Concept
Modern Reform of Joint Liability
Joint and several liability versus apportionment of harm to causes
Modern Reform of Joint Liability
Joint and several liability makes each of several tortfeasors individually liable for the full amount of the plaintiff’s damages, so the plaintiff may collect all of it from any one defendant or from any group of them.1 The rule rests on indivisibility. Damages are apportioned among two or more causes when the harm is distinct or reasonably divisible,2 and damages for any other harm cannot be apportioned.3 At common law, two negligent drivers whose near-simultaneous impacts produce one back injury that no expert can divide each answer for the whole injury.
The rule took shape when contributory negligence barred every plaintiff who was at fault, so that only a blameless plaintiff could recover. Between a blameless plaintiff and negligent defendants, joint and several liability fairly placed the risk of one defendant’s insolvency on the other wrongdoers. Comparative negligence removed that premise, because a plaintiff who recovers reduced damages is no longer entirely innocent; the plaintiff was negligent too.4 Reform therefore asks whether a solvent defendant should still absorb a missing wrongdoer’s share when the plaintiff shares responsibility for the loss.
A single verdict shows what is at stake. A jury finds Nell 20 percent at fault, Fagan 70 percent, and Twist 10 percent, and it sets her damages at $100,000. Nell recovers $80,000, her damages reduced by her own share.5 Under joint and several liability, Fagan and Twist are each liable for the whole $80,000, and Nell may collect it from either or from both.6 Under traditional contribution doctrine, whichever defendant pays recovers a pro rata share, $40,000, from the other, if the other can pay.7 Twist, at 10 percent, thus bears as much as Fagan, at 70 percent, and he pays the entire judgment if Fagan cannot.8 That result is the pressure behind reform.
Adopting comparative negligence did not by itself change these principles, and some comparative-negligence states still apply the traditional approaches to contribution and to joint and several liability.9 Most states, however, have altered or abolished the rule for certain classes of cases or kinds of damages, replacing it with several liability of each actor based on its apportioned share.10 Eight jurisdictions at this writing keep the doctrine in its original form, about sixteen have adopted several liability (some with exceptions), and most use a hybrid with features of both.11 Colorado, Utah, and Wyoming abolished the rule outright by statute.12
The reform rules concern independent tortfeasors whose separate negligence combines to cause one indivisible injury. They apply only after the divisibility analysis, because harm that can be divided is apportioned under § 433A before any reform rule comes into play, and each percentage below is a share of the total damages for one whole injury.13 Joint liability that rests on a relationship between defendants stands on a different ground, a failure to perform a common duty to the plaintiff: a master’s liability for a servant, an employer’s for an employee, a seller’s for a product someone else made.14 The subsections below take four models in order of their departure from the traditional rule: pure several liability, hybrids that keep joint liability above a fault threshold, hybrids that sort by type of damages, and a reallocation rule that spreads an uncollectible share across the parties.15 On an exam, identify the regime the stem assumes before computing anything. If the stem states the jurisdiction’s rule, apply it; if it is silent, state the traditional rule and note the alternatives.
Several Liability
Vermont’s statute states pure several liability as a ratio: each defendant is liable for that proportion of the total damages that equals the ratio of the defendant’s causal negligence to the causal negligence attributed to all defendants against whom recovery is allowed.16 The jury assigns each defendant a percentage, and the judgment against each is that percentage of the damages.
Nell’s verdict shows the effect. Fagan owes 70 percent of $100,000, or $70,000, and Twist owes $10,000, so Nell holds two separate judgments totaling $80,000. Neither defendant owes more than his own share, so neither overpays and neither needs contribution.17 The Tennessee Supreme Court drew the same consequence when it abolished joint and several liability: once a defendant is liable only for the percentage of damages its negligence occasioned, no defendant pays more than its share of a judgment, and the contribution statute no longer governs the division among codefendants.18
Several liability changes who bears the risk of a defendant who cannot pay. Joint and several liability places that risk on the other defendants; several liability places it on the plaintiff. If Fagan cannot pay, Nell recovers only $10,000, because Twist is not liable for Fagan’s share.19 The loss lands on Nell even though Fagan, the defendant who cannot pay, was the principal wrongdoer, and a plaintiff with no fault at all would bear it the same way.
