Concept
Indemnity Versus Contribution
Apportionment of liability and contribution among tortfeasors
Indemnity Versus Contribution
Contribution and indemnity both let a defendant who has paid a judgment recover from someone else, but they differ in how much comes back and in who qualifies. Contribution is partial reimbursement: a tortfeasor that pays more than its own share recovers the excess from the others who were at fault. Indemnity is total reimbursement. Traditionally it shifted the entire cost of a judgment or settlement away from a defendant whose liability to the plaintiff rested on no wrongful conduct of its own, but was imposed on it by law because of its relationship with the tortfeasor whose wrongful conduct caused the injury.1 The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability § 22 reflects that narrowness by limiting indemnity to cases premised on vicarious or derivative liability.2
The two remedies coexist because joint liability forces a choice about who finally bears the loss. When the tortious conduct of each of two or more persons is a legal cause of harm that cannot be apportioned, each is liable for the entire harm, whether the conduct is concurring or consecutive.3 The plaintiff may therefore collect the whole judgment from either defendant, and the remaining question is who should carry it. Contribution answers by assigning each defendant a share, which makes sense when each contributed fault to the loss. It makes no sense for a defendant with no wrongdoing of its own, because dividing the loss would make an innocent party absorb part of what someone else's wrong caused. Indemnity puts the entire loss back on the wrongdoer. Where both defendants were negligent, neither fits that description, and the loss is shared according to fault.
Two familiar relationships show derivative liability at work. An employer held liable under respondeat superior for an employee's negligence has a right of indemnity against that employee. A retail seller held liable without fault for selling a defective product has a right of indemnity against the manufacturer that actually produced it.4 The Restatement frames liability of this kind as joint responsibility for a single share: if the vicariously liable defendant pays that share to the plaintiff, it ordinarily may obtain indemnity from the other.5 Because the two answer for one share rather than two, there is no second share for them to divide. The law also protects the right once it exists. Damages in a later judgment against a principal can be no greater than those previously obtained against the agent, so that the principal's indemnity right against the agent is not compromised, and a prior judgment for either principal or agent bars a later action against the other unless the judgment rested on a personal defense.6
On paper the employer's right of indemnity is complete, but in practice it is seldom exercised. A suit against the employee would often be futile because the employee cannot pay, an insurance policy frequently covers both employer and employee, and suing one's own worker does not make for positive employee relations.7 The right exists whether or not anyone uses it, and an analysis should say so without assuming the employer collects.
Indemnity can also arise by agreement. A hold-harmless clause in a contract gives the promisee a right to reimbursement, and that right rests on the parties' promise rather than on any vicarious status.8
The limit on indemnity matters most when the payer was itself at fault. In Safeway, Inc. v. Rooter 2000 Plumbing and Drain, a child was injured when a diaper-changing table collapsed in a Safeway restroom. The jury put 40 percent of the responsibility on Safeway and 60 percent on the installer, and the New Mexico court held that Safeway could not obtain indemnity from the installer.9 Safeway's liability rested partly on its own fault, so it was not in the position of a defendant whose liability the law imposed solely because of its relationship with the wrongdoer. The jury's percentages already mark the ground on which two negligent parties share a loss, and the installer, at 60 percent, bears the larger part. A retailer that merely sold a defective product it neither designed nor mishandled stands on the other side of the line: it has no fault to share and recovers from the maker.
Some courts once allowed indemnity between negligent parties on the basis of active versus passive negligence, and comparative responsibility has largely displaced that approach. Minnesota held that, in light of its adoption of comparative negligence, contribution rather than equitable indemnity is the proper vehicle for allocating loss between a negligent manufacturer and a negligent installer. Tennessee, in Owens v. Truckstops of America, held that a claim for indemnity can no longer rest on active-passive negligence, because that distinction was subsumed into the newly adopted doctrine of comparative fault.10 Once fault is measured in percentages, one negligent defendant's greater culpability is reflected in its larger share, and calling it primarily at fault no longer shifts the whole loss to it.
The choice between these remedies has practical stakes beyond the ordinary accident case. In a legal malpractice action, for example, the rules governing joint liability and reimbursement, including indemnity and contribution, can be raised as defenses that arise more or less by operation of law.11