Concept
Contribution Among Tortfeasors
Apportionment of liability and contribution among tortfeasors
Contribution Among Tortfeasors
Joint liability lets a plaintiff collect the whole judgment from whichever tortfeasor is easiest to reach. Under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 879, each of two or more persons whose tortious conduct is a legal cause of harm that cannot be apportioned is subject to liability for the entire harm, whether their conduct is concurring or consecutive.1 The rule serves the plaintiff and burdens the defendant who pays, who now carries a loss that others helped cause. Contribution lightens that burden: the defendant who paid the plaintiff’s damages redistributes the loss by making the other tortfeasors contribute to the payment of the common liability.2
The right leaves the plaintiff’s position untouched. The plaintiff may still collect from any liable defendant, up to one full satisfaction of the damages.3 The contribution claim belongs to a defendant and arises only when that defendant has paid more than its pro rata share of the common liability.4 A defendant therefore cannot pay half a judgment and send the plaintiff after another tortfeasor for the balance. The defendants settle the shares among themselves, and the plaintiff’s right to collect does not change.
Contribution matters only where liability is joint. Where harm is divisible, § 881 makes each independent tortfeasor liable only for the portion it caused,5 so no one pays more than its portion. Where a jurisdiction has eliminated joint and several liability, contribution is neither necessary nor permitted.6 A defendant who is only severally liable never pays more than its own share, so it has nothing to recover.7 Contribution does its work where joint liability survives, and in a hybrid system it reaches only the part of the judgment that remains joint.
Five questions organize the rest of this unit. Where does the right come from? How does a court measure each share? How does a paying defendant collect? Against whom does the right run? And who is barred from claiming it?
Origin of the Right
Contribution is the right of a tortfeasor who has paid more than a fair share of a common liability to recover the excess from the others who share it. Many contribution statutes follow the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, a model statute drafted in 1955.8 Section 1(a) creates the right where two or more persons are jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injury, even though judgment has not been recovered against all or any of them.9 Section 1(b) limits who may use it. The right exists only in favor of a tortfeasor who has paid more than his pro rata share of the common liability, his recovery is capped at that excess, and no tortfeasor must contribute beyond his own pro rata share of the entire liability.10
The payment condition ties the remedy to its problem. Section 879 makes each tortfeasor liable for the entire harm, so the plaintiff chooses whom to collect from, and a defendant can end up paying for a loss that others helped cause.11 Only a defendant who has actually paid more than a fair share is in that position. Until payment, contribution has nothing to repair.
The common law gave no such right. The English rule began with Merryweather v. Nixan, decided in 1799. The report is meager, but a joint judgment had apparently been entered against two defendants in an action for conversion, and they had acted in concert, since joinder was then possible only on that basis. One defendant was denied contribution from the other, apparently because he had acted intentionally and his claim rested on what the law saw as entirely his own wrong.12 Two further explanations supported the result. Hostility toward apportionment in contributory negligence cases carried over to disputes between codefendants, and the common law held that no wrongdoer could sue another party whose wrong was no greater than his own. Partnership law divided money obligations pro rata with ease, but tort claims offered no comparably easy measure.13
A rule suited to deliberate joint wrongdoers did not stay confined to them. Once procedure allowed independent tortfeasors who had caused the same harm to be joined in one action, the origin of the no-contribution rule and its reason were lost to sight, and contribution was denied among all “joint tortfeasors.” That was the majority common law rule in the United States early in the twentieth century.14
Suppose Nash and Benchley each negligently contributed to an accident that injured Twain. Twain sues Nash alone and recovers. Nash pays the whole judgment, and Benchley pays nothing, though Benchley also caused the accident. The courts saw no injustice in that result. Nash was a wrongdoer who had caused Twain’s injuries and could fairly be made to pay, justice had been done between plaintiff and defendant, and Nash could not complain that Benchley had gotten off scot free so long as Nash had caused the damages he paid.15
