Concept
Credit for Payments
Effect of judgment, release, and satisfaction on other tortfeasors
Credit for Payments
A plaintiff who can collect the whole loss from any of several tortfeasors must still stop collecting once the loss is paid. Take Erg, whose damages total $16,000. Kelvin has paid Erg $7,000 in settlement, and Erg holds a $16,000 judgment against Volt for the same harm. If Volt owed the entire judgment, Erg would end with $23,000 for a $16,000 injury. Volt instead receives a credit for Kelvin's $7,000 and pays $9,000, because no plaintiff is entitled to more than one full satisfaction of damages.1
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 885(3) states the rule behind that result. A payment by any person, made in compensation of a claim for a harm for which others are liable as tortfeasors, diminishes the claim against those tortfeasors at least to the extent of the payment. The credit applies whether or not the payer is liable to the injured person, whether or not anyone agreed to it when the payment was made, and whether the payment came before or after judgment.2
The credit is the counterweight to the survival rules earlier in this chapter. A judgment against one tortfeasor does not bar suit against another unless the first judgment is satisfied,3 and a valid release of one tortfeasor does not discharge the others unless the parties agree that it will.4 Both rules protect a plaintiff whose claim remains unpaid. Section 885(3) ensures that what survives is only the unpaid part of the claim.
The two subsections below take the rule in two parts. The first covers the single-satisfaction principle, which fixes the ceiling on recovery. The second covers the reach of the credit, meaning which payments count against that ceiling. The phrase “at least to the extent of the payment” sets a floor on the reduction and does not fix its size; later sections of this chapter measure how much credit the remaining tortfeasors receive.
One Satisfaction Only
However many tortfeasors share liability for a harm, the plaintiff recovers for it once. One court rested the point on the nature of a joint tort: the tort is “a thing integral and indivisible,” each tortfeasor is liable for the whole, and the injured party may pursue one separately, all jointly, or any number short of all. “But while they may be thus pursued separately or jointly, yet there can be but one satisfaction.”5
The reasoning follows from what damages measure. Damages measure the plaintiff's injury, and an injury is a single quantity however many people helped cause it. Each added defendant adds one more person who owes that quantity; none adds to the quantity itself.
The principle works alongside joint and several liability, and the two do complementary work. Because joint tortfeasors are each responsible for the plaintiff's entire injury, the plaintiff may pursue all, some, or one of them for the full amount.6 The practical payoff is collectibility: when one defendant is insolvent, the loss falls on the other tortfeasors and not on the plaintiff.7 The single-satisfaction principle then caps the total. The first rule widens the plaintiff's sources of payment, the second limits what those sources may yield, and together they give the plaintiff many chances at one recovery.
The cap operates at collection and not at the entry of judgment. With three liable defendants and damages of $100,000, the plaintiff may take a $100,000 judgment against each, and an unsatisfied judgment against one defendant does not bar a later action against another.8 What the plaintiff may not do is collect more than $100,000 in all. The opposite mistake, treating a verdict against one defendant as the end of the claim, fails for the same reason: the claim shrinks only as money arrives.
Defendants raise the principle by pleading it. In Bundt v. Embro, five passengers from two colliding cars sued the owners and drivers and a contractor whose repair work had negligently obstructed the view of a stop sign. The plaintiffs had also recovered a judgment for the same injuries against the State of New York in the Court of Claims, and that judgment had been satisfied. The defendants moved to amend their answers to interpose the defense of discharge and satisfaction.10
The ceiling holds in every liability system, but the amount beneath it differs. A minority of states (eight at the time of the source's writing) retain joint and several liability in its original form, about 16 have adopted several liability so that each defendant owes only its proportional share of fault, and most use a hybrid of the two.11 Where a defendant owes only a share, the plaintiff cannot recover more than the ceiling and may recover less. Later sections of this chapter show how credit works in each system.
