Concept
Weakened Condition and Later Harm
Successive and subsequent causes of harm
Weakened Condition and Later Harm
A first injury can set up a later harm without anyone else doing a thing. The injury changes the plaintiff: resistance to infection falls, or a limb stops bearing weight reliably. A later disease or fall then exploits the change, and the question is whether the original tortfeasor answers for it. The Restatement (Second) of Torts gives a limited yes in two settings. An actor liable for an injury that lowers the plaintiff's vitality, leaving the plaintiff peculiarly susceptible to a disease, is also liable for the disease contracted because of the lowered vitality.1 An actor liable for an injury that impairs the plaintiff's physical condition is also liable for harm sustained in a later accident that would not have occurred had the condition not been impaired and that is a normal consequence of the impairment.2
The aid cases in the previous section sent later harm through other people: a physician or rescuer steps in, and a mistake in helping adds to the damage. These rules send it through the plaintiff's own body. The vulnerability exists only because of the injury the actor caused, so a disease or fall that exploits it is a consequence of the original wrong, and calling it a separate misfortune would leave the plaintiff to pay for a weakness the actor created. Each rule also carries a limit that keeps liability tied to the injury: the disease must be contracted because of the lowered vitality, and the accident must depend on the impairment and be a normal consequence of it. The Restatement then draws a boundary. It expresses no opinion on whether an actor who weakened the plaintiff's body is also liable for later harm from a third person's negligence.3 The subsections below take the disease rule, the accident rule, and that open question in turn.
Lowered Vitality and Disease
A serious injury can leave the body unable to fight off illness, and the Restatement charges the resulting disease to the actor who caused the injury. If the negligent actor is liable for an injury that so lowers the plaintiff's vitality as to make the plaintiff peculiarly susceptible to a disease, the actor is also liable for the disease contracted because of the lowered vitality.4 Vitality is the body's general capacity to resist illness, and peculiarly susceptible means far more exposed to the disease than a healthy person would be. The rule rarely carries a whole exam problem, but when a stem describes a badly hurt plaintiff who later falls ill, it supplies the path from the injury to the illness.
That path runs through the plaintiff's own body. The injury produces a physical condition, lowered resistance, and the disease is a germ meeting defenses the injury had already weakened. An actor who caused the weakness cannot fairly call the later illness an unrelated misfortune when a healthy body would likely have resisted it. The text asks only whether the disease was contracted because of the lowered vitality; it adds no requirement that the actor foresee the particular disease. The omission makes sense, since a wrongdoer cannot know which illness a weakened body will meet, and a foresight requirement would let the harm escape through the very impairment the wrongdoer created.
The limit lives in the phrase because of the lowered vitality. The disease must trace to the impairment, which screens out illnesses the plaintiff would have caught with or without the injury. Without that link, the rule would make a defendant answerable for every sickness the plaintiff suffers after the injury merely because the injury came first.
What separates the two illnesses is the causal clause. The pneumonia entered through defenses the injury had lowered, while the influenza would have struck a healthy person the same way, so only the first is charged to the landowner.
Two decided cases sit near this rule and sharpen it, though neither applies it. Vosburg v. Putney, a schoolyard battery case, shows a related idea. A schoolboy lightly kicked a classmate whose leg was still recovering from an earlier injury, and the court held the kicker liable for the full damages even though their seriousness could not have been foreseen.5 That principle sits comfortably with the absence of any foresight requirement in the lowered-vitality rule. The vulnerability differs in origin, however. The weakness in the Vosburg plaintiff existed before the kick, while the lowered-vitality rule concerns a weakness the defendant's own tort created. Vosburg tells you how far a defendant's liability extends once it attaches, and the rule here tells you when a weakness made by the injury carries that liability forward to a disease.
