Concept
Effect of a Judgment
Effect of judgment, release, and satisfaction on other tortfeasors
Effect of a Judgment
A plaintiff who wins a judgment against one tortfeasor has not necessarily finished with the others, and the law needs a way to say what that judgment did to them. The Restatement (Second) of Torts supplies it by borrowing: the effect of a judgment for or against one of several tortfeasors upon claims against others who were or may have been liable for the same harm is determined by the principles of res judicata.1 Res judicata is the body of doctrine that decides when a final judgment settles a question so that the parties cannot litigate it again. The answer in a multiple-tortfeasor case therefore turns on who was a party to the first action, what that action actually decided, and whether the later claim is one the first judgment forecloses.
The earlier discussion of judgment for one defendant and against another dealt with mixed results inside a single action. This section picks up after the case ends, when the plaintiff holds a judgment against one tortfeasor and others remain, perhaps unsued, perhaps sued separately. Three questions arise, and separating them clears up most of the confusion in this area:
- Who is bound by the judgment? That is, does its result carry into a later suit involving someone who was not a party, or involving the plaintiff?
- Does an unpaid judgment discharge the other tortfeasors, meaning end their liability?
- What changes once the judgment is satisfied, meaning the amount it awards has actually been paid?
The first question concerns the preclusive force of the court's decision and can arise before any money has changed hands. The other two concern money: whether the plaintiff's claim for the harm still exists against the other tortfeasors, and how far actual payment uses up the one recovery the plaintiff may have. The subsections below take them in that order.
Res Judicata Limits
The Restatement answers the first question by pointing to preclusion law, and under that law the reach of a judgment depends on who took part in the case that produced it.2 The rule therefore adds nothing special for torts. For each person against whom, or for whom, the earlier judgment is offered, the question is whether that person was a party and had a fair opportunity to contest the issue now at stake.
Party status controls, rather than shared responsibility for the harm, because the opportunity to be heard is what justifies binding anyone. A tortfeasor who was never sued had no chance to dispute fault, to test the plaintiff's proof of damages, or to raise defenses peculiar to him, and tortfeasors differ in exactly those respects. That each of them may owe the whole sum is one fact; that each has been heard is another, and only a day in court establishes the second.
Rogers sues only Dunne over a fire and wins. The judgment establishes Dunne's liability, but Thurber, who may also have negligently caused the fire, was never a party and has never been adjudged liable for it.3 If Dunne pays and seeks contribution, meaning reimbursement from a fellow tortfeasor for payment beyond his own share, he must bring a separate contribution action and prove Thurber's negligence in that suit.4 Thurber can then offer there the evidence and defenses he had no occasion to offer in the first case.
Presence in the first action changes the result. Suppose Rogers sues Dunne and Thurber together, the jury finds Dunne not liable, and Thurber alone pays Rogers. Thurber's later claim for contribution against Dunne fails, because the Uniform Act makes the court's judgment determining the several defendants' liability to the claimant binding among them in fixing their rights to contribution.5 Thurber had the same chance as Rogers to examine the witnesses on Dunne's conduct, so holding him to the finding respects the opportunity to be heard that preclusion presupposes.
The employment relationship supplies the second setting. The employee is directly liable and the employer vicariously liable for the same tort, and the two are jointly and severally liable, so the customary joint-tortfeasor rules apply.6 A prior judgment against either the principal or the agent does not bind the other, who has not had his day in court, unless the first action was controlled by the defendant in the second action.7
The exception for a first action controlled by the later defendant applies the same reasoning from the other side. A company that hired the lawyer, paid for the defense, and directed the strategy in the roofer's case has in substance litigated the question itself. It has already had the fair opportunity that preclusion requires, so the judgment can be held against it. Even then, the damages awarded in a later judgment against the principal can be no greater than those previously obtained against the agent, so that the principal's right of indemnity against the agent is not compromised.8
A judgment in favor of the employee works differently, and the difference again follows from who had the chance to litigate. A prior judgment in favor of either the principal or the agent bars a later action against the other, unless the judgment resulted from a personal defense.9 The absent employer cannot be bound by a loss it had no chance to contest. The plaintiff, however, was a party to the first case and had every opportunity to prove the employee's tort. When a full trial ends with a finding that the employee committed no tort, the question on which the employer's vicarious liability depends has been decided against a plaintiff who was heard, and she cannot reopen it by changing defendants.
A personal defense falls outside that bar because it leaves the wrong itself undecided. Immunity shields one defendant from one plaintiff's claim and says nothing about whether the employee acted carelessly. In one case an injured wife sued the employer after the employee escaped liability because of intra-family tort immunity, and the court rejected the employer's argument that the employee's immunity was a defense for it. The employer is not exonerated when the employee has escaped liability on grounds not inconsistent with the commission of a wrong unreleased and unrequited.10
Unsatisfied Judgments
Section 3(e) of the Uniform Act answers the second question: the recovery of a judgment against one tortfeasor does not of itself discharge the other tortfeasors from liability for the injury unless the judgment is satisfied.14 To discharge a liability is to end it, and a judgment is satisfied when the amount it awards has been paid, which may happen long after entry or never. The inquiry differs from the one in the previous subsection. Preclusion asks which issues the first case settled and for whom; discharge asks whether the plaintiff has yet been compensated.
