Concept
Measuring Equitable Shares
Contribution and indemnity among tortfeasors
Measuring Equitable Shares
A tortfeasor who pays a judgment in full may recover only what it paid above its own equitable share of the common liability, and no co-tortfeasor can be made to pay more than its own share.1 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 886A(2) states that rule, but those sentences do not say how to measure a share, and the method chosen decides who ends up bearing the loss.
The plaintiff, the judgment, and the payment are the same in both results; only the yardstick changed, and the $15,000 swing falls entirely between the defendants.
Two yardsticks compete. Equal division, borrowed from suretyship, counts tortfeasors and nothing else. Division by relative fault, which most jurisdictions adopted once comparative negligence arrived, uses the percentages a factfinder assigns.2 Two further problems cut across both methods: how to count a defendant whose liability is only vicarious, and who absorbs a share that cannot be collected. The subsections below take the baseline method first, then relative fault, then those two problems.
Pro Rata Shares
Equal division is the traditional measure. As courts began allowing contribution among joint tortfeasors, they borrowed the allocation rule from contribution among sureties, who share a debt equally: half and half for two, thirds for three, and so on.3 The Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act carries the rule forward by limiting each tortfeasor's contribution liability to its pro rata share, and a pro rata share in this setting is an equal one.4
The Nash example shows the arithmetic. Nash pays Twain's $20,000 judgment. With two tortfeasors, Nash recovers half, or $10,000, from Benchley. With four, each share is $5,000, so Nash can recover only $5,000 from Benchley and must pursue the other two tortfeasors for theirs; if all three pay, Nash collects $15,000 and bears his own $5,000.5 The number of tortfeasors is the only variable.
The Act then takes fault out of the calculation. In fixing pro rata shares, “their relative degrees of fault shall not be considered.”6 A court applying the rule counts tortfeasors and never asks which of them was more to blame. The same provision leaves room for equity, and later subsections use both of its other clauses: a group may count as a single share “if equity requires,” and “principles of equity applicable to contribution generally shall apply.”7
The cost of ignoring fault shows up when the tortfeasors differ sharply in blame.
Under equal division, a tortfeasor 10 percent responsible owes exactly what one 90 percent responsible owes. Most jurisdictions abandoned the rule after adopting comparative negligence, as the next subsection explains.8
The divisor counts every tortfeasor who shares the common liability, and that group can be larger than the list of defendants in the judgment. The Mauldin problem shows how the count becomes contested: are there three shares, for the three defendants who lost at trial, or four, adding Dunne, the settling tortfeasor?9 The answer matters because each added share shrinks every other share. Settlement raises its own questions, treated below, and a tortfeasor the plaintiff simply chose not to sue raises the same counting question.
Because the share is a share of the common liability, a person who is not liable to the plaintiff for the harm has no share to pay and takes no place in the count.10
Comparative Shares
Once a verdict assigns every party a percentage of fault, those percentages offer an obvious measure of each defendant's equitable share. With the advent of comparative negligence, most jurisdictions switched from equal division to division by relative fault, and the Uniform Comparative Fault Act and Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability § 23(b) take the same approach.12
Equal division wastes information the verdict already contains. Nell, who was 20 percent at fault, sues Fagan (70 percent) and Twist (10 percent) on damages of $100,000, and she recovers $80,000. Fagan is liable to her for the whole judgment under joint and several liability. If Fagan pays it, equal division gives him half back from Twist, but Twist will argue that Fagan should recover much less than half, since Twist was only one-seventh as faulty as Fagan.13 The argument has force: a system that weighs fault to decide what Nell recovers should weigh it again when the defendants divide the loss.
Proportional contribution answers Twist. Each defendant's share is a fraction whose numerator is its own percentage of fault and whose denominator is the sum of all the defendants' percentages.14 On Nell's verdict the denominator is 80, so Twist bears 10/80ths of the $80,000 judgment, or $10,000, and Fagan bears 70/80ths, or $70,000. If Fagan pays Nell the whole $80,000, he recovers $10,000 from Twist and absorbs $70,000 himself.15 Nell's own 20 percent stays out of the denominator because it has already done its work, reducing her judgment from $100,000 to $80,000.
Some statutes write the result into their text. Rhode Island's contribution statute keeps the words “pro rata” but provides that “when there is a disproportion of fault among joint tortfeasors, the relative degree of fault of the joint tortfeasors shall be considered in determining their pro rata shares.”16 The label therefore proves nothing by itself. Under the uniform act, pro rata means equal shares; under Rhode Island's statute, it can mean fault-weighted ones, so a problem that says only “pro rata” calls for a check of the jurisdiction's rule.
Moving to fault-based shares leaves the plaintiff's position where it was. In American Motorcycle Association v. Superior Court, 578 P.2d 899 (Cal. 1978), the California Supreme Court held that joint and several liability of multiple defendants to a single plaintiff was neither abolished nor limited by the decision adopting comparative negligence, and it adopted a doctrine of partial equitable indemnity that apportions loss among codefendants on pure comparative principles.17 The plaintiff may still collect the whole judgment from any one liable defendant, which is the very purpose of joint and several liability.18 The percentages operate afterward, when the defendant who paid seeks reimbursement.