Fuller v. Preis supplies a parallel in which an injury-created condition leads to a later, different harm. The decedent, a physician, walked away from an automobile collision believing himself unhurt, but he had struck his head, and in the seven months before his death he suffered 38 seizures, though he had never had one before.6 The jury had been told it could find the defendants liable for a suicide committed by an accident victim whose mental disease left him unable to control an irresistible impulse to destroy himself. The New York Court of Appeals held that suicide is not a superseding cause as a matter of law, and it ordered a new trial because the only genuine issue was whether the impulse was caused by traumatic organic brain damage.7
Fuller shares the structure of the lowered-vitality rule: the injury produces a condition inside the body, and the later harm travels through that condition. The harm differs, a death by the plaintiff's own act and not a disease, and the court resolved it through superseding-cause analysis, so the case sits beside the rule as a parallel and not as an application. The causal link does the same screening work as because of the lowered vitality. The defendant answers only if the impulse flowed from the injury, and a suicide with some other source stays outside the injury's reach.
Later Accidents from Impairment
A damaged limb makes a later fall more likely, and the Restatement charges the fall to the actor who damaged the limb, within limits. An actor liable for an injury that impairs the physical condition of the plaintiff's body is also liable for harm sustained in a subsequent accident that would not have occurred had the plaintiff's condition not been impaired, and that is a normal consequence of the impairment.9 An impairment is a lasting loss of function, such as a knee that no longer bears weight reliably. The classic picture is a weakened limb giving way: the plaintiff steps down, the leg buckles, and the fall breaks a wrist. The rule has two requirements, causation through the impairment and normal consequence, and the plaintiff must satisfy both.
The disease rule sent the first injury through the plaintiff's resistance to illness.10 The accident rule follows the same route through the plaintiff's body, but the later harm is a physical event, a fall or a stumble, and not a disease. The reason for charging the first actor is the same. When the impairment the actor caused makes the accident possible, the accident is downstream of the original injury and not an unrelated event. The two requirements exist because that reasoning would otherwise overreach and charge the defendant with every accident the plaintiff suffers after the injury.
The first requirement ties the accident to the impairment. The text asks whether the accident would not have occurred had the condition not been impaired, which is a but-for question about the impairment itself and not merely about the earlier injury. The distinction matters because an injured plaintiff goes on living, and many accidents in the following months have nothing to do with the damaged body part. An accident that would have happened to a plaintiff with sound limbs owes nothing to the impairment, and the defendant's negligence connects to it no more than to any other accident in the plaintiff's life. Coming later in time is never enough, which repeats the lesson of the original tortfeasor doctrine: ask what links the later event to the first injury.
A but-for link is still not enough, because an impairment can be a but-for cause of an accident in a technical sense and yet be a poor explanation for it. The second requirement therefore asks whether the accident is a normal consequence of the impairment. This is a foreseeability limit, and it keeps the defendant from answering for freak events merely because the plaintiff happened to be weakened when they occurred. A weakened knee buckling on stairs is the ordinary result of a weakened knee. An event that has nothing to do with how the impairment affects the body, but that reaches the plaintiff because the impairment put the plaintiff in a particular place, is a different matter.
Both requirements concern the link between the impairment and the accident, and neither asks whether anyone else was careless. A stem in which a third person's negligence combines with the weakened condition raises a further question. Suppose a driver strikes a plaintiff whose damaged knee kept the plaintiff from clearing a crosswalk in time. The impairment now contributes to the accident, so the first requirement is met, but the driver's carelessness leaves open whether the original actor also answers. The Restatement declines to resolve that question. It states that the Institute expresses no opinion on whether the actor whose negligence weakened the plaintiff's body is also liable for later harm resulting from the subsequent negligence of a third person.11 The next subsection takes up that open question, while the sequence above governs accidents that are the plaintiff's own misstep or that involve no one's fault.
Third-Party Negligence Caveat
The caveat marks a place where the Institute chose to say nothing. It states that the Institute expresses no opinion on whether an actor whose negligence has weakened another's physical condition is also liable for later harm resulting from the subsequent negligence of a third person.13 Because the sentence disclaims an opinion, an answer that says the Restatement imposes liability here, or denies it, misreads the text. The caveat marks the edge of the accident rule. That rule covers a later accident the impairment made possible and that is a normal consequence of it, while the caveat points to the neighboring case in which the later harm also involves someone else's fault, such as a driver who carelessly strikes a plaintiff whose damaged knee kept the plaintiff from clearing the crosswalk.