The earliest cases reached the opposite result. They treated a tort claim as a single cause of action that, once sued upon, was extinguished and replaced by the judgment.15 A judgment against one tortfeasor thus operated like a release of all of them, and the plaintiff could not sue another tortfeasor even if the first judgment was never paid.16 The rule fell hardest on a plaintiff who had chosen a defendant without money. A paper judgment against an insolvent defendant ended the plaintiff's remedy and left every solvent tortfeasor free.
Courts later abandoned that approach and adopted the rule that a plaintiff may bring a second action against another party responsible for the injury, so long as the prior judgment has not been fully satisfied. Section 3(e) codifies that rule.17 It has two halves. The claim survives until satisfied, because compensation is the point of the claim and a judgment that pays nothing has delivered nothing. And the plaintiff may take a second judgment but cannot collect more than the damages actually assessed.18 The ceiling counts dollars received rather than lawsuits filed.
The ceiling works across any number of defendants. If three defendants are each found liable and the plaintiff's damages are $100,000, the plaintiff receives judgment against each for $100,000 and may collect from any one or any combination, so long as total collections do not exceed $100,000.19 A partial payment shows where the two halves meet. It does not satisfy the judgment, so the claim against the others survives. But a payment by any person in compensation of the claim diminishes the claim against the tortfeasors at least to the extent of the payment, whether made before or after judgment.20 If Kelvin has paid Erg $7,000 before Erg collects on a $16,000 judgment against Volt, Volt owes the remaining $9,000.21 The later sections on credit for payments take up how that reduction is measured.
Contribution follows the same preference for payment over paper. The right arises in favor of a tortfeasor who has paid more than his pro rata share, not one who has merely been found liable.22 The survival rule also assumes that the remaining tortfeasor owes enough to make a second suit worthwhile. Under joint and several liability in its original form that tortfeasor owes the whole loss, but in states that have adopted several or hybrid systems, a defendant may be liable only for its proportional share of the fault, and the plaintiff may then be unable to make up the shortfall left by an insolvent co-defendant.23
Satisfied Judgments
Payment is the event that matters most, and the res judicata principles that govern the effect of a judgment on other tortfeasors do their most decisive work when the judgment is paid.25 The result depends on how the judgment came into being. If the damages were actually litigated, payment in full ends the plaintiff's claim against every other tortfeasor for the same harm. If the judgment was simply agreed to, payment is treated like a release. An Oklahoma decision, Kirkpatrick v. Chrysler Corp., supplies both halves of this answer, and what follows presents its reasoning as that court's rationale, not as a rule every jurisdiction has adopted.26
The court said that the views expressed in § 886 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts and § 50 of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments generally comport with what should be the law in Oklahoma. It drew a line at the actual adjudication of damages. When a judgment rests on actual litigation of the measure of a loss and is thereafter paid in full, the injured party has no enforceable claim against any other obligor responsible for the same loss.27 Without such adjudication, satisfaction of an agreed or consent judgment is generally treated like a release, covenant not to sue, or similar agreement.28
The reason for the first rule is issue preclusion, the branch of res judicata that bars a party from relitigating an issue already decided after actual litigation. A trial on damages fixes what the plaintiff's loss is worth, and the plaintiff, who was a party with every opportunity to prove a larger figure, is precluded from relitigating it against anyone.29 The judgment amount therefore becomes the limit of the plaintiff's entitlement to redress, whoever the obligor may be. Payment in full delivers everything up to that limit, and nothing remains to enforce. The same ceiling explains the previous subsection from the other direction: before payment the plaintiff holds a fixed entitlement and no money, so the claim survives up to that figure. Nor does the result conflict with the rule that a tortfeasor who was never a party is not bound on liability.30 The person precluded is the plaintiff, who had a full hearing, and the second tortfeasor has simply been left with no unpaid balance to answer for.
A question on this topic usually turns on a preliminary inquiry: did anyone ever measure the loss? A consent judgment, which a court enters because the parties agreed to its terms, records a bargain and not a finding. The Oklahoma court therefore turned to its rule for releases, announced in Moss v. City of Oklahoma City, under which a release discharges other potential tortfeasors only if they are named or otherwise specifically identified in it as persons to be discharged. The court applied the same rule where an agreed or consent judgment is satisfied without any adjudication of damages.31
The two outcomes differ because only the first produces a ceiling. A tried damages figure binds the plaintiff against everyone, so full payment exhausts the claim by operation of preclusion. An agreed figure reflects what one tortfeasor was willing to pay to end the dispute, which may be less than the loss, so the payment takes the effect the release rules give it. Payment still counts toward the loss, which is why the retailer above receives credit: a payment by any person in compensation of the claim diminishes the claim against the tortfeasors at least to the extent of the payment.32 The later sections on releases and on credit for payments develop both points.
Even for an adjudicated judgment, satisfaction means payment of the whole. Where only full satisfaction of a judgment against one tortfeasor bars its enforcement against the others, a payment of less, even a pro rata share, is not accepted as satisfaction.33 The requirement keeps a part-payment from ending a claim that is still mostly unpaid. If a judgment after trial is $90,000 and one tortfeasor pays $50,000 and stops, the claim against the others survives, reduced at least by the $50,000 received.34 Only when the last dollar of the adjudicated amount is paid does the plaintiff's entitlement run out.