Concept
Original Tortfeasor Doctrine
Successive and subsequent causes of harm
Successive and Subsequent Causes
Original Tortfeasor Doctrine
A defendant who negligently injures a plaintiff rarely controls what happens next. A physician may mishandle the treatment, a second vehicle may strike the plaintiff at the scene, or the injury may simply worsen, and the question becomes who pays for the added harm. The baseline answer is the original tortfeasor doctrine (a tortfeasor is anyone who commits a tort). The original tortfeasor is liable, along with the later acting tortfeasor, for the plaintiff's enhanced injuries, provided the later harm is related to the first injury.1 The doctrine takes its name from that result: the first wrongdoer stays on the hook.
The standard illustration uses four actors. A driver negligently strikes a pedestrian and breaks his leg. While the pedestrian lies helpless in the street, a bicyclist negligently runs over his arm. At the hospital, a physician treats the leg negligently and aggravates the injury. The driver is responsible for all of those injuries. The bicyclist is responsible only for the arm injury, and the physician only for the aggravation of the leg injury.2
The allocation turns on who caused what. The driver's collision set the whole sequence in motion, so the driver answers for every stage of it. The bicyclist and the physician did not break the leg, so each answers for the increment its own conduct added and nothing more.
Banks v. Elks Club Pride of Tenn. applies the same allocation. A chair collapsed at the club and injured the plaintiff's back, and doctors who treated the back injury committed malpractice. The club was liable for her injuries along with the doctors.3 The malpractice occurred while treating the very injury the collapse caused, and that connection is why the club's liability reached it.
Other courts reach the same result when the first actor and the later actor are both at fault. In Harsh v. Petroll, the employer of a trucker who rear-ended a car was liable for the injuries from the initial collision. It was also liable for the deaths of occupants who died when the car burst into flame because of a defect in its fuel system, a defect for which the manufacturer was also liable on a crashworthiness theory.4 In Payne v. Hall, a clinic that began a late-term abortion would be liable for injuries caused by malpractice at the hospital to which the patient was sent to complete it, if the jury found that the clinic had itself committed malpractice.5
The doctrine does not run on autopilot, because the plaintiff must still tie the later event to the first negligence. In Cramer v. Starr, the plaintiff had to prove that the driver's negligence created a reasonably foreseeable risk that spinal fusion surgery might be necessary and that the surgery might be performed negligently.6 That showing is the link between the later harm and the first wrong.
The hinge of the topic is whether the later incident is related to the first or independent of it. When the second incident is independent, the first tortfeasor is not responsible for it, and the plaintiff bears the burden of proving what damages the first accident caused.7 Compare the pedestrian sequence with a plaintiff who injures an elbow in March and is still under a physician's care for pain and swelling when, about a month later, a separate automobile accident injures the same elbow. The April collision has no connection to anything the March tortfeasor did. It is a fresh accident, not a consequence of the first injury.
Lovely v. Allstate Ins. Co. shows where that independence leads. In an action based on the April accident, the trial court found no basis for apportioning the elbow damages between the two accidents. The second tortfeasor was held liable for the whole injury because the damages could not be divided.8 Independence does not make the allocation problem disappear; it moves the dispute to proof, which the section on apportioning successive harm develops.
Exam stems test the hinge with facts that sit between the poles. After a car accident, a plaintiff schedules a consultation with a lawyer to discuss representation. While the plaintiff sits in the firm's conference room, the chair collapses, and the plaintiff hits his head and lands on the floor. Does the driver answer for the injury in the lawyer's office?9 The visit exists only because of the accident, which pushes toward relatedness. The collapse, though, came from defective furniture and has no obvious connection to the plaintiff's original injuries, which pushes toward independence. Arguments run both ways, so the method matters most: ask what links the later event to the first injury, and do not stop at the observation that the first injury came earlier in time.
The rest of this chapter follows the routes by which a related later harm arises. The next sections take up aid and medical treatment, where physicians, rescuers, and others can make matters worse. After that comes weakened condition, where the original injury leaves the plaintiff vulnerable to disease or a later accident. The chapter closes with the apportionment of successive harm, where the questions are who pays for what and how the plaintiff proves it.