Payment by Any Person
Section 885(3) carries four qualifiers, and each one answers an argument for ignoring a payment: that the payer was a stranger to the suit, that the payer was never liable, that no one agreed to give credit, or that the payment came at the wrong time. Under the Restatement each argument fails, and the inquiry narrows to a single question: has the plaintiff already received money in compensation of this loss? The discussion takes the four qualifiers in turn and then marks where the credit stops.
The words “by any person” make the credit independent of who supplied the money. A settling tortfeasor's payment counts, and so does a payment by that tortfeasor's liability insurer, which pays on the tortfeasor's behalf.13 One court quoting § 885 stated the consequence for jointly liable tortfeasors: a payment by one of them in compensation of the harm diminishes the claim against all of them to the extent of the payment.14 The payer's identity does not matter because the credit measures how much of one fixed sum remains unpaid. In the opening example, Volt received credit for Kelvin's $7,000 although Volt took no part in that settlement.
The payer also need not be liable to the injured person.15 Settlements often buy peace where liability is uncertain, and the payer may have held a defense that would have prevailed at trial. If credit depended on proving the payer's fault, the remaining tortfeasor would have to litigate that fault just to earn a deduction, and a plaintiff who settled with a party later cleared of fault would keep the settlement and still collect the whole loss elsewhere. The credit follows the plaintiff's receipt of money, which is the same whether or not the payer was at fault.
A statute can change that result. In Gouty v. Schnepel, the Florida Supreme Court applied a setoff statute that presumes joint liability and denied a setoff when the jury found the settling defendant not liable. On the resort facts, the contractor would therefore receive a $20,000 credit under § 885(3) and none under a statute of that kind. The difference comes from the statute's wording, so an exam answer should first identify whether the jurisdiction follows the Restatement or a statutory setoff scheme.
The third qualifier removes any need for an agreement about credit. A settlement is a bargain between the plaintiff and the payer, and the remaining tortfeasors are strangers to it, so what those two said or left unsaid about others cannot determine how much of the loss has been paid. Agreement does matter elsewhere: a valid release of one tortfeasor does not discharge the others unless it is agreed that it will.16 Agreement therefore controls whether the claim against the others survives. It has no say over whether dollars already paid count against the claim that survives, even when the settlement papers never mention the other tortfeasors.
The fourth qualifier makes timing irrelevant. A payment made before judgment is credited against the judgment later entered, and a payment made after judgment reduces what remains collectible on it.17 Timing reflects only when the plaintiff happened to settle, collect, or sue, and the loss is the same amount either way. A rule crediting only payments made after judgment would reward a plaintiff for settling first and trying the case second: the jury would fix the full loss, and the settlement would sit on top of the verdict as a double recovery.
The breadth of these qualifiers invites a misreading, that any dollar the plaintiff receives from anyone after the accident reduces what the tortfeasors owe. That reading drops the requirement that the payment be made “in compensation of a claim” for the harm.18 The limit comes from the common law collateral-source rule: payments not made by or on behalf of a tortfeasor are not credited to the tortfeasor's benefit, even when the plaintiff ends up with more than the losses suffered.19
Benefits from the plaintiff's own insurance policies, gratuities, employment benefits, and benefits from social legislation fall on the collateral side. About half the states have modified the rule by statute, usually as part of tort reform, so a local statute can change the answer.20 In United States v. Byrd, a plaintiff who received medical treatment free as a member of the military recovered the reasonable value of that treatment from the tortfeasor, on the reasoning that a defendant should not profit from a gratuity extended to the victim.21
The payer in each collateral case is performing its own obligation or making its own gift, and is not paying down the claim against the tortfeasor. A health insurer that pays hospital bills honors a contract the plaintiff bought with premiums, and a brother who pays a bill is giving a gift. Crediting either would let the tortfeasor profit from benefits the plaintiff acquired independently. “By any person” therefore tells you who may make a credited payment, and “in compensation of a claim” tells you whether a particular payment counts. A liability insurer paying for the tortfeasor is paying the claim; a health insurer paying under the plaintiff's own policy is paying its customer.