Concept
Measuring the Credit
Effect of judgment, release, and satisfaction on other tortfeasors
Measuring the Credit
A payment to the plaintiff shrinks what the remaining tortfeasors owe, and the credit rules say by how much. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 885(3) sets the floor: a payment by any person in compensation of the claim diminishes the claim against the tortfeasors “at least to the extent of the payment made,” whether or not the payer is liable, whether or not the parties so agreed, and whether the payment comes before or after judgment.1 The words at least leave open how much more the reduction may be.
Where liability is joint and several, two measures compete to answer that question. The dollar credit subtracts what the settling tortfeasor actually paid. The proportional credit subtracts the settlor’s share of the judgment, whatever the settlor paid; with two tortfeasors sharing equally it becomes the pro rata credit, under which the settlor is treated as having sold half of the claim. Rogers’s suit against Dunne and Thurber shows how far apart the two can land. Dunne settles for $12,000, and the jury later sets Rogers’s damages at $42,000.
| Thurber owes | Rogers collects in all | |
|---|---|---|
| Dollar credit | $30,000 | $42,000 |
| Pro rata credit | $21,000 | $33,000 |
Dunne’s half of a $42,000 loss was $21,000, so he underpaid by $9,000. Under the dollar credit, Thurber absorbs that $9,000. Under the pro rata credit, Rogers absorbs it, because settling with Dunne effectively sold Dunne half of Rogers’s claim.2
Several liability makes the whole question disappear. When each defendant owes only its own share, a settlement leaves nothing to credit against the others. The three subsections below take the dollar credit, the proportional credit, and several liability in turn.
Dollar Credit
The dollar credit, also called the pro tanto credit, treats the § 885(3) floor as the whole measure. The nonsettling defendant stays jointly and severally liable for the judgment, less the dollars the settling tortfeasor, the settlor, actually paid.3 The settlor’s share of fault, the plaintiff’s private view of what the claim was worth, and the reasonableness of the price never enter the subtraction. A court can therefore apply the credit without trying the settlor’s responsibility a second time.
Dollars are the unit because of the single-satisfaction principle. Under pure joint and several liability, a plaintiff may obtain judgment for the full amount against each of several defendants and collect from any one or combination of them, so long as total collections do not exceed the damages. With three defendants and $100,000 in damages, each judgment is for $100,000, yet the plaintiff may collect only $100,000 in all.4 Every dollar that reaches the plaintiff from one defendant reduces what remains collectible from the rest.
Erg’s case against Kelvin and Volt applies the arithmetic. Erg settles with Kelvin for $7,000 and later wins a $16,000 judgment against Volt. Because no plaintiff is entitled to more than one full satisfaction of her damages, Volt receives a $7,000 credit and pays $9,000.5
Rogers’s case works the same way. Thurber remains answerable for the whole $42,000, and the only reduction is the $12,000 Dunne paid, so Thurber owes $30,000 and Rogers collects exactly $42,000, the full loss and no more. Because Dunne’s half of the loss was $21,000, Thurber now stands to pay more than half of the damages unless Thurber settles as well.6
A plaintiff may settle with one tortfeasor for less than the claim is worth for reasons that have nothing to do with that tortfeasor’s share of fault. She may doubt that she can prove liability and prefer a sure payment to the risk of losing entirely; a risk-averse client takes $13,000 in hand over a 25 percent chance of collecting $27,000. She may know the party can pay no more than its insurance. She may dread a sympathetic defendant or an aggressive defense.7 Under the dollar credit, those private judgments cost her nothing permanent, because the unpaid balance remains collectible from the others. In a dollar-credit state, Twain can settle with Nash for $5,000 and still recover his full $20,000 in damages by collecting $15,000 from Benchley.8 The remaining defendant pays for a cheap settlement and profits from an expensive one: had Dunne paid $35,000 on the same verdict, Thurber would owe only $7,000.
