Concept
Related Doctrines Compared
Alternative liability when the responsible defendant cannot be identified
Related Doctrines Compared
Alternative liability answers one narrow question: which of several negligent actors caused a harm that only one of them caused? Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433B(3) shifts the burden of proof to each actor when the conduct of two or more actors is tortious, harm is proved to have come from only one of them, and uncertainty exists about which one.1 The rule fits a harm with a single source, every candidate for that source before the court, and no evidence that names it.
Few multi-actor injuries arrive in that shape. A court may face two negligent acts that were each sufficient to cause the whole harm; two negligent actors who probably both contributed to one injury; actors bound together by a common plan; or a product made by so many producers that the plaintiff can sue only some of them. The surface facts look alike in all four: several wrongdoers, one injury, something unproven. The plaintiff lacks a different fact in each, though, and each calls for a different rule. The four comparisons below therefore turn on one question: what can the plaintiff not prove, and who should bear the risk of that gap?
Multiple Sufficient Causes
Some harms have two sources rather than one unknown source. When two negligent acts concur and either alone would have produced the same result, the harm is overdetermined, and courts speak of multiple sufficient causes or duplicative causation.2 Two fires, each negligently set, that combine to destroy a plaintiff’s property are the standard example. So are two tortfeasors who separately but simultaneously release contaminated water into a plaintiff’s lake when either release would have caused all the damage.3 Counting sources separates this setting from alternative liability: one source that no one can name belongs to § 433B(3), while two sources that are each enough belong to a different rule.
The trouble lies in the but-for test, not in the evidence. Each fire-setter can truthfully say that the property would have burned without his fire. If that statement excused one defendant it would excuse the other, and the plaintiff would recover from neither.4 The defendant in Anderson v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M. Ry. Co. made exactly that argument: the plaintiff would have suffered the same harm had his fire never burned.5 The plaintiff could not show that the barn would still stand but for the defendant’s fire, since the other fire would likely have caused the damage anyway, yet the defendant’s culpable act had clearly contributed.6
Anderson answered by changing what counts as a cause. A defendant is a cause in fact if the jury finds that his act was “a material or substantial element” in producing the harm, and the court imposed liability although the property would probably have burned in the other fire anyway.7 The Second Restatement reaches the same result for two separately set fires, either of which would have destroyed a farm field: neither fire-setter escapes by pointing to the other fire.8 The Third Restatement recognizes the concept in § 27 under the label “multiple sufficient causes.” The substantial-factor test serves as an alternative approach to cause in fact for these unusual situations, in which the but-for test yields unsatisfactory results.9
Once each sufficient cause counts as a cause, ordinary joint liability follows. Where both actors are culpable and no apportionment is possible, each may be held jointly and severally liable for the whole loss, because the sine qua non rule is inapplicable.10 The preferred rule even holds a negligent defendant liable when the other sufficient cause was blameless, as when lightning set one of the fires. A fortuitous natural event should not exonerate a defendant who would have been jointly and severally liable had the other cause been culpable.11 These remain exceptions. Outside overdetermined harms, a defendant whose conduct was not a but-for cause is generally not liable.12
Summers v. Tice has a different causal structure. One pellet entered the plaintiff’s eye; one hunter’s shot caused the entire injury, and the other hunter’s shot caused none of it.13 That single shot could not have come from both guns.14 The fire cases have two sufficient causes; the hunting case has one cause with an unknown owner. The but-for test works against the hunter who fired the pellet, and the plaintiff lacks only his identity. That is why the burden of proof shifts to each hunter to show that his shot was not the one.15 A substantial-factor instruction cannot fill the gap, because even under that test only one shot was a substantial factor, and the problem of tracing it remains.16
The choice between the doctrines therefore turns on a count of possible sources. Two negligent defendants and one injury appear in both situations, so that description decides nothing. If the facts say that each act would alone have produced the whole harm, treat each as a factual cause and impose no shift. If the facts say that the harm came from the act of just one defendant and the evidence cannot say whose, apply § 433B(3) and require each defendant to prove that he did not cause it. Running the burden shift against the fire defendants solves a problem the facts do not contain, because each fire is already a cause.
Divisible or Cumulative Harm
Not every combined injury has one unknown source, and not every one is overdetermined. Two negligent actors may each have contributed part of a single harm, with no one able to say how much. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433B(2) covers that case. When the tortious conduct of two or more actors has combined to bring about harm to the plaintiff, and one of them seeks to limit his liability on the ground that the harm can be apportioned, the burden of proving the apportionment falls on each such actor.18 Subsection (3) assumes that only one actor caused the harm and no one can say which. Subsection (2) assumes that the conduct combined and asks how much of the harm belongs to each.19 The comparison turns on one variable: either/or causation on one side, probable contribution by both defendants on the other.
Summers shows the either/or structure: one pellet, one hunter who caused the whole injury, one who caused none.20 Two negligent drivers in successive collisions present a different structure. One collision may have caused the entire back injury, but it is more likely that the first caused some of it and the second caused more. Cases in which both negligent defendants have probably contributed and no one can say how much each caused are far more common than the pure Summers scenario.21 The missing proof differs too. Against the hunters, the plaintiff lacked evidence of identity. Against the drivers, the plaintiff may prove that both were negligent and that both collisions did harm, and still lack the measure of each driver’s share.
