Concept
Joint Liability Based on Conduct
Apportionment of liability and contribution among tortfeasors
Apportioning Liability Among Tortfeasors
Joint Liability Based on Conduct
A plaintiff can recover the whole of a loss from each of several defendants for either of two reasons, and most apportionment problems turn on keeping the two apart. One reason lies in what the defendants did together or owe together. The other lies in the indivisibility of the injury they caused. This unit takes up the first, which has two branches: concert of action and common duty.
“Joint and several” has a precise meaning. Each tortfeasor can be sued together with the others for the amount of the plaintiff’s loss, each is also individually liable for the full amount, and the plaintiff can collect up to the full amount from any one of them or any group of them.1 Conduct-based liability gives every defendant that exposure because of a shared undertaking, so the plaintiff need not prove which defendant caused which fraction of the loss.
The harm-based ground, which the next section develops, runs differently. If the tortious conduct of each of two or more persons is a legal cause of harm that cannot be apportioned, each is subject to liability for the entire harm, whether the conduct is concurring or consecutive.2 That rule asks for no agreement and no shared duty, and the defendants need not even know one another. The tie among them is a single injury that cannot be divided. The conduct-based grounds ask instead what the defendants undertook together or owe together.
Courts blur the two grounds by using the label “joint tortfeasor” loosely. It customarily covers everyone liable to one plaintiff for the same harm, even when each defendant acted independently, no joint enterprise existed, and no one sued the defendants together, or at all. “Concurrent tortfeasors” would be the more accurate name for those cases, since only their liability is potentially joint.3 Procedure no longer helps sort them. Modern joinder rules permit one suit when the claims arise from the same transaction, occurrence, or series of them and share a common question of law or fact. Defendants who acted in concert, who acted independently to cause the same harm, and even who acted independently to cause different harms may therefore all be joined.4 Joinder also remains the plaintiff’s choice: in most jurisdictions the plaintiff may sue one tortfeasor alone, and a defendant cannot compel joinder of the others over the plaintiff’s objection.5
The distinction matters more as states retreat from joint liability among independent actors. At this writing, eight states keep joint and several liability in its original form, about 16 have adopted several liability (some with exceptions), and most use hybrid systems that vary too widely for simple description.6 Whether such a retreat also reaches defendants bound by a plan or a common duty is a separate question, and the Illinois decision discussed below answers it for concert of action.
Concert of Action
Two or more persons who act in pursuance of a common plan or design to commit a tortious act, and who actively take part in it, further it by cooperation or request, lend aid or encouragement to the wrongdoer, or ratify or adopt the wrongdoer’s acts done for their benefit, are jointly and severally liable to the plaintiff for the resulting tort.7 Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability § 15 states the rule in these terms. Two elements do the work. The common plan binds the defendants to one another, and each defendant’s own participation, cooperation, aid, encouragement, or ratification binds that defendant to the plan.
Suppose Kelvin and Curie go looking for Marconi, planning to beat him up. They find him, and Curie breaks his jaw. Both are liable to Marconi because they acted in concert to injure him; Kelvin did not hit Marconi, but he encouraged and participated in the common scheme.8 Tort law traditionally held, and still holds, actors engaged in such joint conduct liable for the acts of either, much as conspirators are criminally responsible for the acts of other conspirators.9 Because the plan makes the separate acts one wrong, the plaintiff need not trace the injury to the hands of a particular participant.
The rule does not depend on an intent to injure. In the highway-race cases, all parties engaged in a motor vehicle race on the highway are wrongdoers acting in concert, and each participant is liable for harm to a third person arising from the tortious conduct of the other, because each induced and encouraged it. Liability attaches regardless of which racing car directly inflicted the injury.10 Bierczynski v. Rogers states the rule in these terms.11 A drag race shows why the label fits: two actors consciously engage together in negligent conduct that they know creates unreasonable risks to others.12 Other decisions apply the same principle, among them Thompson v. Johnson, which turns on encouragement and aid given to an assailant, and Navarrete v. Meyer and Reilly v. Anderson, which carry the reasoning into negligent driving.