The aid rule from the previous section shows how much the gap leaves open. It charges the original actor with additional bodily harm resulting from normal efforts of third persons to render aid the injury reasonably requires, whether the aid is given properly or negligently.14 The weakened-condition rules contain no counterpart, so a stranger's carelessness unrelated to aid finds no textual answer in them. A court may treat the aid rule as suggestive, but it speaks only of aid, and a motorist who fails to yield renders none. The court must therefore reason from the general law of superseding cause. A superseding cause is an act of a third person or other force that, by its intervention, prevents the actor from being liable for harm that the actor's antecedent negligence is a substantial factor in bringing about.15
That doctrine asks two connected questions. The first is whether the risk of the third person's conduct is the very risk that made the original conduct negligent. When it is, the intervening act does not relieve the actor of responsibility.16 Section 449 applied that principle where a burglar's illegal entry was one of the hazards that made it negligent to wire a system improperly.17 The second question is whether the third person's conduct was extraordinary. The usual test for a superseding cause is put in terms of foreseeability under § 447: a person is deemed to foresee the normal consequences of conduct but is not responsible for extraordinarily negligent intervening acts of third persons.18
Both questions bear naturally on a weakened plaintiff. A damaged body leaves the plaintiff slower to avoid a careless driver and less able to catch a fall, and ordinary lapses by other people are a constant feature of daily life, so the impairment magnifies the very risk that ordinary carelessness creates. That reasoning favors charging the original actor with foreseeable lapses, though it is an argument and not a holding. It loses force when the third person's conduct is extraordinary or highly culpable, because the original actor could not reasonably be expected to guard against it.
The deliberate-driver version draws on the rule for intentional torts and crimes. Under § 448 the act of a third person in committing such a tort or crime is a superseding cause of the harm that results, even though the actor's negligence created an opportunity for it, unless the actor at the time realized or should have realized the likelihood of that situation and that a third person might avail himself of the opportunity.19 Even this rule leaves room for argument. It is probably impossible to state a comprehensive rule for when a negligent defendant remains liable after an intervening criminal act, the Kentucky Supreme Court has said that criminal conduct no longer automatically interrupts the causal link, and intervening acts that are unforeseeable, unusual, or highly culpable may fall outside the scope of the risk.20 In both versions of the hypothetical the impairment helped produce the harm, so the character of the third person's act decides the outcome.
Courts also divide on the question in medical settings, which shows that it is a live one. In Siggers v. Barlow an emergency room physician negligently failed to identify a fracture that required surgery. An attending physician later read the films and reported the fracture to a subsequent emergency room physician, whose duty was to tell the patient, but the patient was never notified and suffered irreparable injury. The court treated the later physician's failure to prevent the harm that the first physician's negligence began as a superseding cause.21 Looney v. Davis points the other way, since it treats later negligent medical care as foreseeable and therefore not a superseding cause.22 Siggers contains a feature a court could treat as decisive. By the time the later physician acted, the first physician's error had already been caught, and responsibility for preventing the threatened harm rested with the person assigned to deliver the correction. Looney begins from the foreseeability of later medical negligence, which keeps the original wrongdoer attached to what follows. Neither decision applies the weakened-condition rules, because both involve medical negligence and not a weakened body, but together they show the general intervening-cause analysis producing different results when a third person's fault joins the first actor's.
Steps three and four carry the analysis, and they apply the foreseeability tests of §§ 447 and 449 to the facts of a particular stem. The label superseding records a conclusion that the later event was extraordinary or unforeseeable, and it supplies no method for reaching that conclusion, so an answer that stops at the label has analyzed nothing.23 A strong answer names the hazard that made the original conduct negligent, explains how the impairment increased the plaintiff's exposure to the third person's carelessness, and then measures the third person's conduct against what could ordinarily be expected. A lapse in attention by a driver fits comfortably within the ordinary risks around an impaired plaintiff. A deliberate attack, or a later actor who has taken over the job of preventing harm, pushes toward a superseding cause.