Concept
The But-For Baseline
Concurrent causes and the substantial factor test
Concurrent Causes and Substantial Factor
The But-For Baseline
Negligence is not actionable unless it is a cause in fact of the harm: the defendant's carelessness must have contributed to what happened to the plaintiff. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 432(1) states the requirement in the vocabulary of substantial factor. Except as subsection (2) provides, an actor's negligent conduct is not a substantial factor in bringing about harm if the harm would have been sustained even had the actor not been negligent.1 That is the familiar but-for inquiry, which asks whether the event could have occurred without the cause in question.2 In the ordinary case, then, substantial factor and but for ask the same question, and cause in fact will almost always be established once the but-for test is met.3 The exception is narrow, and the opening words of § 432(1) point to it; we return to it at the end of this section.
Section 432(1) matters most when the negligence is an omitted precaution. The comment explains that when a defendant failed to take a required precaution, and the same harm in character and extent would have occurred even had the precaution been taken, the failure was not a perceptible factor in the harm and cannot be a substantial factor in producing it.4 The plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the defendant's tortious conduct caused the harm, so the plaintiff must show that the missing precaution would have made a difference.5
Perkins v. Texas & New Orleans Railroad Co. shows the rule defeating a plaintiff whose defendant was plainly negligent. The railroad's own safety regulations set a 25 mile per hour limit for trains in the town of Vinton, the plaintiff conceded that this was a safe speed at the crossing, and the train was traveling 37. A railroad's violation of its own speed regulations, adopted in the interest of safety, is evidence of negligence, and the court found the trainmen negligent.6 The court nonetheless called cause in fact the prime issue: was the excessive speed a cause in fact of the fatal collision?7 It held that the speed was not, because the collision would have happened even at the lawful speed. The plaintiff had proved a breach but not that the breach made any difference.
The landlord's negligence is the same in both buildings; what differs is the evidence about what the missing precaution would have done. The plaintiff need not eliminate every possibility that the defendant's conduct was not a cause, because no one can say with absolute certainty what would have occurred had the defendant acted differently. It is enough to offer evidence from which reasonable people could find it more probable than not that the defendant's conduct caused the harm. A body found in the hall supplies that evidence, and a body found in bed does not.9
Students often get a second feature of the baseline backward: the defendant's negligence need not be the sole cause of the harm. Harper stops sharply, which sends him into James's lane, and James, not watching the road, hits him and knocks his car into Gray's truck. Both drivers' negligence is a but-for cause of Gray's injuries, because each contributed to a single, indivisible harm, and each is liable for all of it.10 Almost every accident has several contributors, and the question under § 432(1) is only whether the harm would have occurred without this defendant's negligence. A second cause, whether negligent or innocent, does not change the answer.
The counterfactual in § 432(1) removes the negligence, not the whole activity, which is why the section speaks of the actor's negligent conduct rather than simply the actor's conduct.12
The but-for test has a blind spot, and the words except as stated in Subsection (2) mark where it lies. The test asks whether the negligence was necessary to the harm. Suppose two forces are actively operating, one because of the actor's negligence and the other not because of any misconduct on his part, and each is sufficient to bring about the harm. Neither force was necessary, so the negligent actor can truthfully say the harm would have happened anyway. Section 432(2) answers that his negligence may still be found a substantial factor.14 The court in Anderson faced the same dilemma on facts where the property would probably have burned in the other fire anyway. It applied a less stringent test, asking whether the defendant's act was a material or substantial element in producing the damage, and that test leaves more leeway to the jury.15 The next section takes up that exception.