The dollar credit also shapes the incentive to settle. Once Dunne has settled, Thurber faces a verdict that may cost him more than half of the damages and so has reason to settle too. Dunne is protected: § 4(b) of the Uniform Act bars contribution from a settling tortfeasor, so Thurber cannot force Dunne to pay anything above the $12,000 he paid to settle. Thurber might argue that so low a price shows bad faith, but a court is unlikely to agree merely because Dunne paid less than his pro rata share. Parties weigh subjective factors, such as the risk that the settlor’s negligence cannot be proved or the adverse effect of a sympathetic defendant. The rule gives defendants a strong incentive to settle.9
When the plaintiff is also at fault, the order of operations matters. The New York court in Whalen v. Kawasaki Motors Corp. subtracted the settlement from the verdict first and only then reduced the remainder by the plaintiff’s percentage of fault, and it observed that this settlement-first method matches the prevailing trend. Other limits, such as a statutory cap on damages, raise the same sequencing problem, and courts have gone different ways on them.10
All of this assumes that the remaining defendants owe the whole loss. Many states have cut back joint and several liability, and where each defendant owes only its own share the analysis changes, as the last subsection explains.11
Proportional Credit
The proportional credit measures the settlor’s contribution by its fault, not its price. A nonsettling defendant who remains jointly and severally liable receives a credit equal to the settlor’s percentage of fault applied to the judgment, the measure advocated in Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability § 16. The theory is that the settlor has sold its proportion of the ultimate judgment to the plaintiff for the agreed price, so the plaintiff cannot collect that proportion again from a co-defendant.14 Once comparative percentages of fault are established, this credit is a logical implication of them, an alternative to the traditional dollar credit of § 4(a) of the Uniform Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors Act.15
The two credits can be compared on one set of facts. Nell sues Fagan and Twist in a jurisdiction that requires the jury to assign percentages of negligence to all tortfeasors, and she settles with Fagan for $25,000 before trial. The jury finds her damages are $100,000 and assigns fault: Nell 20 percent, Fagan 70 percent, Twist 10 percent. Because joint and several liability remains, Twist faces a judgment of $80,000, Nell’s damages reduced by her own 20 percent. A dollar credit takes Fagan’s $25,000 off that figure. A proportional credit puts Fagan’s 70 percent over the 80 percent the defendants bear together and takes 70/80ths of the $80,000 judgment.16
| Dollar credit | Proportional credit | |
|---|---|---|
| Credit to Twist | $25,000 | $70,000 |
| Twist owes | $55,000 | $10,000 |
| Nell collects in all | $80,000 | $35,000 |
Twist’s $10,000 equals 10 percent of the $100,000 loss, the share his fault earned, and that is the result the percentage system aims to produce. The price falls on Nell, who took $25,000 for a slice the jury valued at $70,000. Because the credit follows the settlor’s share and ignores the price, it works the same way when the other defendant settles. Had Nell settled with Twist for $3,000, Fagan would receive a credit of 10/80ths of the $80,000 judgment, or $10,000, and would pay $70,000.17
The dollar credit can also sever liability from fault. Justice Clark’s dissent in American Motorcycle Association v. Superior Court illustrated the problem with a plaintiff 30 percent responsible, a first defendant 10 percent responsible, and a second defendant 60 percent responsible. If the 60 percent defendant settles for a sum equal to 20 percent of the loss, the plaintiff’s judgment of 70 percent of the loss shrinks by only that 20 percent, and the 10 percent defendant can be held liable for 50 percent of the loss. Liability then runs in inverse proportion to fault. A credit keyed to the settlor’s share closes the gap: the settlor’s 60/70ths of the 70 percent judgment is a credit of 60 percent of the loss, so the lightly negligent defendant owes 10 percent however cheaply the other settled.18
The third step is where computations go wrong. Applying Fagan’s 70/80ths to Nell’s raw $100,000 would produce a credit of $87,500, larger than the $80,000 judgment it is supposed to reduce, and that absurd result signals that the fraction has been applied to the wrong base.