Walt Disney World Co. v. Wood shows how large the difference can be in dollars. The jury found fault in the plaintiff, in the park, and in a spouse protected by interspousal immunity, and it assigned the plaintiff 14 times as much fault as the park. The judge reduced the judgment by the plaintiff’s 14 percent and held the park liable for the remaining 86 percent, so a defendant found 1 percent at fault paid 86 percent of the loss.20 Several liability would reverse the result rather than cure it: the park would pay 1 percent, and the plaintiff would absorb the immune spouse’s share along with her own 14 percent. Several liability is unfair to the plaintiff in the same way that joint and several liability is unfair to the defendant.21
Courts that adopted comparative fault by decision, rather than by statute, had to say whether joint and several liability survived, and they split. In Bartlett v. New Mexico Welding Supply, Inc., the jury found the defendant 30 percent at fault and an unidentified driver, who could never be sued, 70 percent. The New Mexico Court of Appeals limited the defendant to 30 percent of the damages. It reasoned that the idea of a single indivisible wrong rested on pleading and joinder technicalities that comparative negligence had made obsolete, and that nothing justified shifting the risk of one defendant’s insolvency from the plaintiff to a codefendant.
The Illinois Supreme Court answered the other way in Coney v. J.L.G. Industries, Inc., holding that comparative fault does not eliminate joint and several liability. Assigning each tortfeasor a percentage of fault does not make an indivisible injury divisible, the court reasoned, because a concurrent tortfeasor whose negligence proximately caused the whole injury is liable for the whole. A faultless plaintiff would otherwise bear part of the loss if a tortfeasor proved insolvent, and a partly at-fault plaintiff has already paid the price of comparative fault through the reduction of her damages by her own percentage.
The two decisions differ on what a percentage means. Bartlett treated indivisibility as a relic of pleading rules and a defendant’s percentage as the proper measure of its liability. Coney treated indivisibility as a point about causation that percentages leave untouched, and it asked wrongdoers, not an innocent plaintiff, to carry the shortfall. Other courts followed Bartlett’s path. The Tennessee court reasoned that, having adopted a rule that links liability more closely to fault, it would be inconsistent to keep a rule that may fortuitously impose liability out of all proportion to fault.22 In Brown v. Keill, the Kansas Supreme Court read its comparative negligence statute to equate recovery and the duty to pay with degree of fault, and it observed that there is “nothing inherently fair about a defendant who is 10% at fault paying 100% of the loss.”23
Defenders of the traditional rule answer on fault and causation. Critics, they say, mistook comparative fault for degree of fault: a defendant’s fault may be small beside other tortfeasors’, especially if the defendant can point to many wrongdoers, yet extensive nonetheless, because no defendant is liable unless its conduct was negligent, a cause in fact, and a proximate cause of the damages.24 Suppose A and B separately set fire to the plaintiff’s house, one with a blowtorch and one with a gallon of gasoline, and either fire would have burned it down. Neither defendant’s fault nor causal impact shrinks because the other appeared, and no logic suggests why a second tortfeasor should hand the first a windfall.25
Even where several liability governs, the jury’s percentages measure culpability for a single indivisible injury and do not divide the injury by cause. A jury that finds one defendant 15 percent at fault and another 85 percent is saying that the first was considerably less negligent than the second, though each was a but-for cause of all of the plaintiff’s damages.26 The divisibility test still comes first, so distinct or reasonably divisible harm is apportioned by causation before any fault percentage is assigned.27 Fault apportionment governs what remains: one injury that causal measures cannot split, for which each tortfeasor is liable for its comparative fault share.28
The number of actors whose fault can be counted affects the plaintiff’s recovery directly, because 100 percent is the most fault that can be shared.29 Two negligent actors average 50 percent each and twenty average 5 percent, while each actor’s own fault stays what it was. A defendant in a several-liability state therefore gains by naming every other wrongdoer, including nonparties and immune actors, and the plaintiff has the opposite incentive. The statute decides which actors the jury may count, so an answer should flag the question whenever the facts include a nonparty or an immune actor.
