Concept
Immunity of One Tortfeasor
Apportionment of liability and contribution among tortfeasors
Immunity of One Tortfeasor
A tortfeasor cannot escape liability because the plaintiff is barred from suing someone else who helped cause the harm. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 880 states the rule: if two persons would otherwise be liable for a harm, one is not relieved from liability by the fact that the other has an absolute privilege to act or an immunity from liability to the person harmed.1 The rule completes the reasoning of the preceding sections. Under § 879, each tortfeasor whose conduct legally caused an indivisible harm owes all of it. Section 880 adds that the answer does not change when the law shuts the plaintiff out from reaching one of the wrongdoers. A privilege justifies one actor's conduct. An immunity protects one actor from this plaintiff's suit while leaving the underlying wrong intact. In both cases the escape belongs to the protected person alone.
The reason lies in what an immunity decides. Immunities rest on considerations tied to the protected party's own situation, such as the marital relationship or the workers' compensation system, which makes an employee's compensation remedy exclusive against the employer.2 None of these considerations says that the protected party acted carefully, that the plaintiff was unhurt, or that the protected party's conduct failed to contribute to the harm. Each answers a narrower question: may this plaintiff collect from this person? The second defendant's liability rests on that defendant's own duty, breach, and causation, and none of the three depends on the immune party. If the second defendant could borrow the immunity, the plaintiff would absorb a loss caused by wrongdoing, on a ground that has nothing to do with the plaintiff or with the defendant's own conduct. For the plaintiff, an immune co-tortfeasor therefore works much as an insolvent one does. Under joint and several liability, the risk of non-payment falls on the remaining defendants, not on the injured person.3
Walt Disney World v. Wood shows the rule at its sharpest. The plaintiff was hurt in a bumper-car collision with a car driven by Daniel Wood, her fiancé. The jury found Daniel and Walt Disney World (WDW) negligent and the plaintiff contributorily negligent, and it assigned 85 percent of the fault to Daniel, 14 percent to the plaintiff, and 1 percent to WDW.4 The couple married before trial, so interspousal immunity protected Daniel. The judge reduced the judgment by the plaintiff's 14 percent and held WDW liable for the remaining 86 percent.5
Wood separates two percentages that students often merge. The plaintiff's 14 percent comes off the judgment because comparative fault reduces a plaintiff's recovery by her own share of responsibility. Daniel's 85 percent does not, because a defendant whose negligence legally caused an indivisible harm owes the entire harm, and Daniel's immunity bears only on whether he can be made to pay. WDW therefore owed 86 percent of the damages even though the jury had assigned the plaintiff fourteen times as much fault as it assigned the park.6 An answer that also subtracts the immune party's percentage in a joint-and-several jurisdiction confuses that party's share with the plaintiff's own.
Wood is a joint-and-several result. Under several or proportionate liability, WDW would owe only 1 percent of the damages, and Daniel's share would stay with the plaintiff, uncollected. That sounds fair on its surface, but it is unfair to the plaintiff in the way joint and several liability is unfair to the defendant: the jury found the plaintiff only 14 percent responsible, yet 99 percent of her damages would go uncompensated.7 Approximately 15 states now apply several or proportionate liability.8
Where joint liability has been abolished, counting an immune actor's fault lowers the fault chargeable to the defendant and so usually lowers what the defendant owes, which is why plaintiffs stand to lose by that counting.9 Courts disagree about whether to count it. Tennessee has let a jury consider the conduct of an immune employer in deciding whether a manufacturer is liable while forbidding it to assess fault against the employer, and Mississippi has allowed fault to be allocated to an immune employer.10 One court that declined to abolish joint and several liability after adopting comparative negligence reasoned that abolition would shift the burden of an insolvent or immune defendant to the plaintiff and reduce her damages beyond her own percentage of fault, a further reduction that comparative negligence does not require.11 The later sections on comparative fault and nonparty fault return to this debate.
Employment supplies a second setting. A vicariously liable employer answers for an employee's tort without having committed one, so it can seem to follow that the employer may use any defense the employee has. In Schubert v. August Schubert Wagon Co., an employee driving on the employer's business injured his wife, and intra-family tort immunity protected him from her suit. The employer argued that its derivative liability fell with the employee's immunity, and the New York court rejected the argument.12 Respondeat superior requires that the employee have committed a wrong, and the wrong was committed here. The immunity is a personal defense, consistent with the wrong having occurred rather than erasing it, so in most states the employer cannot take advantage of it.13
The court also answered the objection that letting the wife sue the employer would push the burden back onto her husband through the employer's right of indemnity. Indemnity, it said, rests on breach of an independent duty owed to the employer rather than on subrogation to the wife's claim, and if immunity and indemnity ever collided, intra-family immunity would give way.14 The line to hold runs between a wrong that was committed but cannot be sued upon and no wrong at all. A driver who was not negligent committed no tort, so nothing passes to the employer. An immune driver who was negligent leaves the employer exposed. The same distinction explains the rule that a prior judgment for the principal or the agent bars a later suit against the other unless the judgment rests on a personal defense.15
The employer of an injured worker stands where the immune spouse stood in Wood. The exclusive-remedy provision makes that employer immune from the worker's tort claim, but it does not bar the worker's claim against a third party, such as the maker of a defective machine, whose conduct contributed to the injury.16 Section 880 leaves that third party fully exposed. Most courts also reject the third party's contribution claim against the immune employer, although a few permit it up to the employer's compensation liability.17 Whether the worker ends up whole then depends on the liability regime. Suppose the employer and the third party are each 50 percent at fault, damages are $100,000, and compensation payments total $10,000. A joint-and-several system makes the third party pay full tort liability. Where joint liability has been completely abolished, the third party pays only its $50,000 share, and the worker, who also has the $10,000 in compensation, bears the remaining $40,000 unless the court reinstates joint and several liability for this situation.18
The remaining defendant also has trouble shifting the loss afterward. A party seeking contribution ordinarily must show that the person it targets was subject to liability to the injured plaintiff. Defenses personal to the contribution defendant, including intra-family or governmental immunity, privilege, and workers' compensation immunity, therefore usually bar contribution, although some authority is to the contrary.19 Under that usual rule, WDW could not collect Daniel's share from Daniel. A limitations bar is treated differently: the running of the statute of limitations on the plaintiff's claim against the contribution defendant is no defense to contribution.20 The contrast tracks the requirement. An immune person is not subject to liability to the plaintiff at all, while a person whose limitations period has run was subject to liability. The later section on the common liability requirement develops these limits on contribution.