Answering that the burden moves because the plaintiff cannot tell which driver caused the injury misdescribes the gap. The plaintiff can tell: both did. What the evidence cannot supply is the division between them.
A plaintiff who must prove each defendant’s share may recover nothing from any of them, though several defendants seriously damaged him.22 Courts have often come to the plaintiff’s rescue by shifting the burden of apportionment to the defendants.23 Defendants who then cannot separate the damages are held jointly liable for them all, or severally liable in proportion to their fault.24 Summers supplies the rationale. Where independent tortfeasors are each liable for the damage they caused and apportionment is incapable of proof, the innocent wronged party should not be deprived of redress, and the wrongdoers should work out any apportionment among themselves.25
The burden that moves under subsection (2) differs from the one that moves under subsection (3), and the difference marks the line between the doctrines. Under (3), a defendant escapes entirely by proving that he did not cause the harm, because the premise is that one actor caused all of it.26 Under (2), the plaintiff’s showing already establishes that each defendant’s conduct combined to bring about the harm, so no defendant can disclaim causation. He can only limit his liability by proving which part he caused.27
A record may leave open which structure applies. Multi-vehicle collisions, like the one in Cummings v. Kendall, can pose that problem. Suppose three negligent drivers collide in a chain, a passenger dies, and nothing shows which impact killed her. If the jury finds that more than one impact contributed to the death, the case is one of combined contribution, and defendants who cannot separate the damages answer jointly for all of them or severally in proportion to their fault.28 If the jury finds that only one impact caused the death and no one can say which, § 433B(3) applies. Each driver must prove that his negligence did not cause the death, and a driver who cannot do so is liable.29 The jury’s finding on the causal structure thus decides which burden operates.
Some combined harms need neither shift, because the injury divides along lines the evidence can see. Suppose two negligently driven cars strike a plaintiff at the same moment, and the experts agree that both drivers’ negligence combined to cause a broken hip. The drivers are traditionally jointly and severally liable for that indivisible injury. If one car instead struck the plaintiff’s right arm and the other struck her left leg, each driver answers only for the damages to the limb his car struck.30 The Restatement reaches the same result for harms that arrive separately. A negligently maintained platform breaks one of a passenger’s legs, a negligently operated bus breaks the other leg a month later, and each defendant is severally liable for the fracture of one leg only.31 Several polluters of a stream likewise answer only for the portion each caused, unless they acted in concert.32 In each case the plaintiff can match each injury to its source with ordinary evidence, so no gap exists for either shift to fill.
Two negligent defendants and an injury of uncertain origin describe both the apportionment problem and the hunting accident. The evidence about contribution sorts them. Probable contribution by both calls for a burden of apportionment; proof that one actor caused everything and the other nothing calls for the burden of exculpation.
Concert of Action
Concert of action ties defendants together by their relationship to one another, not by a gap in the plaintiff’s evidence. When two or more tortfeasors act pursuant to a common plan or design and the acts of one or more of them tortiously cause the plaintiff’s harm, all are jointly and severally liable.34 The theory holds defendants liable when, in pursuing a common scheme, any of them breaches a duty owed to a third person, regardless of who causes the injury.35 Liability rests on a defendant’s participation in and furtherance of group activity he knows to be tortious, a kind of aiding and abetting.36 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 876 states the principle: a person is liable for harm resulting from another’s tortious conduct if he knows that the conduct breaches a duty and gives substantial assistance or encouragement to it, or gives substantial assistance in accomplishing a tortious result and his own conduct, separately considered, breaches a duty to the third person.37
The drag race is the classic case. Two drivers agree to race on a public highway, and one of them injures a third driver; both racers are jointly and severally liable.38 The second racer is liable because he helped create the risk that harmed the plaintiff.39 By joining the contest, each racer made the other’s reckless driving part of a shared undertaking. Which car made contact never has to be decided, and a racer who proves that her car stayed clear has offered no defense.
Alternative liability runs on the opposite feature. Section 433B(3) places on each actor the burden of proving that he did not cause the harm, and a defendant who carries it leaves the case.40 The text says nothing about agreement or encouragement; it looks only to the actors’ conduct and to the plaintiff’s proof. The defendants share a lawsuit because the plaintiff cannot tell their conduct apart, and the rule does not bind them to one another. Proof that my shot or my car was not the one therefore wins release under alternative liability and counts for nothing under concert.