The label “partial equitable indemnity” can mislead. The doctrine divides a judgment among codefendants by percentage, which is comparative contribution in this chapter's sense, whereas indemnity in the traditional sense shifts the entire loss to a party who would otherwise be unjustly enriched.19
The arithmetic extends to any number of defendants. Flite, who was 20 percent at fault, has an adjusted judgment of $48,000, which is 80 percent of $60,000, against Micawber (50 percent), Heap (20 percent), and Murdstone (10 percent). Over a denominator of 80, Micawber's share is $30,000, Heap's $12,000, and Murdstone's $6,000, which together total $48,000.20 Who actually pays Flite depends on the liability regime. Where defendants are jointly and severally liable, whoever pays the full $48,000 recovers the others' shares in contribution. Where each is only severally liable, Flite must collect from each defendant separately; she cannot collect the whole from one and leave him to seek contribution from the others, which shifts the burden of collection onto her.21 Several liability receives its own treatment later in the chapter.
Step two carries a trap, because a defendant named in the verdict may share no part of the common liability. Suppose joint and several liability applies and the jurisdiction compares the plaintiff's fault with each defendant's separately, so that Flite, at 20 percent, cannot recover from Murdstone, at 10. Murdstone is then not liable to Flite, and a defendant who owes the plaintiff nothing has no share of the common liability to contribute.22 Murdstone's 10 percent drops out and the denominator becomes 70. Heap, having paid the $48,000, recovers 50/70ths, or $34,286, from Micawber and bears 20/70ths, or $13,714, instead of the $12,000 he would have borne with Murdstone counted. A share that nobody owes is spread over those who do.
A tortfeasor who is liable but was never a party raises the opposite difficulty, because no percentage was assigned to that tortfeasor. Suppose a tortfeasor who paid seeks contribution from Turveydrop, who was not a party to the first action. The court in the contribution action would apparently have to make a new finding of the relative percentages of all the parties, Turveydrop included. Turveydrop would owe the percentage allocated to him there, while the other tortfeasors presumably pay according to the percentages assessed against them in the original action. The source calls the result awkward, since somehow the accounting is not going to work out right, and it burdens the court in the contribution action.23 Equal division avoids the problem because it needs only a head count; fault-based shares match payment to blame, but only for tortfeasors whose fault someone has measured.
Fault-based sharing also reaches defendants who are not liable in negligence. Most courts, and Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability § 1, allow the trier of fact to apportion damages between parties liable on a negligence theory and those liable in strict liability, and the Restatement substitutes “comparative responsibility” for “comparative negligence” and “comparative fault.”24 Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Nest-Kart illustrates the rule: a supermarket sued in negligence and a cart manufacturer sued in strict liability were placed on the same scale, so that the loss was divided by percentage instead of being blocked by the difference in theories.
Vicarious Defendants Share Once
A defendant whose liability rests solely on another tortfeasor's wrong is counted together with that tortfeasor as one share. California's contribution statute says so directly: where one or more persons are held liable solely for the tort of one of them or of another, “as in the case of the liability of a master for the tort of his servant, they shall contribute a single pro rata share, as to which there may be indemnity between them.”26 The Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act reaches the same place through its equity clause, under which, where equity so requires, “the collective liability of some as a group shall constitute a single share.”27 Both provisions address vicarious liability, the liability one person bears for another's wrong because of the relationship between them. An employer, for example, answers under respondeat superior for its employee's torts even if the employer did nothing wrong itself.
The Simon, Porter, and Reliable problem shows the rule at work. Allen wins a $60,000 judgment against Simon and Porter, who were each negligent, and against Reliable, which is in the case only because it employed Porter. Simon pays the judgment. Two tortfeasors committed the wrong, so there are two pro rata shares of $30,000: Simon keeps his own and recovers $30,000 from Porter, and Reliable can be made to pay that share under respondeat superior. Reliable's liability for Porter's share does not make it a third tortfeasor.28
The tempting count of three defendants produces three shares of $20,000, so that Simon recovers $20,000 from Porter and another $20,000 from Reliable and pays only $20,000 himself.29 That count is wrong because Reliable is not a tortfeasor itself; it is a party responsible for the negligence of Porter.30 The error also shifts the loss unfairly. Simon, one of two negligent actors, would bear a third of the loss, and the Porter side would be charged $40,000 on a $30,000 share. If Porter had no employer, Simon would owe half, and his half should not shrink merely because Porter has one. Contribution divides a loss among those who committed torts, and vicarious liability gives the plaintiff a second source of payment for one wrongdoer's tort without adding a wrongdoer.
Grouping holds whichever yardstick measures the shares. A defendant whose liability is entirely vicarious is jointly and severally liable for whatever share the jurisdiction assigns to the other tortfeasor's fault, and the two are jointly responsible for a single share.31
The grouping rule reaches liability that rests solely on the relationship; “solely” is the statute's own word.32 An employer with fault of its own is a tortfeasor in its own right, and only the vicarious portion rides along with its employee's share.
