Concept
No Relieving Rule of Law
But for and substantial causes
No Relieving Rule of Law
Negligent conduct becomes a legal cause of harm under section 431 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts only when two conditions are both met: the conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the harm, and no rule of law relieves the actor from liability because of the manner in which the negligence resulted in the harm.1 The earlier sections of this chapter built the first condition, which asks how much the negligence contributed to the harm.2 Section 431(b) asks something different. A contribution can be real and large, and the law may still refuse to hold the actor responsible because of the way the harm came about. The plaintiff must satisfy both conditions, so a defendant whose negligence passes the factual inquiry can still escape if a rule of law cuts off liability for the manner in which the harm occurred.
The two conditions run in sequence. The first asks what happened, and the second asks what the law should do about it. Cause in fact comes first, because unless actual causation is found there is no need to consider proximate cause at all, and a defendant who was not a cause in fact is dismissed without reaching the policy question whether liability should follow.3 That policy question is the work of the second condition, which is why courts often call it “legal cause” or “scope of liability.” Both labels stress that the issue is whether liability should be imposed, not whether the defendant’s act was a cause in fact.4 The traditional name, proximate cause, misleads. It has little to do with proximity in time or space, or with causation, and it refers instead to the rules that require a legal proximity, in the sense of justice or fairness, between the tortious conduct and its consequences.5
The second condition exists because necessity has no stopping point of its own. A negligent act can be a but-for antecedent of consequences far removed from anything the actor could have weighed, and some of those consequences no legal system would make the defendant pay for: the relation between the negligence and the injury is too tenuous, and the consequence too out of proportion to the fault.6 Stating the limit as a rule of law keeps the policy judgment visible. A court can say that the law will not stretch responsibility that far, without pretending that the negligence made no factual contribution.
Most of the questions that remain after the foreseeability and harm-within-the-risk tests fall into three groups. In the first, the harm is remote in time or space from the negligent conduct. In the second, one party negligently enables or increases the risk that another will engage in tortious conduct. In the third, the issue is what must be foreseeable, or when liability may follow although some aspect of what occurred was unforeseeable.7 The examples below come mostly from the second and third groups, where a later act or event enters the story.
The third step does the real work. It repeats the comparison between harm and hazard that decided whether the conduct was negligent toward the plaintiff, and superseding-cause arguments call for no different analysis than other proximate cause problems; the court asks what risk made the conduct unreasonable and whether the harm falls within it.8 An answer that skips step one spends policy analysis on a defendant who was never a cause. An answer that skips step three has nothing to measure the later event against.
The failing side shows the doctrine most plainly, because the but-for link is undeniable and liability fails anyway. An airline negligently fails to fill a plane’s fuel tanks, the plane lands on an island, and a volcano erupts there, injuring Beale. With full tanks the plane would never have been on the island, so the omission is a but-for cause of the injury. Yet leaving the fuel out creates a risk that the plane will have to ditch in the water or make an emergency landing, not that it will land on an island at the time of an eruption, so virtually any court would deny Beale recovery.9 A taxi company that negligently fails to send a car to Costas, waiting at a park, is in the same position when a tornado strikes the park. The dangers foreseeable from failing to send a car do not include tornadoes, and a court would very likely call the storm a superseding cause.10
In Derdiarian v. Felix Contracting Corp. the events were just as quirky, and the defendant was held liable. A contractor working in a busy street failed to put up a barrier, and a vehicle driven by Dickens, whose epilepsy figured in the crash, entered the worksite and injured a worker near a vat of molten enamel. The contractor argued that the bizarre sequence superseded its negligence. Working in the middle of a busy street, however, poses a risk that a vehicle will enter the worksite, and that risk is exactly why a barrier is reasonable. The contractor was therefore liable even though Dickens’ later negligence put the vehicle in the worksite, and the court correctly noted that the precise manner of the event need not be anticipated.11
The volcano and the tornado differ from Derdiarian in one respect: the later event is measured against the hazard that made the conduct negligent. In Derdiarian the later event was that hazard coming to pass. In the airline and taxi cases it was a danger no careful actor would have counted. Coming later does not by itself cut off an earlier wrongdoer. If a later negligent actor superseded every earlier one, only the party who was negligent last would be liable, and there would be no law of joint tortfeasors, even though each party’s negligence was a but-for cause of the injury.12
Deliberate wrongs by third parties are the hardest intervening events, and the Restatement answers them with a default and an exception. A third person’s intentional tort or crime ordinarily supersedes the actor’s negligence, even when the negligence supplied the opportunity for it, unless the actor realized or should have realized the likelihood that a third person might take advantage of the situation. The exception applies when that likelihood is itself the hazard, or one of the hazards, that makes the actor negligent. The third person’s act, whether innocent, negligent, intentionally tortious, or criminal, then does not prevent liability. The Restatement’s own illustration shows the exception at work. A railroad negligently runs down a cider truck at night, at a place where thefts from the company’s freight cars have been frequent. The barrels scatter along the road, unknown thieves carry the cider off, and the railroad’s negligence is a legal cause of the loss.13 Both rules make the same comparison with the hazard. The default favors the defendant, and the exception applies when the wrongdoing was part of what made the conduct negligent.
Courts often say that a superseding cause breaks the chain of causation, and the phrase is a convenient label for a result. The defendant’s negligence remains a cause in fact in every case discussed here. What a rule of law changes is the legal consequence, and the reasoning that earns the conclusion is the same scope-of-the-risk comparison as in any other proximate cause problem.14 An exam answer that says only that the later act broke the chain has stopped before the analysis begins. A complete answer names the hazard that made the conduct negligent and asks whether the later event falls within it.