The hunting setting shows where the two doctrines meet. The Restatement’s illustration under § 876(b) puts A and B in a hunting party. Each, in the presence of the other, shoots across a public road at an animal, which is negligent as to persons on the road. A hits the animal, and B’s bullet strikes C, a traveler. A is liable to C.41 A’s own shot hurt no one, and A is still liable. The illustration under § 876(c) omits the fact that both defendants shot, and there joint liability is not imposed.42
Summers v. Tice reached the same defendants by a different route and declined to choose between the labels. The defendants there argued that the plaintiff had changed his theory by claiming concert of action. The court disagreed. Joint liability and the lack of knowledge about which defendant was responsible had been pleaded, and for reasons of policy each defendant is liable for the whole damage whether the two are deemed to act in concert or independently.43 The authority the court quoted states the unifying point. Wigmore found the real reason each joint tortfeasor answers for the whole damage in the practical unfairness of denying redress because the injured person cannot prove how much each did, when between them they did it all. Since difficulty of proof is the reason, the rule should apply whenever the harm has plural causes, and not merely when the actors acted in conscious concert.44 Commentary on the case describes the same choice: rather than find a dubious concert of action, as a few courts have done, the California Supreme Court shifted the burden of proof on causation to the defendants.45
Hunters who fired from opposite ridges, each unaware of the other, would have no plan or encouragement linking them. The plaintiff’s route to recovery would then run through § 433B(3), which asks only whether each hunter was negligent and whether the identity of the shooter cannot be shown.
A stem that shows two negligent actors acting at the same moment does not by itself show concert. Timing shows only timing; concert requires a shared plan or substantial assistance or encouragement. When the stem supplies one, as with an agreement to race, each participant is liable, and the plaintiff need prove nothing about whose act did the harm. When it supplies only independent, simultaneous negligence, move to the elements of alternative liability and to each defendant’s chance to prove that he did not cause the harm.
Market Share Liability
The DES litigation confronted a plaintiff who could not name the maker of the drug that injured her. In Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, the plaintiff alleged that DES was produced from a common, mutually agreed-upon formula as a fungible drug interchangeable with other brands, and that pharmacists filled prescriptions with whatever brand happened to be in stock.47 So many years passed between the mother’s use of the drug and the daughter’s injuries that she, like many others, could not identify the manufacturer. No one could suggest that she was at fault for that: the exposure occurred while she was in utero, a generation earlier.48
On its surface the case resembled the hunting accident. One defendant made the pills, and the plaintiff could not say which. The court nonetheless held that she could not prevail on the Summers rationale, at least as those principles had previously been applied. In Summers, all the parties who were or could have been responsible had been joined as defendants. Here, approximately 200 drug companies made DES, any of which might have made the injury-producing drug.49 The defendants pressed the arithmetic. Summers involved a 50 percent chance that either defendant was responsible; with 200 possible makers, they argued, there was no rational basis to infer that any defendant caused the injuries, nor even a reasonable possibility that it did.50
The joinder requirement matters here for a reason the court identified. With about 200 possible makers and only some of them sued, a named defendant has only a remote chance of having made the pills, and the actual maker may be absent. Making each defendant exonerate itself would then be unfair. Industry-wide liability, which grew out of Hall v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., likewise assumes a small, closed group: manufacturers who together made virtually the whole of an industry’s product.
The court therefore modified Summers. Where all defendants produced a drug from an identical formula and the manufacturer of the DES that injured the plaintiff cannot be identified through no fault of hers, a modification of the rule of Summers is warranted.51 The plaintiff must join the manufacturers of a substantial share of the appropriate market. The more of the market she joins, the less unjust it becomes to shift to the defendants the burden of proving that they could not have made the substance that injured her. A figure of 75 to 80 percent had been suggested, but the court held only that a substantial percentage is required.52
The same joined share supplies a way to apportion damages. Each defendant is liable for the proportion of the judgment represented by its share of that market unless it demonstrates that it could not have made the product that caused the plaintiff’s injuries. One manufacturer was dismissed after filing a declaration that it had not manufactured DES until after the plaintiff was born.53 Liability is several: unless a manufacturer proves that it did not make the drug the plaintiff’s mother took, it is severally liable for the share of the injuries represented by its share of the DES market.54 Summers held each hunter liable for the whole damage.55 The DES remedy instead makes each manufacturer pay a share sized to its market.
The court grounded the modification in familiar policy. The manufacturer is in the best position to discover and guard against defects in its products and to warn of harmful effects, and it can insure the risk and distribute it among the public as a cost of doing business. Those considerations carry particular weight for medication, because the consumer is virtually helpless to protect himself from the injuries that deleterious drugs cause.56
Courts have not followed Sindell far. A small number of decisions from the few market share states have allowed such claims outside DES, but most courts have rebuffed efforts to extend the doctrine to lead paint, asbestos, breast implants, guns, blood, tire rims, and other products.57 See, e.g., Burton v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.; Thurmon v. Georgia Pacific, LLC. The Michigan DESS decision shows another limit. In Abel v. Eli Lilly and Co., defendants who could not exculpate themselves were held jointly and severally liable, apparently on a per capita rather than a market share basis.58 Whether that ruling survives the Michigan legislature’s restriction of joint and several liability is an open question.59 One federal court has found that the legislature’s action precludes the use of alternative liability in a case against pesticide manufacturers.60
The second step screens out most problems. The court framed its modification for a setting in which all defendants produced the drug from an identical formula and the plaintiff could not identify the maker through no fault of her own. DES-like facts therefore call for two confirmations before the theory applies: the product is a true duplicate, and the forum has adopted the theory.62 Where either is missing, the plaintiff’s inability to identify the maker defeats the claim.