Concept
Aid and Medical Treatment
Successive and subsequent causes of harm
Aid and Medical Treatment
An injured plaintiff needs help, and help sometimes makes the injury worse. The ambulance crew drives badly, the surgeon slips, or the nursing home lets an infection in. Each later harm exists only because the defendant's negligence created a need for aid, yet each has a nearer author in the helper. The question is whether the helper's error cuts off the defendant's liability even though the defendant was negligent and was a factual cause of the injury.1
Section 457 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts answers no in the ordinary case. A negligent actor who is liable for another's bodily injury is also liable for any additional bodily harm resulting from the normal efforts of third persons in rendering aid that the injury reasonably requires, whether the aid is given properly or negligently.2
The rule charges the cost of helper error to the person who made help necessary. A plaintiff who seeks the care an injury calls for does what a sensible person does, and no one who seeks care can be sure the provider will perform without a mistake. If the original wrongdoer could point to a careless provider and walk away from the added harm, the plaintiff would absorb a loss that began with the wrongdoer's negligence. The provider stays liable for the harm the provider added, so the plaintiff may reach both.
Two limits keep the rule from reaching every mishap that happens near a hospital. The later aid must be directed at the harm the defendant caused, and the helper's efforts must be normal. The sections below take the ordinary case first, then rescue and escape, then each limit in turn.
Normal Efforts to Render Aid
The clearest case is a competent provider who handles the original injury badly.
The final clause of § 457, which extends liability whether aid is given properly or negligently, gives the rule its work.3 Aid that goes perfectly adds no harm, so disputes arise only when something goes wrong, and a rule confined to flawless aid would almost never operate. Courts reach the same result through foreseeability. In Looney v. Davis, the court treated later negligent medical care as foreseeable and therefore not a superseding cause, meaning an intervening cause that relieves the first actor of liability.4
Multiple helpers do not change the answer. In Banks v. Elks Club, 301 S.W.3d 214 (Tenn. 2010), a chair collapsed at an Elks Club, and the plaintiff's injuries were then made worse by an orthopedic surgeon's malpractice and by an infection she contracted at a nursing home during her recovery. The nursing home answered for the infection, the surgeon for the malpractice and the infection, and the Elks Club for all of the injuries. The court noted that the surgeon was both a successive tortfeasor and an original tortfeasor.5 In Fairchild v. South Carolina Department of Transportation, the plaintiff was entitled to a jury instruction that the defendant would also answer for damages flowing from a physician's negligence.6
Courts also state the idea as a condition on the plaintiff's own conduct. In Stuart v. Hertz Corp., the court said that an injured person who uses reasonable care in securing a competent physician or surgeon, and in following the physician's advice and instructions, may hold the original wrongdoer liable when the physician's negligence, mistake, or lack of skill aggravates the injury.7 The condition mirrors the reason for the rule: charging the wrongdoer with the physician's error is fair because the plaintiff did what a sensible injured person does. A stem showing the plaintiff choosing a competent provider and following instructions fits the formulation, and the answer should point to those facts.
Step one comes first because § 457 enlarges what a plaintiff collects from a proven wrongdoer and supplies no liability where none exists. A student who sees a malpractice stem and reaches for the rule at once has skipped the question whether the defendant caused the original injury.
Step two keeps the arithmetic straight. The section adds liability only for additional harm, the increment the aid contributed. The original injury already belongs to the defendant under ordinary negligence principles, so § 457 widens the damages the defendant owes without creating a new basis of liability. Naming the increment also tells the court what each helper owes, which is the harm its own efforts added.
Rescue and Escape Injuries
Aid begins before the physician's office, because the injured person must first reach it. Ambulance crews, flight crews, and bystanders who carry or drive the plaintiff are third persons rendering aid, and a trip to the hospital is part of the aid a serious injury reasonably requires. Section 457 therefore charges the negligent actor with additional bodily harm the plaintiff suffers on the way, whether the crew performs properly or negligently.9 Anaya v. Superior Court supplies the baseline: a driver whose negligence caused an automobile accident was held liable for a death in a helicopter crash on the way to the hospital.10 The flight existed only because the accident created a need for treatment.