Most critics of the rule accepted that each defendant should be fully liable to the plaintiff. They objected to what happened next: a defendant who paid should be able to redistribute the loss by making the other tortfeasors contribute to the common liability.16 Without that right, the plaintiff’s choice of whom to collect from, and not relative fault, decided who bore the whole loss. The repair left joint liability intact. The plaintiff may still collect from either defendant but is entitled to only one full satisfaction of the damages.17
Most states have since created a right of contribution among joint tortfeasors, by statute or by judicial decision.18 Indiana is a holdout, and the Sixth Circuit has described it as adhering to the traditional rule that prohibits contribution among joint tortfeasors.19 Contribution is now a generally accepted part of joint and several liability, although many jurisdictions still deny it to intentional tortfeasors, the group on whom the original rule fell.20
Payment, not judgment, triggers the claim. Rogers sues Dunne alone over a fire that Dunne and Thurber both negligently caused, and the court enters a $42,000 judgment against Dunne. That judgment gives Dunne no claim against Thurber yet. If Dunne pays, he acquires a right to pro rata contribution of $21,000 from Thurber, but Thurber has never been adjudged liable to Rogers, so Dunne must prove in the contribution action that Thurber was also negligent.21 The same point appears from the other side. Suppose Twain’s judgment against Nash is $20,000 and Nash pays it in full. Nash has paid $10,000 beyond his pro rata share, and if he proves that Benchley was also negligent, he recovers Benchley’s $10,000 share and no more.22
California’s statute states the trigger in its own terms. Where a money judgment has been rendered jointly against two or more defendants, contribution may be enforced only after one tortfeasor has, by payment, discharged the joint judgment or paid more than his pro rata share, and it is limited to the excess so paid.23 The Uniform Act demands less about the judgment: it does not require one against all of the tortfeasors, but it keeps the condition of payment beyond one’s share.24
Measuring Each Share
Once a defendant has paid more than a fair share, the next question is how large the fair share is. Jurisdictions first divided the common liability equally, by analogy to contribution among sureties, so that two tortfeasors bore half each and three bore a third each. With the advent of comparative negligence, most jurisdictions changed and now divide according to the relative fault of the parties, the position of the Uniform Comparative Fault Act and of Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability § 23(b).26 The choice of method matters only after the plaintiff has been paid, because it decides how a judgment that every defendant owed in full is finally split among them.
Equal division, called pro rata contribution, is simple. The court counts the tortfeasors and divides: if two are liable, the one who pays recovers half from the other, and if six are liable, each bears a sixth.27 Nobody has to decide how blameworthy anyone was. The cost is that equal division treats unequal wrongdoers as equals. Suppose Porter is 80 percent at fault, Simon is 20 percent at fault, and Porter pays a $100,000 judgment. Under the pro rata rule of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, Porter recovers $50,000 from Simon and so bears half of a loss for which he was four times as much to blame.28
Comparative negligence made equal division look blunt, because juries now state each party’s percentage of fault. Nell sues Fagan and Twist. The jury finds her damages are $100,000 and her own fault is 20 percent, so her judgment is $80,000, and it finds Fagan 70 percent at fault and Twist 10 percent at fault. Fagan and Twist are each liable for the full $80,000 under joint and several liability, and under traditional contribution whichever pays recovers a pro rata half, or $40,000, from the other. Twist will object that he was only one-seventh as faulty as Fagan.29
The Supreme Court made a parallel observation about the admiralty rule that split collision damages equally between two ships at fault. In United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., the Court explained that an equal division is reasonably satisfactory only where each vessel’s fault is approximately equal or where proportionate degrees of fault cannot be measured and determined on a rational basis, and that it produces palpably unfair results in every other case.30 Equal shares therefore remain defensible as a fallback for equal or unmeasurable fault. Once a verdict has measured fault, the reason for equal division is gone.
Proportional contribution makes the jury’s percentages the measure of each share. The court adds the percentages of the liable defendants to form the denominator and puts each defendant’s own percentage over that total.31 On Nell’s verdict the denominator is 70 plus 10, or 80. If Fagan pays the whole $80,000, he recovers 10/80ths ($10,000) from Twist and absorbs 70/80ths ($70,000) himself. A Twist who paid everything would recover 70/80ths ($70,000) from Fagan. Nell’s 20 percent stays out of the denominator, because it has already come off her judgment and she owes nobody contribution. Dividing by 100 instead is a common mistake. It yields $56,000 for Fagan and $8,000 for Twist, which accounts for only $64,000 of the $80,000 paid.
