Concept
The Restatement Rule
Alternative liability when the responsible defendant cannot be identified
The Restatement Rule
Section 433B(3) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts took the result in Summers v. Tice and compressed it into a single sentence: where the conduct of two or more actors is tortious, and it is proved that harm has been caused to the plaintiff by only one of them, but there is uncertainty as to which one, the burden is upon each such actor to prove that he has not caused the harm.1 Courts have generally accepted that principle since the Second Restatement appeared in 1965, while working out its limits.2 Read clause by clause, the sentence shows what a plaintiff must establish before the burden moves.
The tortious-conduct clause confines the shift to wrongdoers, so an actor who breached no duty is never asked to exculpate himself. The clause requiring proof that only one actor caused the harm carries the most weight. Without it, a plaintiff could reach any group of negligent actors on the bare possibility that one of them did it. With it, the shift reallocates a single missing fact, the identity of the cause, and everything else is proved in the ordinary way. The uncertainty clause then marks where the gap lies, and the rule asks each actor, not the plaintiff, to resolve it.
The subsection makes full sense only beside its neighbors in the same section. Subsection (1) states the default: except as subsections (2) and (3) provide, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the defendant's tortious conduct caused the harm.3 Subsection (2) covers the case in which the tortious conduct of two or more actors has combined to bring about the harm and one or more of them seeks to limit his liability on the ground that the harm can be apportioned among them. The burden of proving the apportionment then falls on each such actor.4 The two exceptions answer different questions. Under (2), the actors' conduct has combined to produce the harm and the dispute is how much of it belongs to each. Under (3), only one actor caused the harm and the dispute is which one.
The Restatement's own commentary qualifies the rule in a way that shapes everything that follows. It notes that every case decided to that point in which the rule had been applied was a case in which all of the actors were joined as defendants. It also recognizes that some modification may be necessary if one of the actors is not or cannot be joined, or if the actors' conduct or the risks they created differ substantially.5 The caution tracks the premise of the shift. Making each actor exculpate himself is fair when each stands in much the same position as the others, as the two hunters did. An absent actor, or one whose conduct created a different risk, changes that picture, and a defendant in the group may then be a much less likely cause than the burden shift assumes. The elements section below takes up joinder and similarity of conduct in their own right.
Courts have read the simultaneity point in conflicting ways. One federal court, considering theories of recovery for asbestos-related injury, interpreted the subsection to require that the tortious actions occur simultaneously. Starling v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 533 F. Supp. 183, 191 (S.D. Ga. 1982). Another, applying the theory in a Factor VIII case, disagreed. Poole v. Alpha Therapeutic, 696 F. Supp. 351, 356 (N.D. Ill. 1988).6
The Restatement (Third) of Torts restates the rule in § 28(b) in somewhat different terms. The plaintiff sues all of the actors and proves that each engaged in tortious conduct that exposed the plaintiff to a risk of harm and that the tortious conduct of one or more of them caused the harm. If the plaintiff cannot reasonably be expected to prove which actor or actors caused it, the burden of proof on factual causation shifts to the defendants, and that burden includes both production and persuasion.7 Two features of the text stand out. The requirement that the plaintiff sue all of the actors, which the Second Restatement's commentary treated as a feature of the decided cases, now appears in the rule itself. And because the shifted burden includes persuasion as well as production, a defendant must do more than deny causation.