Concept
Why Contribution Exists
Contribution and indemnity among tortfeasors
Contribution and Indemnity
Why Contribution Exists
When two or more tortfeasors independently contribute to one indivisible injury, each is fully liable to the plaintiff for all of it.1 Suppose Nash and Benchley each negligently contribute to an injury that costs Twain $100,000, and the fact-finder puts 60 percent of the fault on Nash and 40 percent on Benchley. Twain gets judgment against both for $100,000. He may collect from either one, or from both in any amounts he likes, so long as his total collections never exceed $100,000.2
The rule exists to protect the plaintiff. Twain is fully compensated as long as at least one defendant can pay, and if the other is insolvent, immune, or beyond the court's jurisdiction, the loss falls on the defendant who can pay and not on Twain.3 The rule once reached fewer defendants. Under the original English joinder rule, only defendants who acted in concert, or who were vicariously liable for one another (answerable for another's tort because of the relationship between them), were "joint tortfeasors," and a judgment against one of them, even an unsatisfied one, barred any later action against another.4 Statutes have since altered that rule, and an unsatisfied judgment against one defendant no longer bars an action against another.5
Full liability to the plaintiff leaves a question among the defendants. If Twain collects the whole $100,000 from Nash, Nash has paid $40,000 that was Benchley's share. The common law gave Nash no way to make Benchley reimburse him. Nash was a wrongdoer who had caused Twain's injuries and could fairly be made to pay, so justice had been done between plaintiff and defendant, and Nash could not be heard to complain that Benchley had escaped.6
Merryweather v. Nixan announced a no-contribution rule, but it applied only to intentional conversions. In time, courts extended the rule to ordinary negligence.7 Once procedure allowed the joinder of tortfeasors who had acted independently to cause the same harm, the origin of the rule and the reason for it were lost to sight, and contribution was denied among all "joint tortfeasors." That was the majority common-law rule in the United States early in the twentieth century.8 The rule left the loss wherever the plaintiff's collection happened to put it. If one of two solvent, equally blameworthy defendants paid a $100 judgment, he could not recover $50 from the other, and the plaintiff decided which of them shouldered the whole loss.9
The critics of the rule did not quarrel with full liability to the plaintiff. Most accepted that each defendant should answer for the whole, and argued only that a defendant who paid should be able to redistribute the loss by making the other tortfeasors contribute to the common liability.10 That answer keeps Twain's security intact and takes the final sorting of the loss away from his choice of whom to collect from.
Most states adopted the critics' answer. By the middle of the twentieth century a substantial majority permitted contribution, by statute or judicial decision. Three uniform acts (the contribution acts of 1939 and 1955 and the Uniform Comparative Fault Act of 1979) provided for it, and Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability § 23 takes the same position.11 California's statute shows the basic shape. It replaced the all-or-nothing results of the common law with pro rata liability: a defendant who paid a $100 judgment in full could recover $50 in a separate action from a co-defendant, so long as judgment had been entered against both. It did not reach intentional harms, and it did not displace any available indemnity action.12 Many other statutes were modeled closely on the 1955 Uniform Act, which this treatise uses as its example.13
Contribution leaves the plaintiff's side of the case alone. The Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, by itself, did not change the common-law rule that co-defendants remain jointly and severally liable to the plaintiff.14 If Twain collects the full $100,000 from Nash, Nash may call on Benchley for the $40,000 Benchley owes.15 Under several liability, by contrast, Twain could call on Nash only for $60,000 and on Benchley only for $40,000, and if either could not pay, Twain would bear the uncompensated loss.16 Contribution thus pairs with joint and several liability. The plaintiff is protected, and the defendant who paid has a way to recover the excess.
A case with several defendants therefore has two layers. In the first, plaintiff against defendants, joint and several liability and the one-satisfaction limit govern. In the second, defendants against each other, two doctrines can apply. Contribution lets defendants who are both liable to the plaintiff share the ultimate loss.17 Indemnity shifts all of it, as when an employer held vicariously liable for an employee's tort pays the judgment and then sues the employee who committed the tort for the entire amount, a result available even under the traditional common law.18 The sections that follow take up when the right to contribution arises, how shares are measured, and where the right stops, and then turn to indemnity.