Concept
Limits on the Doctrine
Res ipsa loquitur
Limits on the Doctrine
Res ipsa loquitur fills a gap in the plaintiff’s proof with a probability, and two limits follow from that function. The doctrine has no work to do when the plaintiff’s own evidence closes the gap or points to someone other than the defendant, and it does not ask whether the defendant knows more about the accident than the plaintiff does. Both limits come from the three conditions of Restatement (Second) of Torts § 328D(1), which permits an inference that the defendant’s negligence caused the plaintiff’s harm when the event is of a kind that ordinarily does not occur without negligence, other responsible causes (including the conduct of the plaintiff and of third persons) are sufficiently eliminated by the evidence, and the indicated negligence falls within the defendant’s duty to the plaintiff.1 Each condition describes the accident, the people who might have caused it, or the duty owed. None turns on what the defendant happens to know or whether the defendant chooses to speak.
The two subsections take the limits in order: first what the plaintiff’s own proof does to the inference, then whether the plaintiff must show that the defendant is better placed to explain the accident.
When Specific Proof Displaces It
Res ipsa loquitur serves the plaintiff who cannot say what the defendant did wrong, so it applies only when the circumstances of the accident are mysterious and unknown.2 Where direct evidence shows how a product failed, how the defendant was blameworthy in allowing the failure, and how the failure caused the injury, there is neither need nor room for a doctrine that permits plausible guesses about how an accident happened.3 A guess is a poor substitute for facts the jury has already heard.
The same is true when everyone agrees on what happened and disagrees only about who was careless. Suppose, in Byrne v. Boadle, that Boadle had testified that a delivery person for another company was in the shop and dropped the barrel, while the delivery person testified that Boadle dropped it. The court would not have reached for any legal Latin; it would have left the jury to decide who was telling the truth.4 The accident is explained, the conflict concerns which of two negligent acts caused it, and credibility resolves that conflict.
A passenger injured in a derailment shows how the doctrine’s usefulness rises and falls with the plaintiff’s own evidence:
- The passenger proves only that the train derailed. Derailments are events that ordinarily do not happen without negligence, so the passenger has made a prima facie case although nothing yet shows what the lapse was.5
- The passenger goes on to prove exactly how the failure occurred and what the railroad could have done to prevent it. The need for the doctrine vanishes, because the evidence itself explains the accident.6
- The passenger’s evidence instead shows that the track was sabotaged moments before the derailment, without warning or reason for the railroad to expect it. The inference collapses. A railroad that proved the same thing by undisputed evidence would probably be granted a directed verdict.7
The third stage applies the second condition of § 328D(1), which requires that other responsible causes, including the conduct of third persons, be sufficiently eliminated by the evidence. A plaintiff whose own proof names a cause outside the defendant’s responsibility has done the opposite of eliminating it.8
Most real plaintiffs fall between the first two stages, with some specific proof and some gaps. Many courts allow such a plaintiff to rely on res ipsa even when the plaintiff pleads and offers specific evidence of negligence and causation, and the need for the doctrine disappears only when that evidence specifically and fully explains how the failure occurred and what reasonable steps the defendant could have taken to prevent it.9 Because a plaintiff’s proof of how an accident happened is frequently incomplete, the plaintiff should be entitled to rely on the doctrine in addition to the specific proof.10 A rule that stripped the doctrine from any plaintiff who learned part of the story would penalize investigation. Not every court is so generous: Stahlecker v. Ford Motor Co. treated the doctrine as unavailable to plaintiffs who alleged specific acts of negligence.11 When both lines of proof go forward, the court decides whether the jury may reasonably draw the inference or whether it must necessarily be drawn, and the jury decides whether to draw it where different conclusions may reasonably be reached.12
Medical cases show the same displacement. Suppose a surgeon testifies that a wire became dislodged during an operation and that she chose to leave it in place instead of prolonging the anesthesia and enlarging the incision to find it. A plaintiff who builds a claim on that choice attacks a deliberate professional judgment. The accident is no longer unexplained; the question is whether the judgment departed from accepted practice, and ordinary experience does not tell jurors whether it did. The basis for the inference must then come from expert testimony, which in such a case may be essential to the plaintiff’s proof.13
On a fact pattern, begin by reading what the plaintiff can actually prove about the defendant’s conduct. A plaintiff who describes only an accident of a kind that signals negligence is in res ipsa territory. A plaintiff whose evidence shows a particular lapse proves negligence in the ordinary way, and an answer that reaches for res ipsa has misread the facts. A plaintiff with partial proof can use both lines in many courts, unless the stem signals a stricter local view. Proof that points to a cause outside the defendant’s responsibility defeats the inference under the Restatement’s second condition.