Whether a statute that limits joint liability among independent tortfeasors also limits concert liability was the question in Woods v. Cole. The defendant argued that each concert participant must engage in some form of affirmative conduct to be liable under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 876, so nothing barred apportioning the participants’ liability, and the Illinois apportionment provision (section 2-1117) should apply to a defendant whose liability rests on concert. The Illinois Supreme Court disagreed.13 Its account of the independent concurring tortfeasor shows the contrast it had in mind. That tortfeasor is liable for the whole injury not because he or she answers for what the others did, but because the injury cannot be divided and the tortfeasor’s own conduct satisfies the standard elements of tort liability.14 The contrast implies that a concert participant’s liability does rest on responsibility for the others’ acts, and the plan supplies that responsibility.
The doctrine has three limits. First, a shared outcome is not a shared plan. Edison and Joule, whose separate negligence combined to cause a single injury, did not act together, probably did not know each other, and may not have known of the other’s presence. The negligence of each was a “but for” cause of the harm, and that causal tie, not any common scheme, is what links them.15 Liability of that kind belongs to the indivisible-harm ground in the next section.
Second, presence is not participation. The definition describes what a participant does: takes part, furthers the plan by cooperation or request, lends aid or encouragement, or ratifies the wrongdoer’s acts.16 A bystander who silently approves has done none of these.
Third, an agreement must be to commit a tort. Hahn and Whiting worked together on a construction job and agreed that Whiting would cut off the power. Whiting was responsible for that task, and Hahn was not. Hahn faced no liability for Whiting’s negligence merely because they worked the same job, since that rule would make employees liable for the torts of any co-worker. Agreeing to split up work in a particular way is quite different from agreeing to engage in tortious conduct, and unlike two drivers in a drag race, Hahn agreed to no negligent course of conduct.17
Common Duty
A second conduct-based route needs no agreement at all. If two or more persons are under a common duty and failure to perform it amounts to tortious conduct, each is subject to liability for the entire harm resulting from the failure.19 Concert of action looks to what the defendants chose to do together; this rule looks to what their relationship obliges them to do. The familiar pairs are master and servant, employer and employee, and the seller of a product and the manufacturer who made it. In each pair, one party answers to the plaintiff because of its relationship to the other.20
The distribution chain shows the rule at work. In Marcon v. Kmart Corp., a jury found a sled defective because its bankrupt manufacturer had failed to warn of the risks of kneeling on it. The seller, Kmart, was held liable under Minnesota’s statute on joint and several liability for the entire $8 million award.21 A plaintiff who cannot collect from an insolvent manufacturer can therefore collect from the seller the full amount the manufacturer cannot pay.
Employment follows the same pattern. An employee remains personally liable for a tort committed in the scope of employment. Respondeat superior gives the plaintiff a second, potentially more solvent target; it does not bar suit against the employee, and frequently both are sued.22 Two rules protect the relationship between the two defendants. Damages awarded in a later judgment against the principal can be no greater than those previously obtained against the agent, so that the principal’s right of indemnity against the agent is not compromised. And a prior judgment in favor of either the principal or the agent bars a later action against the other, unless the judgment rests on a personal defense.23
A vicariously liable defendant is also unlike an independent tortfeasor when fault is divided. Metro, the employer in a familiar illustration, “is not a tortfeasor at all, but rather is vicariously liable for the tort of someone else.”24 It has no fault of its own to assign. The Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act builds a related idea into its text: where equity requires, the collective liability of some as a group constitutes a single share.25 Bylsma v. R.C. Willey applies the single-unit idea to defendants in a distribution chain who share the same duty.
The rule carries a precondition that is easy to overlook: the failure to perform the duty must itself amount to tortious conduct.26 Vicarious liability is liability for the tort of someone else.27 If the driver committed no tort, there is nothing to impute to the employer. The relationship must also make the duty common. Co-workers on the same job share work, not liability, since a rule making employees answer for the torts of any co-worker would be a tough rule indeed.28
Joint liability to the plaintiff does not settle who finally bears the loss. The right of indemnity that an employer holds against its employee, and the one-way direction of that right, are taken up in the later section on indemnity.30