Concept
The Hunting Accident
Alternative liability when the responsible defendant cannot be identified
The Hunting Accident
The facts of Summers v. Tice are the yardstick for every later element of the doctrine, so they repay close reading. On November 20, 1945, Summers hunted quail on open range with two companions, Tice and Simonson. Each defendant carried a 12 gauge shotgun loaded with 7 1/2 size shot. Before the hunt began, Summers discussed procedure with them, telling them to exercise care when shooting and to “keep in line.”1
As the hunt went on, Summers walked up a hill, and the three men ended up at the points of a triangle. Tice and Simonson had an unobstructed view of Summers and knew where he stood. Tice flushed a quail, which rose to about ten feet and flew between Summers and the two defendants, who were 75 yards away. Both defendants shot at the quail, and both shot in Summers’s direction. One pellet struck him in the eye; another struck his upper lip.2 The quail’s flight put Summers in the line of fire, and each shooter fired with his position in plain view.
The trial judge, sitting without a jury, made findings that fall into two groups. The first group goes to fault. The judge found both defendants negligent in shooting as they did and found Summers not contributorily negligent.3 The evidence supported the negligence finding: both defendants shot at about the same time, one immediately after the other, toward a plaintiff uphill from them whose location they knew. A trial court could conclude from that conduct that they acted other than as persons of ordinary prudence, and the issue was one of fact for the trial court.4 The second group goes to injury. The judge found that, as a direct and proximate result of the shots fired by “defendants, and each of them,” one birdshot pellet lodged in Summers’s right eye and another in his upper lip.5
Simonson argued that Summers was contributorily negligent and had assumed the risk as a matter of law. The court gave the argument no weight. Simonson cited no authority for the idea that hunters assume the risk of their companions’ negligence, and the court called such a tenet unreasonable. Summers had suggested that the party “stay in line” and had gone uphill at roughly a right angle to the hunting line, but he had also cautioned the others to use care, and the defendants knew his position.6
The findings left one fact open. Neither defendant disputed that someone had shot Summers; they disputed whose shot it was. On appeal the defendants argued that they were not joint tortfeasors acting in concert and that the evidence did not show whether Tice’s shot or Simonson’s caused the injuries. Tice added that Simonson had allegedly admitted to third persons that he fired the shots, and that nothing showed the pellets came from Tice’s gun. The reviewing court framed the question as whether the judgment against both defendants could stand.7 The trial court had evidently given the alleged admissions no credit, which it was entitled to do. The reviewing court therefore read the findings to imply that the trial court could not tell whether the shots came from one gun, the other, or one from each. One fact was fixed all the same. The pellet in the eye was the major factor in assessing damages, and it could not have come from both guns. It came from one or the other only.8
The contrast shows why the findings in Summers matter. Both hunters fired in the same dangerous direction at a man they could see, so each was negligent in the same way, and the plaintiff’s own care was established. Everything else was proven. The only missing fact was which of the two negligent hunters had fired the pellet that reached the eye.