The same arithmetic handles larger groups. Flite is 20 percent at fault, Micawber 50, Heap 20, and Murdstone 10, so Flite’s adjusted judgment is $48,000, and the defendants’ shares are Micawber’s 50/80ths ($30,000), Heap’s 20/80ths ($12,000), and Murdstone’s 10/80ths ($6,000).32 A Heap who pays the whole $48,000 recovers $30,000 from Micawber and $6,000 from Murdstone and bears his own $12,000. Pure several liability reaches the same shares. The two systems differ only in who bears a share that cannot be collected, because eliminating joint and several liability would shift the burden of an insolvent or immune defendant onto the plaintiff.33
Fault-based shares cost more to administer. Judges and juries must work with fractions in place of a head count.34 A jury’s percentage measures how faulty a defendant was, not how much of the harm that defendant caused. One defendant may be found 15 percent at fault and another 85 percent although each was a but-for cause of all of the plaintiff’s damages.35 In assigning percentages the jury weighs each person’s risk-creating conduct and the strength of its causal connection to the harm.36
A tortfeasor who was never sued complicates the accounting. Suppose Turveydrop was not a party to the first action. The court in the contribution action would have to make a new finding of the relative percentages of negligence of all the parties, Turveydrop included. Turveydrop would owe the percentage allocated to him there, but presumably the other tortfeasors would pay according to the percentages assessed against them in the original action. The accounting does not work out cleanly, and it burdens the court.37 Nor would a finding in the first action bind Turveydrop, because an absent party has had no opportunity to be heard.38 Equal division meets a milder form of the problem, because an unsued tortfeasor still counts in the head count. Suppose Rogers recovers a $42,000 judgment against Dunne and Thurber and never sues White. If White was also negligent, each share is $14,000 and not $21,000, so the court in the contribution action must decide the question.39
Vicariously liable parties count as a single share. An employer liable only for an employee’s tort has no fault of its own to measure, and the two are jointly responsible for one share.40 The same grouping applies to other relationships, such as master and servant or a seller and the maker of a defective product.41 The Uniform Act provides that the collective liability of some as a group may constitute a single share where equity requires. If Reliable is liable only for Porter’s tort under respondeat superior, a $60,000 judgment produces two shares of $30,000, not three of $20,000.42 A vicariously liable party that pays ordinarily has indemnity against the party at fault, a subject for the next section.43
The arithmetic assumes that every share can be collected, and equity decides what happens when one cannot. Suppose Dunne, Thurber, and White are equally responsible for a $42,000 judgment that Dunne pays, so each share is $14,000, and White is insolvent. Read literally, § 1(b) of the Uniform Act says that no tortfeasor is compelled to contribute beyond his pro rata share. On that reading Thurber owes $14,000 and Dunne is $28,000 out of pocket. Most courts view contribution as an equitable doctrine and would require Thurber to pay $21,000. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 886A comment c says a court may “do what is fair and equitable under the circumstances” when a tortfeasor is insolvent, and § 2(c) of the Uniform Act preserves that flexibility by providing that principles of equity applicable to contribution generally apply in determining the shares.44 The plaintiff’s freedom to collect from whichever defendant was easiest to reach put the whole judgment on Dunne by chance, and leaving Dunne to absorb White’s insolvency would let chance decide twice. Splitting White’s $14,000 between the two solvent tortfeasors leaves each with $21,000, which follows the same instinct as the earlier reallocation of uncollectible shares.
Enforcing Contribution
The Uniform Act gives a paying defendant two routes to collect. Section 3(b) authorizes an order for contribution in the plaintiff’s own lawsuit, § 3(a) authorizes a separate suit for contribution, and § 3(c) and (d) set limitation periods for the separate suit.46 Both routes exist because § 879 lets the plaintiff collect the entire judgment from any liable tortfeasor,47 and that leaves the paying defendant with a claim against someone who may never have appeared in the case. Enforcement therefore raises three questions. Can the other tortfeasor be brought into the plaintiff’s suit? What must the payer prove if not? And how long does the claim last?
The cheapest route settles contribution inside the plaintiff’s own lawsuit. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 14(a)(1) lets a defendant implead, meaning bring in as a third-party defendant, a person who may be liable to the defendant for all or part of the plaintiff’s claim.48 Suppose Napoleon sues Wellington for an injury, and Wellington contends that Robespierre’s negligence also contributed. Wellington may implead Robespierre, because Robespierre may be liable to Wellington for part of any damages Wellington is ordered to pay Napoleon.49 If both are found liable and Wellington pays, he moves in the original suit for contribution, an order that § 3(b) of the Uniform Act expressly authorizes.50 A defendant whose co-tortfeasor the plaintiff sued from the start can make the same motion, because the verdict has already fixed each defendant’s liability. One trial avoids litigating a single accident twice, and it removes the risk that two juries will disagree about whether the same person was negligent.