Several liability also changes settlement bargaining. Under joint and several liability, the plaintiff can tell even a slightly negligent defendant, “as long as the jury finds you negligent at all, even one percent, you are liable to me for the entire judgment.” The argument carries force because a defendant’s theoretical right of contribution against more negligent tortfeasors is often worthless when they cannot pay. Several liability removes that threat, and a defendant at risk only for a small share is likely to be a good deal more stingy in considering settlement.30
Several liability leaves some joint liability in place. The Third Restatement keeps joint and several liability for a defendant whose negligence lay in failing to protect the plaintiff against the specific risk an intentional tortfeasor created, so that defendant answers for the intentional tortfeasor’s share as well as its own.31
Fault Threshold Hybrids
Iowa’s statute states the threshold hybrid in one sentence: the rule of joint and several liability “shall not apply to defendants who are found to bear less than fifty percent of the total fault assigned to all parties.”33 The statute sorts defendants by the percentage of fault the jury assigns each. A defendant whose share reaches the line remains jointly and severally liable and can be made to pay more than its own percentage. A defendant below the line is only severally liable and owes its own percentage of the damages and nothing beyond it. The effect is to place the risk of uncollectibility on the plaintiff as to every defendant below the line.34 Iowa adds a second limit, because the joint liability it keeps above the line covers economic damages only, a separate kind of hybrid taken up in the next subsection.35
The line has two halves, and each has its own purpose. Below it, the target is the marginal defendant, whose tiny fraction of responsibility can require it to bear the full damages attributable to more culpable but insolvent defendants.36 Above it, a defendant stays jointly liable, so the plaintiff keeps the assurance of collecting the whole from the principal wrongdoers. A legislature must draw the line somewhere, and a defendant one point under it stands in nearly the same moral position as one at it while standing in a different legal one.
The asymmetry shows most clearly with two defendants. Take a line at 50 percent, a faultless plaintiff, damages of $100,000, and fault assigned 60 percent to A and 40 percent to B. A is jointly and severally liable, so A may end up paying all $100,000 if B is insolvent. B is only severally liable, so B can never be made to pay more than $40,000, and if A is insolvent the plaintiff absorbs the remaining $60,000.37 One verdict yields opposite results depending on which defendant lacks the money, and the difference traces entirely to which side of the line each defendant occupies.
Iowa’s statute applied to a full verdict puts both groups of defendants in one case. Jingle sues Weller and Snubbin, and the jury finds Jingle 20 percent at fault, Weller 60 percent, and Snubbin 20 percent, with economic damages of $20,000 and noneconomic damages of $60,000, or $80,000 in all.38 Snubbin’s 20 percent falls below the line, so he is only severally liable for 20 percent of the $80,000, or $16,000. If Weller cannot pay, Snubbin still owes $16,000 and no more, and Jingle absorbs the $48,000 that was Weller’s own share. Weller’s 60 percent clears the line, and the next subsection computes what he owes.
The line itself moves from state to state, and the wording at the line decides cases. New Hampshire enters a judgment for the full amount against a codefendant found 50 percent or more at fault and allows only several liability against one found less than 50 percent. New Jersey sets its line at 60 percent for both economic and noneconomic damages.39 Wisconsin draws its line a point higher: a defendant whose causal negligence is less than 51 percent is liable only for that percentage, and one at 51 percent or more is jointly and severally liable.40 A defendant found exactly 50 percent at fault therefore sits on the joint side of the line in Iowa and New Hampshire and on the several side in Wisconsin.
Because one point in a statute can shift half the loss from a defendant to the plaintiff, the working skill is to read the statute for the line and for what it does to a defendant exactly at the line. The state figures themselves need not be memorized.
Economic and Noneconomic Damages
California’s Civil Code § 1431.2 states the type-of-damages hybrid in its plainest form: liability for noneconomic damages is several only, so each defendant pays the noneconomic damages allocated to it in proportion to its percentage of fault.42 Economic damages are the concrete out-of-pocket losses, such as medical expenses and lost earnings; noneconomic damages are the intangible losses, such as pain and suffering and loss of consortium. In this category of reform the variable is the type of harm the plaintiff suffered. Independent tortfeasors remain jointly and severally liable for certain harms, such as economic or pecuniary harms, but are only severally liable for compensatory damages awarded for other kinds of harm.43 Because the split runs through the verdict itself, a single defendant can owe all of one portion and only a share of the other.
Iowa’s statute, whose 50 percent line the previous subsection applied, layers the category split on top of the threshold. A defendant found to bear less than fifty percent of the total fault is not subject to joint and several liability, and a defendant found to bear fifty percent or more “shall only be jointly and severally liable for economic damages and not for any noneconomic damage awards.”44 The statute sorts twice: the defendant’s percentage of fault decides whether joint liability is available at all, and the category of damages decides what that joint liability covers.
The Jingle verdict shows both rules working on one defendant. Return to Jingle’s 20 percent, Weller’s 60 percent, Snubbin’s 20 percent, and the $20,000 and $60,000 in itemized damages. Under Indiana’s several-liability statute, each defendant owes its percentage of the total damages, so Jingle gets a judgment against Weller for 60 percent of $80,000, or $48,000.45 Iowa’s statute produces a larger figure. Weller’s 60 percent clears the line, so the economic damages, reduced to $16,000 for Jingle’s own fault, are Weller’s to pay in full, and he owes 60 percent of the $60,000 in noneconomic damages, or $36,000, for a total of $52,000.46 The extra $4,000 is Snubbin’s 20 percent of the economic damages, which joint liability makes Weller answer for. If Snubbin could not pay, Weller would cover that $4,000 but not Snubbin’s $12,000 noneconomic share. Treating the whole $64,000 that Jingle may recover after the reduction as joint would overstate Weller’s exposure by exactly that $12,000, because the line unlocks joint liability only for the economic category.
