basis. Expert testimony that such an event usually does not occur without negligence may suffice, and in some cases it is essential to the plaintiff's case.12
The judge should deny the motion. Jurors find the foundation facts, so the judge asks only whether a jury reasonably could conclude that an accident of this kind ordinarily would not happen without negligence.13 If the evidence permits that finding, the jurors must be allowed to make it. If they share the judge's estimate, they will find for the center, and if they conclude that the accident does bespeak negligence, they may infer it. The judge's private figure matters only as a sign that the question is open.
The gate closes when the evidence leaves no reasonable path to the greater probability. The evidence need not be conclusive, and enough to permit a finding of the greater probability will do, as the opinion in Johnson v. Foster puts it.14 The evidence must supply that much, because the jury must be persuaded that the defendant more probably than not breached the standard of care, and a jury that finds the matter in equipoise has not been persuaded.15 In Nutting v. Northern Energy, Inc., the plaintiffs had to admit that they had been working around the heater, and weather records suggested that 80-mile-per-hour winds had caused a downdraft that blew the burner flame outward onto stored combustibles. The court held that the plaintiffs had not made a case for the foundation fact that the negligence, if any, was likely attributable to the defendant, and it refused to give a res ipsa instruction.16 The toddler's record differs in kind. Nothing in it narrows the range of reasonable estimates, so the jury answers the question.
The second determination in § 328D(2) is the mirror image and arises far less often. In exceptional cases the inference is so strong that the court must direct a verdict for the plaintiff unless evidence explains the accident away. A barrel that falls from a window of the defendant's warehouse onto a passerby is the standard illustration.17 The head-on collision of two trains of one railroad on the same track is another, because no innocent account leaves reasonable minds divided.18 A plaintiff who clears the first gate ordinarily receives a jury question, and a directed verdict for the plaintiff remains the exception.
The Jury's Role
Section 328D(3) gives the second decision to the jury, whose function is to determine whether the inference is to be drawn in any case where different conclusions may reasonably be reached.20 The rule begins where subsection (2) stops. The court first decides whether the jury may reasonably draw the inference or whether it must necessarily be drawn,21 and most cases fall between those extremes. Whenever reasonable people could go either way, the jurors receive the question.
The jury holds this decision because the inference is permissive. The jury is free to accept or reject it, so a defendant needs no evidence to win a defense verdict, and the plaintiff's only clear procedural gain is that the plaintiff can rest without expert testimony on causation and still reach the jury.22 The burden of persuasion points the same way. Jurors must be persuaded that the defendant more probably than not breached the standard of care, and a jury that finds the evidence in equipoise has not been persuaded.23 A rule that required the inference whenever the foundation facts appeared would turn a probability into a certainty and relieve the plaintiff of that burden.
The jury's work has two steps. Where the evidence would let jurors find the foundation facts probably true, they decide whether those facts are proved and then whether to make the further inference that the defendant was negligent.24 In Sullivan v. Crabtree, a death followed the driver's loss of control of a truck, which might have come from the driver's negligence or from no fault of his, such as brakes giving way or a part of the control mechanism breaking. Because the evidence supported conflicting inferences, the jury chose the one it thought most probable, and the court affirmed the verdict for the driver.25
The jury may decline the inference even when the defendant says nothing. A verdict for the defendant requires no defense evidence,26 and jurors who find the plaintiff's showing thinner than it first looked may simply remain unpersuaded. An exam answer that treats the defendant's silence as requiring a verdict for the plaintiff has borrowed the presumption rule from a different version of the doctrine and applied it to the permissive inference.
Conflicts between experts show the same division of labor. A patient left with a loss of sensation after surgery may offer an expert who testifies that nerve damage of this type does not ordinarily occur unless the surgeon was negligent, and the surgeon may answer with an expert who testifies that it can result from several causes, including the underlying medical problem, poor post-surgical nursing care, unavoidable surgical abrasion of the nerve, or negligence.27 Each expert supports a different estimate of the likelihood of negligence, and the choice between them depends on whom the jurors believe. The plaintiff's expert, if believed, supplies a reasonable basis for the inference, so the case goes to the jury. If the jurors credit that expert, they may infer negligence, and if they credit the defense expert, they may find for the surgeon.28
A clash between the plaintiff's foundation evidence and the defendant's explanation raises the same question.
The jury decides whether the collision happened. If jurors believe the explanation, they may refuse the inference, because another responsible cause has not been excluded. If they disbelieve it, they remain free to draw the inference from the foundation evidence. An explanation takes the question from the jury only when it is uncontradicted and fully corroborated and nothing suggests that the witnesses are lying, because then the accident is no longer unexplained and the judge would likely direct a verdict for the defendant.29 The impeaching evidence in the shelving case keeps that condition from being met.
Some cases never reach the jury's choice because the record leaves no choice to make. The falling barrel and the head-on trains described above return to the court under subsection (2), and the jurors are never asked to decline the inference. Where the evidence leaves room for a reasonable difference of opinion, as it does with the competing experts, subsection (3) puts the choice with the jury.