Superior Knowledge Not Required
Courts often explain res ipsa loquitur by saying that the defendant is better placed than the plaintiff to explain the accident, and older decisions sometimes treated cases of superior access to evidence as especially suited to the doctrine.15 On that view the doctrine does more than label a class of cases; it “smokes out” evidence in the defendant’s possession. If the ordinary rules of evidence would have required a directed verdict for the defendant at the close of the plaintiff’s case, an artificial inference of negligence would give the defendant an incentive to explain what happened. The inference is “artificial” because, if the ordinary rules governing circumstantial evidence would already have required denying the motion, res ipsa would add nothing.16 The incentive is real. A defendant who risks a jury that may draw the inference has every reason to offer an account of careful handling or proof of an unrelated cause, such as sabotage.17
An incentive the doctrine happens to create is not a condition of using it. The inference rests on what experience says about the type of event, and the odds that a falling barrel reflects someone’s carelessness do not shrink because the shopkeeper’s employees saw nothing. Most jurisdictions accordingly hold that res ipsa loquitur applies even though the defendant’s knowledge is not superior to the plaintiff’s. The standard examples are accidents that left no one able to explain them:18
- In Johnson v. Foster, a car unaccountably left the highway and overturned, and both the driver and the passenger died.
- In Nicol v. Geitler, the facts were similar; the guest passenger was dead and the driver had disappeared.
- In Burkett v. Johnston, the facts were again similar, and both occupants were dead.
- In Haasman v. Pacific Alaska Air Express, the defendant’s plane was lost.
- In Judson v. Giant Powder Co., a nitroglycerin factory blew up, and the “witnesses who saw and knew, like all things else around, save the earth itself, were scattered to the four winds.”19
Commercial defendants can be just as much in the dark. A canner sued over glass in the spinach, or an airline sued over a vanished plane, may have no idea what caused the accident and no way to find out, yet negligence may still be the likely explanation. The defendant cannot avoid the doctrine merely by showing that it knows no more than the plaintiff does.20
A minority of jurisdictions have turned the rationale into a requirement. A Wyoming decision, Reese v. Memorial Hospital, said that “if the circumstances do not show or suggest that defendant should have superior knowledge, or if the plaintiff himself possesses equal or superior means of explaining the occurrence, the rule may not properly be invoked.” A Missouri decision, Sides v. St. Anthony’s Medical Center, reiterated that the third requirement of the doctrine is that “the defendant possesses superior knowledge or means of information as to the cause of the occurrence.” Applying Michigan law, the Sixth Circuit in DeBusscher v. Sam’s East, Inc. recited a requirement that “evidence of true explanation of event must be more readily accessible to the defendant than to the plaintiff,” and it applied that requirement to a portable basketball goal that fell on a shopper.21 Where the requirement exists, a plaintiff who cannot know what happened meets it easily. In a Montana case against Murray Hospital, a patient woke after surgery with injuries from a fall while he was unconscious and in the hospital’s care.22 It was impossible for him to prove the circumstances of the fall, and the court applied the doctrine in the interest of justice, since “by common knowledge and experience, it is clear that such injury would not have been sustained, ordinarily, had the responsible party not been negligent.”23
The two riders must not be confused with the second condition of § 328D(1). That condition asks who probably created the danger, which is a question about causation, and the conduct of the plaintiff is among the responsible causes it requires the evidence to eliminate.24 The superior-knowledge requirement asks who can better explain the accident, which is a question about access to evidence. The first question can defeat the inference even in a majority jurisdiction, and the second cannot.
The dissent in Johnson v. Foster states the contrary view at its strongest. The dissenting judge described one theory of the doctrine as designed to keep a plaintiff without reasonable access to the facts, and so without direct proof, from losing his day in court, with the defendant’s superior knowledge as the reason to shift the burden of meeting the inference to him.25 The dissent acknowledged that textwriters had criticized the theory but observed that the court had never discarded it, and it urged that the theory be applied to the facts of the case.26 The court nonetheless applied the doctrine to a crash that left no survivor to hold any knowledge.
The smoking-out function survives most plausibly where several defendants control possible causes and the plaintiff cannot prove whose negligence caused the harm. A landlord and its commercial tenant might both control rooftop tiles, or a group of physicians and nurses might control an unconscious patient. If the plaintiff could not otherwise obtain through discovery evidence of which party’s negligence caused the harm, the threat of liability might lead an innocent party who has that information to disclose it.27 Ybarra v. Spangard is the leading example. An unconscious patient sustained a traumatic shoulder injury during an appendicitis operation, and the court applied res ipsa loquitur against all the doctors and hospital employees connected with the operation, although clearly not all of them were negligent. Given the special relationship between medical personnel and patients and their notorious reluctance to testify against one another, the court shifted the burden of explanation to those with sole knowledge of the true facts.28
On a fact pattern, the three conditions of § 328D(1) are the whole test unless the stem signals that the local rule adds a fourth. A stem that mentions a plane lost at sea, a crash that killed every occupant, or a defendant who swears it has no idea what went wrong is testing whether you treat the defendant’s ignorance as a bar, and in a majority jurisdiction it is not one. A defendant who credibly shows due care may still win before the jury, but that goes to whether the inference is drawn, not to whether the doctrine applies. A stem that cites a state requiring superior knowledge calls for one further check, namely whether the plaintiff, rather than the defendant, has the better means of explaining the occurrence.