California adopted its current provision in 1986 by popular referendum, to counteract what the referendum called “the deep pocket rule,” and New York amended its own code the same year.47 A deep pocket is a defendant sued chiefly because it can pay, and a several-only rule for noneconomic damages stops that defendant from covering an insolvent wrongdoer’s share of an intangible award, the same marginal-defendant concern that drives the thresholds.48
New York layers a fault line over the category split. Under CPLR 1601(1), a joint tortfeasor whose culpability is 50 percent or less is not jointly liable for all of the plaintiff’s noneconomic damages, only for its proportionate share.49 The protection does not reach a defendant liable for a tort that requires proof of intent or whose conduct was reckless. In Chianese v. Meier, the limitation was applied to a landlord found 50 percent at fault alongside the person who attacked the tenant. In Lubecki v. City of New York, a bystander held hostage in a bank robbery was killed by police fire, and the court allowed the plaintiff to amend the pleadings to assert the recklessness exception, which would deprive the city of the statute’s protection if the claim succeeded.
Because these statutes vary so widely, an exam answer should say which categories of damages the governing statute treats as joint and which as several. It should not assume that noneconomic damages are several everywhere.
Reallocating Uncollectible Shares
Reallocation answers the question every regime must answer somewhere: who absorbs a share that cannot be collected? Joint and several liability puts the loss on the solvent defendants, and several liability puts it on the plaintiff, who may have no fault at all. A reallocation rule places the risk of an uncollectible share on all parties who bear responsibility for the damages, the plaintiff included, and it divides the insolvent tortfeasor’s share among the others in proportion to their comparative responsibility.51
A jurisdiction can reach the model by two routes. It may begin with joint and several liability for independent tortfeasors who cause an indivisible injury and then redistribute an insolvent tortfeasor’s share. It may instead begin with several liability and add a safety valve that redistributes an uncollectible share. The two designs produce very similar results.52
The reasoning tracks the history. Between a blameless plaintiff and negligent defendants, joint liability fairly put the risk of insolvency on the wrongdoers, but under comparative negligence the plaintiff is not entirely innocent.53 Sharing the shortfall with her in proportion to fault is a logical middle course. The jury’s percentages supply the measure, so no second yardstick is needed, and no party carries the whole insolvency.
Justice Clark’s dissent in American Motorcycle Ass’n v. Superior Court puts three approaches side by side on one set of facts. A jury finds the plaintiff 30 percent at fault, the first defendant 60 percent, and the second defendant 10 percent, and the first defendant cannot pay.54 Under the majority’s joint and several liability, the solvent defendant owes 70 percent of the loss: its own 10 percent plus the entire 60 percent that belonged to the insolvent defendant. Under pure several liability, the solvent defendant continues to bear only its own 10 percent, and the plaintiff bears the rest.55
Reallocation divides the 60 percent shortfall between the two parties still standing. The plaintiff’s 30 and the defendant’s 10 stand three to one, so the plaintiff absorbs 45 percent of the loss and the defendant 15 percent. The defendant owes its own 10 percent plus 15, or 25 percent in all, and the plaintiff recovers 25 percent of the loss from it.56 Across the three rules, the solvent defendant owes 70, 10, or 25 percent of the loss, and reallocation lands between the extremes because it alone charges the plaintiff for her fault in the shortfall. California’s Supreme Court later pointed toward that middle course in Evangelatos v. Superior Court, saying that a shortfall created by an insolvent tortfeasor should be apportioned equitably among the remaining culpable parties, plaintiffs and defendants alike.
The plaintiff’s fault drives the split. With the plaintiff at 30 percent, a solvent defendant at 30, and an insolvent defendant at 40, the 40 percent shortfall divides one to one, and each of the two bears 20 percent of the loss on top of its own 30. If the plaintiff has no fault, her weight in the ratio is zero, and the solvent defendant bears the whole shortfall, which is the result joint and several liability produces. A frequent slip is to divide the shortfall among the solvent defendants alone and leave out a partly at-fault plaintiff, which hands the solvent defendant the whole insolvent share and reproduces the pure joint result.