The reasoning matches the treatment cases. A person bleeding beside a road has no risk-free option. Staying put risks an untreated injury, and moving means entering a vehicle, taking a route, and relying on strangers. Each choice runs through risks the first injury created, so the wrongdoer who caused the injury carries the risks of the one sensible choice.
A stem that adds a second collision on the road to the hospital tests the facts against the words of § 457. If the ambulance crew's own negligence causes the crash, the final clause answers the question, because aid given negligently still counts. If a stranger's negligence causes it, the stranger was not rendering aid, so the section's text does not settle the question alone.
Flight from danger comes from a different source. Section 457 speaks of aid rendered by third persons, and a person running from peril is the plaintiff, so the section's text does not reach the flight itself. The cases nonetheless generally agree that a defendant who caused a danger is liable to someone injured trying to escape it.11 In the classic decision, Tuttle v. Atlantic City R. Co., a pedestrian hurt in a fall while running from a freight car that had left its track was allowed to recover.12 A person facing a runaway car cannot safely stand still, and a dash for safety is the natural response, so the wrongdoer who forced that choice answers for its cost.
Other decisions follow a crash to the hazards it created. In one, a collision drove a truck into a cornfield, and wires from a utility pole the truck knocked down electrocuted the driver. In Thornton v. Weaber, a teenage driver lost control on a curve and hit a utility pole, and the downed wires electrified the metal guardrails and cable on the shoulder, so the driver and passenger were electrocuted when they tried to climb back onto the road from the meadow where the truck had come to rest.13
A defendant whose act merely precedes the plaintiff's harm is not charged with everything that follows, and Oklahoma's parked-car cases show where the line falls. Those decisions treated an illegally parked vehicle as a mere condition rather than a cause of the injuries that followed, because the defendant's conduct alone would have harmed no one without another party's negligence.14 In Atherton v. Devine, the court identified § 457 as the general rule for additional harm resulting from efforts to mitigate harm caused by negligence and distinguished the parked-car cases. The parking in those cases was not a completed tort, since it injured no one by itself, while the conduct in Atherton had already resulted in an injury.15
That boundary is step one of the § 457 sequence in another form. The section carries an existing liability for bodily injury forward and creates none, so a defendant who has injured no one has nothing to carry forward. The escape cases sit on the liability side for a related reason: the derailed freight car was itself the source of the danger, not a passive condition waiting for someone else's carelessness. Before discussing ambulances or flight, therefore, ask whether the defendant's conduct, by itself, had already injured the plaintiff or created the peril.
Treatment Must Target the Harm
Section 457 reaches harm from aid the injury reasonably requires, and the injury it has in mind is the one the negligent actor caused.18 A later physician's error therefore counts as harm from required aid only if that physician was addressing the injury the first actor caused. Cases of successive malpractice, in which a second physician errs after a first physician has already erred, test that link directly.
Daly v. United States states the limit: § 457 applies only when the second physician's treatment is directed toward mitigating harm the first physician inflicted.19 As one court put it, physicians acting independently of one another “are liable only for their own wrong.” The reason follows from why the section charges the first wrongdoer at all. The first wrong made the later care necessary, so the first wrongdoer created the occasion for the helper's mistake. When the later physician is addressing something else, the need for that care does not come from the first physician's error, and the first physician created no occasion for the second physician's mistake.
Lindquist v. Dilkes shows the rule at work in the plaintiff's favor. The court held that a physician cannot avoid liability for harm caused by other physicians' treatment when the physician's own negligence caused the injury that necessitated that treatment.20 The first physician's negligence there had produced an identifiable harm, and the second physician's course of treatment was designed to mitigate it, so the court had no difficulty linking the two.
Daly itself came out the other way. The Veterans Administration's negligent treatment of Daly had caused harm, and Daly then consulted his personal physician, Dr. Byrd, who allegedly failed to provide a correct diagnosis. An earlier injury could not carry the claim by itself. Applying the limit, the court held that the VA may not be held liable for any negligent treatment Daly received from Dr. Byrd.21
Harrington v. Cohen presses the point further, because the two physicians there worked on the same problem. A first surgeon's scoliosis procedure ended in complications and the treatment failed, and a second surgeon then performed the same procedure negligently. The court refused to hold the first surgeon liable. The second operation was not aimed at mitigating harm the first surgeon inflicted, because both physicians had undertaken independent treatment of the same problem. The court acknowledged that a successful first treatment would have made the second unnecessary, but that cause-and-effect link does not satisfy § 457.22 A but-for connection would make every failed first treatment the legal author of all later errors in the patient's care, and the first physician's liability would then extend beyond the harm that physician generated.