Impleader is an option and not an obligation. The defendant cannot affect the plaintiff’s cause of action against other potential defendants, but the defendant can enforce a right to contribution or indemnity by impleading the other party or by bringing a separate lawsuit later.51 Whether impleader is worth using depends on the liability rule. Where joint and several liability applies and the defendant may have to pay the entire award, impleader is appropriate, but where liability is apportioned the defendant pays no more than its own share and has little reason to bring anyone in.52 In states that have abandoned joint and several liability, contribution is not allowed at all.53 In federal court, jurisdiction is rarely an obstacle: an impleaded party who is not diverse from the defendant does not destroy jurisdiction.54 Supplemental jurisdiction lets a federal court hear related state-law claims against properly joined parties.55
When the other tortfeasor stays out of the plaintiff’s suit, the claim moves to a separate action in which the payer is the plaintiff. Suppose Twain sues Nash alone and Nash does not implead Benchley. After paying the judgment, Nash sues Benchley for Benchley’s pro rata share. Nash must allege that Twain sued him and held him liable for the same injury, that he has paid more than his pro rata share, and that he is entitled to pro rata contribution under the statute.56 The hardest element is proof that Benchley was himself liable to Twain. Benchley was not a defendant in Twain’s suit, so no one has determined that he was negligent, and a judgment cannot bind a person who never had a chance to be heard.57 Nash’s judgment establishes only Nash’s liability, so he must allege and prove in the new action that Benchley’s negligence made Benchley liable to Twain for the accident.58
When the other tortfeasor was a party, the first trial does much of the proving. Under § 3(f), the judgment determining the liability of the several defendants to the claimant binds those defendants in determining their rights to contribution.59 A finding that both defendants were negligent therefore stands, and what remains is the measuring of shares. The same rule protects a defendant whom the verdict cleared. If the jury in Rogers’s suit finds Dunne not negligent and Thurber pays, Thurber has no claim against Dunne, because contribution runs only against a person who is liable to the plaintiff and the first trial decided that Dunne was not.60 Every defendant was before the court and could litigate negligence, and letting the loser retry the question against a co-defendant would invite a second verdict that contradicts the first.
Contribution runs on its own limitations clock, because the right does not exist until the defendant has paid. Allen sues Porter alone, and the limitations period on Allen’s direct claim against Simon expires. If Allen wins and Porter pays, Porter may still sue Simon for contribution within one year after he loses to Allen.61 A losing defendant can thus seek contribution long after the plaintiff is barred from suing the other tortfeasor directly. Without a separate period, a plaintiff could defeat a defendant’s right to contribution by suing that defendant alone late in the plaintiff’s own limitations period. Where no judgment was entered against the party seeking contribution, the Act ties the claim to payment. The claimant must have discharged the common liability by payment within the limitations period applicable to the plaintiff’s action against him and sued for contribution within one year after payment, or must have agreed while the action was pending to discharge the liability, paid within one year after the agreement, and sued within that year.62
Common Liability Requirement
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 880 protects the plaintiff against an immune co-tortfeasor. If two persons would otherwise be liable for a harm, one is not relieved from liability because the other has an absolute privilege to act or an immunity from liability to the person harmed.64 The plaintiff’s claim against the defendant who can be sued is untouched. Contribution runs the other way and imposes a stricter condition. The person the payer wants to reach must have been liable to the plaintiff for the same injury.65 Where no judgment has settled the point, the payer must allege and prove that liability.66
The condition follows from what contribution divides. A plaintiff is entitled to one full satisfaction of the damages, so when one defendant pays, the payment discharges an exposure that every liable tortfeasor shared.67 That shared exposure justifies asking the others to reimburse the payer. A person who owed the plaintiff nothing had no exposure, so the payment relieved him of nothing, and making him reimburse the payer would charge him for a debt he never owed. The words “same injury” also do work. Tortfeasors answerable for distinct harms share no debt, because each answers only for the harm it caused.68 The label “joint tortfeasor” turns on liability and not on procedure. A person liable to the plaintiff for the same harm is a joint tortfeasor whether he acted independently or in concert and whether or not anyone sued him.69
A person who owed the plaintiff no duty is outside the debt from the start. In Breen v. Law Office of Bruce A. Barket, P.C., a former wife sued her own lawyers for malpractice in a divorce, and they sought contribution or indemnification from her former husband’s lawyer. A New York appellate court rejected the claims because no theory made the husband’s lawyer answerable in a duty of care to the wife or to her lawyers, so for the harm her lawyers allegedly caused he was not a joint tortfeasor.70 Co-counsel is different. A New Jersey appellate court held that a contribution claim was validly stated even though the lawyer who served as co-counsel was not admitted to practice in the state and was not named as a defendant in the malpractice action.71 Co-counsel served the same client and could be liable to that client for the same harm, while opposing counsel served the other side and owed the client nothing. In both cases the question was whether the target owed the plaintiff a duty, and whether anyone had sued the target did not matter.