Treating Porter and Reliable as one share settles how many shares exist; it does not settle which of the two finally bears that share. The California statute leaves room for indemnity between them, and a defendant whose liability is entirely vicarious ordinarily may obtain indemnity from the actual tortfeasor if it pays that share.33 Indemnity shifts a whole loss and receives its own treatment in the later sections on that doctrine. It operates inside the single share, while contribution operates between that share and Simon's.
Insolvent Co-Tortfeasors
The cap on contribution assumes every tortfeasor can pay. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 886A(2) provides that no tortfeasor can be required to contribute beyond its own equitable share.35 When a tortfeasor is insolvent, its share becomes uncollectible, and the cap by itself does not say who must absorb it. Courts have given three answers, and each moves the loss to a different party: the tortfeasor who paid the judgment, the solvent tortfeasors, or every party responsible for the harm, including a plaintiff who was partly at fault. Each answer corrects a weakness in the one before, so they are best learned in that order.
On a literal reading of the cap, Dunne may collect from Thurber only Thurber's own $14,000 share, and Dunne ends $28,000 out of pocket: his own $14,000 plus the $14,000 White cannot supply.36 The reading has a reason, since a contribution defendant ordered to cover another tortfeasor's share would in effect guarantee that tortfeasor's solvency. But the cost of that protection falls on whichever defendant the plaintiff happened to collect from. Thurber was equally liable to Rogers for the entire $42,000, and had Rogers collected from Thurber, Thurber would have been the one $28,000 short. A result that turns on the plaintiff's choice revives the accident that contribution exists to remove: there is “an obvious lack of sense and justice” in a rule that lets the entire burden of a loss be shouldered onto one alone “according to the accident of a successful levy of execution, the existence of liability insurance, the plaintiff's whim or spite, or the plaintiff's collusion with the other wrongdoer.”37
Most courts avoid that outcome by treating contribution as an equitable doctrine. The Restatement comment says a court may “do what is fair and equitable under the circumstances” when one tortfeasor is insolvent, and the Uniform Act provides that in determining pro rata shares, “principles of equity applicable to contribution generally shall apply.”38 On the Dunne facts a court would likely order Thurber to pay Dunne $21,000, so that Dunne and Thurber each bear half the judgment instead of Dunne bearing two-thirds of it.39 Thurber carries half of White's share, not all of it, which respects the point of the cap.
Equitable adjustment divides the shortfall among tortfeasors only, which is adequate when the plaintiff was blameless and questionable when the plaintiff was partly at fault. Under contributory negligence, only an entirely innocent plaintiff could recover at all, and joint and several liability properly placed the risk of one defendant's insolvency on the other negligent defendants. Comparative negligence removed that premise, because a plaintiff who recovers a reduced judgment was also negligent.40 Reallocation follows from the change. It treats the uncollectible share as a loss for which every responsible party, the plaintiff included, answers in proportion to fault. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability § 21(a) states the rule: “[I]f a defendant establishes that a judgment for contribution cannot be collected fully from another defendant, the court reallocates the uncollectible portion of the damages to all other parties, including the plaintiff, in proportion to the percentages of comparative responsibility assigned to the other parties.”41
California's decisions show the progression within one state. In Justice Clark's hypothetical, the plaintiff is 30 percent at fault and the defendants are 60 and 10 percent, so the plaintiff's judgment is 70 percent of her loss. If the 60 percent defendant is insolvent, American Motorcycle placed 70 percent of the loss on the 10 percent defendant. Evangelatos v. Superior Court instead splits the insolvent defendant's 60 percent between the plaintiff and the solvent defendant in accordance with their responsibility. They share it three to one, so the solvent defendant takes 15 percent on top of his own 10 and bears 25 percent of the loss in all; the plaintiff recovers only that 25 percent from him and absorbs the other 75 percent.42
The usual slip is to divide the shortfall only among the solvent defendants, which silently treats the plaintiff as blameless.
Neither A nor the plaintiff carries the whole insolvency, and the split tracks their relative responsibility. Had the plaintiff been assigned no fault, with A at 60 percent and B at 40 percent on $100,000 of damages, the plaintiff's percentage would be zero, and A would bear the whole $40,000 shortfall, as under joint and several liability without reallocation.43
Which answer governs depends on the jurisdiction. The Restatement (Third) treats reallocation of uncollectible shares as one category of apportionment systems: it begins with joint and several liability for independent tortfeasors who cause an indivisible injury, then places the risk of a tortfeasor's uncollectibility on all the responsible parties, the plaintiff included.44 Reallocation has exceptions for intentional tortfeasors, persons acting in concert, vicarious liability, and persons who fail to protect the plaintiff from the specific risk of an intentional tort.45 At the other end of the range, under several liability, if a defendant cannot pay, the plaintiff bears the uncompensated loss.46 When a problem names no rule, begin with the literal cap, note that equity relieves the payer, and apply reallocation where the plaintiff was partly at fault.