Concept
Comparative Fault and Joint Liability
Apportionment of liability and contribution among tortfeasors
Comparative Fault and Joint Liability
Joint and several liability makes each of two or more tortfeasors answerable for all of a harm that cannot be apportioned. The Restatement (Second) of Torts states the rule: if each person’s tortious conduct is a legal cause of harm that cannot be apportioned, each is subject to liability for the entire harm, whether the conduct is concurring or consecutive.1 Two other settings also support joint and several liability. Participants in a highway race are wrongdoers acting in concert, and each answers for harm to a third person arising from the other’s tortious conduct, because he induced and encouraged the tort.2 And defendants who fail to perform a common duty to the plaintiff may also face joint and several liability, including parties liable because of their relationship to each other: master and servant, employer and employee, or the seller of a product made by someone else.3
Comparative negligence leaves the basic rule where it found it. It lets a plaintiff who is partly at fault recover reduced damages and supplies a formula for the reduction. Standing alone, though, the formula changes neither the rule that each defendant owes the entire judgment nor the contribution rules that redistribute the loss among defendants.4 Whether to change either rule is a separate decision, and jurisdictions have decided it differently.
Suppose Rousseau proves $100,000 in damages, and the jury finds Rousseau 45 percent at fault, Locke 15 percent, and the city 40 percent. Rousseau’s recovery falls to $55,000. Where joint and several liability survives, judgment enters for $55,000 against each defendant, and Rousseau may collect all of it from either Locke or the city; whoever pays then seeks contribution from the other.5 The jury’s percentages shrank the plaintiff’s judgment without shrinking what either defendant owes of it. The common error is to divide the $55,000 into $15,000 for Locke and $40,000 for the city. That division belongs to several liability, under which each defendant owes only its proportional share of the fault.6
Why Comparative Fault Put the Rule Under Pressure
Joint and several liability sat comfortably with contributory negligence. Only a plaintiff without fault could recover at all, so the rule placed the risk of one defendant’s insolvency on the other negligent defendants and spared an innocent plaintiff.7 Under comparative negligence the plaintiff is no longer entirely innocent, because the plaintiff was negligent too.8 The rule is one instance of a general question: what should happen to a holding framed under contributory negligence when a jurisdiction adopts comparative negligence?9 Negligence cases have always turned sometimes on the defendant’s conduct and sometimes on the plaintiff’s;10 comparative fault places both on one scale of percentages.
The case for carrying the old rule forward is weakest for defendants who are merely concurrent tortfeasors. Each is no more responsible for the other’s negligence than the plaintiff is, so holding each liable for the whole judgment is simply a carryover of the prior rule.11 The case looks different where one defendant answers for another’s conduct, as racers do who induced and encouraged each other’s torts.12
The strain shows in the numbers. Suppose Nell suffers $100,000 in damages, and the jury finds Nell 20 percent at fault, Fagan 70 percent, and Twist 10 percent. Nell recovers $80,000, and under joint and several liability she may collect all of it from Twist. Twist will argue that he should not owe $80,000 to a plaintiff who was twice as careless as he was. If Fagan pays the judgment, Twist will also argue that he should reimburse Fagan far less than the half that pro rata contribution would assign, because Twist was only one-seventh as faulty as Fagan.13 In Walt Disney World Co. v. Wood, the jury put 14 percent of the fault on the plaintiff and only 1 percent on Walt Disney World (WDW). The judge reduced the judgment by the plaintiff’s 14 percent and held WDW liable for the remaining 86 percent.14
Three Ways Jurisdictions Responded
Three approaches are possible, and states have adopted each in whole or in part, by statute or by judicial decision.15 The first keeps joint and several liability for the amount of the judgment. The second makes each defendant liable only for its proportional share of the fault. The third mixes the two. Eight states, at last count, still apply the original rule, about sixteen have adopted several liability (some with exceptions), and most use hybrids whose terms, conditions, and consequences vary so widely that they defy simple description.16
Courts That Kept the Rule
The California Supreme Court held in American Motorcycle Association v. Superior Court that its adoption of comparative negligence in Li v. Yellow Cab Co. neither abolished nor limited joint and several liability.17 The court stressed what the rule does for plaintiffs: it frequently lets an injured person recover in full even when a responsible party lacks the means to pay. Citing Summers v. Tice, the court reasoned that fairness dictates the “wronged party should not be deprived of his right to redress” and that the wrongdoers “should be left to work out between themselves any apportionment.” Li, it said, did not detract from that pragmatic policy determination, and the overwhelming weight of judicial and academic opinion supported its conclusion.18
Justice Clark’s dissent measured the cost in numbers. Take a plaintiff 30 percent at fault, a first defendant 60 percent, and a second defendant 10 percent. Under the majority’s rule the plaintiff holds a judgment for 70 percent of the loss against each defendant, so the defendant found only 10 percent at fault may have to pay 70 percent of the loss if the other cannot respond in damages.19 The majority, in his view, had rejected the Li principle by making each defendant, even the marginally negligent one, responsible for the loss attributable to a codefendant’s negligence.20
The Illinois Supreme Court reached the same conclusion in Coney v. J.L.G. Industries, Inc. Having adopted comparative negligence in Alvis, it found nothing in that decision that required either a shift in who bears the risk of the insolvent defendant or the elimination of joint and several liability. The defendant had cited no persuasive authority that comparative negligence compels abolition, and most jurisdictions that adopted comparative negligence had kept the doctrine.21
Courts That Replaced It
Courts and legislatures that replaced the rule treated comparative fault as a policy change large enough to justify a different one: because a negligent plaintiff can still recover, each defendant should owe only its proportional share of the fault.22 New Mexico’s Bartlett v. New Mexico Welding Supply, Inc., Tennessee’s McIntyre v. Balentine, and Kansas’s Brown v. Keill illustrate that route.
Justice Clark’s hypothetical comes out differently under such a rule. If the 60 percent defendant is insolvent, the 10 percent defendant continues to bear 10 percent of the loss, and the plaintiff bears the rest: 30 percent for her own fault and 60 percent for the insolvent defendant’s.23 The California majority’s rule would have placed 70 percent of that loss on the same 10 percent defendant.24 The comparison also invites a further question: does joint and several liability make as much sense with 100 defendants in a cumulative trauma case as with two in an accident case?25
Where the Two Rules Diverge
When every defendant can pay, the choice matters less than the rhetoric suggests. Joint and several liability followed by contribution measured by fault leaves each defendant with its own percentage, which several liability assigns at the outset. The regimes part only over a share that cannot be collected. Joint liability leaves the shortfall with the other defendants, who work out its apportionment among themselves, while several liability leaves it with the plaintiff, because no defendant owes more than its proportional share.26 The result also depends on how contribution is measured. Under pro rata contribution, Twist would repay Fagan half of what Fagan paid, not the one-seventh that fault would suggest.27
A state that resolves the question by statute should expect the statute to be tested. Courts have invalidated legislative damage limits under their state constitutions. In Moore v. Mobile Infirmary Ass’n, an Alabama court struck a malpractice cap on noneconomic damages for denying the right to jury trial and equal protection, because the statute created a favored class of defendants.28 In Bayer CropScience LP v. Schafer, Arkansas’s court struck a statutory cap on punitive damages under a constitutional provision that bars the legislature from limiting recovery for injuries to persons or property.29 Those decisions concern damage caps rather than joint liability, but they show that statutory limits on recovery face challenge under state constitutions.30 The next section takes up the statutory alternatives to joint liability.