Step four has a concrete consequence, which the remand in Daly shows. The district court was directed to decide whether Dr. Byrd met the accepted standard of care when he failed to provide a correct diagnosis. If he did not, the court had to apportion liability and hold the VA responsible only for the damage suffered before Dr. Byrd's negligence.23 The VA keeps the harm its own treatment produced, and harm that began with the later negligence belongs to the later physician alone. In a true aid case the original wrongdoer would answer for the whole, so this division of damages marks the practical difference between the two outcomes.
A referral to a specialist shows the same boundary from another angle. In Spicer v. Osunkoya, a physician allegedly misdiagnosed a child with chronic tonsillitis and referred the child to an ear, nose, and throat specialist, who prescribed too high a dose of a pain killer after a tonsillectomy and caused brain damage. The court held that a referring physician is not liable for the specialist's negligence unless the referrer had reason to know the specialist was incompetent. It rejected the argument that the misdiagnosis was a proximate cause, because full responsibility for control of the situation and prevention of the threatened harm had passed to the specialist, whose malpractice was a superseding cause as a matter of law.24 Daly asks what the later physician was treating, while Spicer asks who held control of the patient's care after the handoff. Both questions end in the same place, with the first physician answering only for the first physician's own wrong.
Abnormal Efforts Cut Off Liability
The word normal in § 457 supplies the second limit. The section reaches harm resulting from normal efforts to render aid, whether those efforts are carried out properly or negligently.26 The final clause can mislead on a quick reading, because it attaches to efforts that are already normal. Carelessness in performing normal aid stays within the rule. Efforts that depart from anything the aid would ordinarily involve fall outside it, and liability for the harm they cause stops there.
Ordinary professional error is the territory the rule was built for. In Banks, the surgeon's malpractice and the infection picked up during recovery both stayed with the Elks Club, which answered for all of the plaintiff's injuries.27 A surgeon who misjudges a procedure, or an infection contracted during recovery, is the kind of mishap that accompanies any course of treatment, and a person who seeks care cannot avoid exposure to it. Because the first actor's negligence sent the plaintiff into the treatment system, the cost of the system's ordinary failures falls on that actor.
Purchase v. Seelye marks the opposite pole. The hospital there made a mistake and operated on the wrong patient, and the court held the intervening negligence so unusual that it was superseding, which cut off the original wrongdoer's liability for that harm.28 The original negligence exposed the plaintiff to the risks that come with treating the injury, such as a clumsy incision or a misread symptom. An operation on the wrong patient departs from the work of treating the injury at all, so the harm it produces is no longer a typical consequence of the original wrong. Treating that kind of error as superseding keeps § 457 from making the first actor an insurer against every conceivable mishap in the treatment process.
The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm § 35 states the same limit in terms of the harm that results. The original tortfeasor is liable for enhanced harm unless the enhanced harm arises from harm different from the harm incident to normal efforts to render aid.29 Section 457 asks whether the helper's efforts were normal, while § 35 asks whether the added harm is of a kind that normal aid brings with it. A nerve damaged during surgery is harm incident to surgical aid, whereas the harm from an operation on the wrong patient is different from anything normal aid would involve.
The line slides from ordinary error toward extraordinary error, so courts draw it case by case, and the label superseding does no analytical work of its own. Calling an intervening mistake superseding records a judgment that it was so far from normal aid that the first actor's negligence can no longer fairly be charged with it. On an exam, identify what the helper was doing and what harm resulted, then measure both against what treating this particular injury would ordinarily involve. Careless performance of normal aid stays with the original wrongdoer, so a stem showing only a negligent doctor does not cut off liability. A stem showing a bizarre mistake that produces a different kind of harm opens the argument for cutting it off, and the answer should lay out the facts on each side of the comparison before concluding.