Flite shows the other side of the bargain. Flite, 20 percent at fault, suffers $60,000 in damages from three defendants: Micawber at 50 percent, Heap at 20 percent, and Murdstone at 10 percent. The judgment is $48,000, the damages less her own 20 percent. Heap settles for $22,000 before trial. His fraction is 20/80ths, or one quarter, so the credit is $12,000, and Micawber and Murdstone owe $36,000 jointly. Flite collects $58,000 in all, $10,000 more than the judgment, because Heap paid well above his share. Had Heap settled for $5,000, she would have collected $41,000, which is $7,000 short. The Restatement (Third) explains the symmetry in terms of risk: because the plaintiff bears the risk of an inadequate settlement, she should also obtain the benefit of a favorable one.19 Heap, for his part, could not know what the jury would do when he paid, and so long as joint and several liability applied, he could have ended up paying the whole $48,000 had he stayed in and the other defendants proved insolvent.20
That allocation of risk changes how plaintiffs bargain. A pro rata credit is the proportional idea with equal shares, so in a pro rata state Twain’s $5,000 settlement with Nash leaves him with $5,000 from Nash and $10,000 from Benchley, or $15,000 against his $20,000 damages, because he gave up half his claim when he settled.21 A plaintiff in that position will not sell half her claim for much less than half its value, which makes plaintiffs cautious about settling with the first tortfeasor.22
The proportional credit also has an administrative price. It works only if someone has found the settlor’s percentage of fault, and the settlor is no longer in the case to contest it. Some jurisdictions require the jury to assign percentages to every tortfeasor, the settlor included.23 In admiralty, the nonsettling defendant must present evidence of the settlor’s liability at trial, just as it would to prove a contribution claim.24
The proportional credit stands in a particular relation to the § 885(3) floor. When the settlor pays less than its share, as Fagan did, the credit exceeds the dollars paid and clears the floor easily. When the settlor pays more than its share, as Heap did, the credit falls below the payment and the plaintiff keeps the excess. A credit smaller than the payment cannot be squared with a rule that diminishes the claim at least to the extent of the payment, so the proportional credit is best read as a different approach, not a gloss on § 885(3).25
The Supreme Court adopted the proportionate share rule for admiralty in McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde & River Don Castings, Ltd. Three considerations guided the Court, and the decisive one was consistency with the proportionate fault rule of Reliable Transfer; the Court regarded the effects on settlement and on judicial economy as ambiguous.26 Under the rule, the judgment against a nonsettling defendant is reduced by the settlor’s percentage of fault, and contribution claims against the settlor are barred without a fairness finding. Joint and several liability survived, so nonsettling defendants still bear the risk of an insolvent co-tortfeasor, a strong motivation to settle.27
On a problem that supplies a settlement and fault percentages, first identify which credit the jurisdiction applies. The same $25,000 settlement leaves Twist owing $55,000 under a dollar credit and $10,000 under a proportional credit, and only the second answer reflects the settlor’s share of fault. The next subsection turns to systems in which the question never arises.
Several Liability Systems
Several liability dissolves the credit question. Each defendant owes the plaintiff only its own proportion of the fault, so a tortfeasor who settles simply extinguishes liability for its own share, and nobody else needs a credit, because the others are liable only for their own shares.30 One state statute, for example, provides: “No defendant is liable to any person seeking recovery for any amount in excess of the proportion of fault attributed to that defendant under Section 78B-5-819.”31 In Brown v. Keill, the Kansas court read its comparative negligence statute, which allows recovery if the plaintiff’s negligence “was less than” the defendant’s causal negligence, to abrogate joint and several liability and create several liability only.32 A minority of eight jurisdictions still recognizes joint and several liability in its original form, about sixteen states have adopted several liability, some with exceptions, and most states use hybrids that defy simple description.33
The credit has one job: keeping the plaintiff from collecting the same dollars twice from defendants who each owe the whole. Under joint and several liability, a nonsettling defendant’s debt includes the slice the settlor has paid for, so the debt must shrink. Under several liability, the debt never included that slice. Flite’s $60,000 in damages, reduced by her own 20 percent, leave $48,000 to allocate among Micawber at 50 percent, Heap at 20 percent, and Murdstone at 10 percent. Each several share is that defendant’s fraction of the 80 percent the defendants bear: $30,000, $12,000, and $6,000. If Flite settles with Micawber for $9,000, Heap still owes $12,000 and Murdstone still owes $6,000, and Flite collects $27,000 in all. She has in effect sold Micawber’s $30,000 share for $9,000, and the $21,000 difference stays with her.34
The same settlement yields different results under the three regimes.