A defendant whom the factfinder clears is outside the debt for the same reason. Rogers sues Dunne and Thurber over a fire, and the jury finds Dunne not negligent and Thurber liable. Thurber pays and seeks contribution from Dunne, and the claim fails. Dunne is not liable to Rogers, and a person who is not a tortfeasor at all cannot be a joint tortfeasor. The Uniform Act reinforces the result by making the judgment on each defendant’s liability binding in the later contribution action, so Thurber cannot ask a second factfinder to reconsider whether Dunne was negligent.72
A defense that belongs to the contribution defendant alone also defeats the claim, even when he was careless, because the defense means he is not liable to the plaintiff. Admiralty supplies the standard illustration. In Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., a longshoreman injured aboard a vessel sued the shipowner, and the shipowner could not obtain contribution from the longshoreman’s employer, the stevedore, because a statute exempted the stevedore from negligence liability.73 The principle is that there can be no contribution against a defendant who is immune from direct suit by the plaintiff, even though the shipowner itself remains fully liable under § 880. Workers’ compensation shows the same pattern on land. Courts commonly reject a contribution claim against an employer who is immune from the injured employee’s direct suit.74
Immunity rules differ from state to state, so the forum’s choice of law can decide the outcome. In Cooney v. Osgood Machinery, Inc., a defendant in a New York action sought contribution from an employer protected by Missouri’s workers’ compensation statute. Missouri shields employers from contribution claims just as it shields them from direct claims by employees who have received benefits, while New York permits contribution claims against employers in similar circumstances. The New York Court of Appeals therefore had to decide which state’s law governed the contribution issue.75
An expired limitations period on the plaintiff’s claim is different, and the difference shows what the requirement measures. An immunity means the law never let this plaintiff recover from this person, so no liability existed to share. A lapsed period means only that the plaintiff waited too long to enforce a liability that existed when the tort occurred. The payer’s payment discharged a real exposure of the contribution defendant, and the payer’s claim arises when the payer pays, not when the plaintiff sues.76
The plaintiff’s choice about whom to sue does not answer the requirement. Return to the fire in which Rogers sued Dunne and Thurber and never sued White. If White’s negligence also contributed to the fire, he is a joint tortfeasor even though Rogers left him out. No judgment has decided White’s liability, so the payer who wants to count him must prove it in the contribution action.77
Intentional Tortfeasors
The Uniform Act gives contribution to a tortfeasor who has paid more than a pro rata share, and it withdraws the right from any tortfeasor who intentionally caused or contributed to the injury.79 California’s statute says the same thing in one sentence: there is no right of contribution in favor of any tortfeasor who has intentionally injured the injured person.80 Both provisions limit who may claim contribution. They shut the door on the deliberate wrongdoer and leave it open to a co-defendant whose fault was carelessness.
The bar is the oldest piece of contribution law. In Merryweather v. Nixan, the 1799 decision that began the no-contribution tradition, the defendants had apparently acted in concert, and the paying defendant was apparently refused relief because his claim rested on what the law saw as entirely his own wrong.81 The general rule against contribution later reached every joint tortfeasor and lost its origin, and reformers won contribution for negligent wrongdoers. The traditional rule against contribution among intentional wrongdoers persisted, there seems little inclination to change it, and many jurisdictions have codified it.82
The policy is easy to state. A defendant who chose to injure the plaintiff did not reach the loss by the accident of whom the plaintiff chose to collect from. Letting that defendant shift part of the loss to a merely negligent co-defendant would lower the price of deliberate harm. Joint and several liability remains the norm among intentional joint tortfeasors, whatever scheme a jurisdiction uses for negligent ones,83 so the bar leaves a deliberate wrongdoer exposed to whatever the plaintiff chooses to collect.
The bar runs in one direction. The statutes deny the right only in favor of the intentional wrongdoer, so a negligent co-defendant who overpays keeps the ordinary right of contribution.84
Where both defendants are merely negligent, the bar never comes into play. When Twain’s $20,000 judgment against Nash is paid in full and Benchley was also negligent, Nash recovers Benchley’s $10,000 share.85 On an exam, apply the statutory bar unless the problem says the jurisdiction has adopted a different rule.