| Regime | Heap and Murdstone owe | Flite collects in all |
|---|---|---|
| Joint and several, dollar credit | $39,000 | $48,000 |
| Joint and several, proportional credit | $18,000 | $27,000 |
| Several liability | $18,000 | $27,000 |
The settlement price is identical in all three rows. What differs is whether the remaining defendants answer for the settlor’s unpaid portion. A proportional credit lands where several liability does, because Flite recovers the same amount she would under joint and several liability so long as everyone is solvent.35
The systems part ways over who must collect and who bears the risk of a defendant who cannot pay. Under several liability, Flite must collect from each defendant; she cannot collect the full judgment from one and leave him to seek contribution from the others, and that is a significant shift in burden to her.36 Insolvency sharpens the shift. If Fagan cannot pay, Nell recovers only Twist’s $10,000 under several liability, because Twist is not liable for Fagan’s share. Under joint and several liability, Nell could collect Fagan’s share from Twist, who might then pay the entire judgment although only 10 percent at fault.37 Fermi’s case runs the same way: if two defendants were each severally liable for half the damages, Fermi would collect $13,500 from Joule and nothing from an insolvent Edison, whereas under joint and several liability Joule takes the risk of Edison’s insolvency.38
Several liability also does away with contribution. A defendant’s judgment is for its share and no more, so it never pays more than its share and has no right of contribution from anyone, and no one has a right of contribution from it.39
Courts in several-liability states refuse a setoff when a nonsettling defendant asks for one anyway. In McReynolds v. Krebs, a Georgia decision, the setoff was unavailable because a 2005 statute had eliminated joint and several liability, so the settling and nonsettling defendants were no longer jointly liable. Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., a Texas decision, reasoned that a settlement does not reflect the amount of harm the remaining defendants caused and so should not affect their liability.40 A credit in this setting would reduce a defendant’s own share by a payment made for someone else’s share.
Hybrid systems sit between the poles, and the credit follows whatever joint obligation a hybrid leaves in place. Three common designs show how:
- Threshold systems make a defendant jointly and severally liable only if its share of fault exceeds a statutory percentage, which runs from as low as 15 percent in some states to as high as 60 percent in others, and leave a defendant below the line severally liable.41
- Type-of-harm systems impose joint and several liability for economic damages such as medical expenses and lost income, and several liability for noneconomic damages such as pain and suffering.42
- Reallocation systems begin with joint and several liability among independent tortfeasors but spread an insolvent tortfeasor’s share among all the other parties, the plaintiff included, in proportion to comparative responsibility.43
A defendant who is only severally liable receives no credit for another’s settlement, as in a pure several-liability state, while a defendant who remains jointly liable for part of the damages receives the state’s credit, dollar or proportional, against that part alone. In Wells v. Tallahassee Memorial Regional Medical Center, where joint and several liability reached economic damages only, the Florida Supreme Court allowed a setoff for economic damages alone, with the settlement divided between economic and noneconomic damages in the same proportion as the jury’s award.44
Where liability is joint, the next section takes up how a settlement affects contribution among the tortfeasors. Where liability is several, the settlement ends the settlor’s exposure, leaves every other defendant’s share untouched, and leaves the plaintiff with whatever bargain she struck.