Concept
Indemnity and Unjust Enrichment
Contribution and indemnity among tortfeasors
Indemnity and Unjust Enrichment
Contribution divides a loss among tortfeasors who share responsibility for it; indemnity moves the entire loss onto one of them. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 886B(1) states the test: if two persons are liable in tort to a third person for the same harm and one of them discharges the liability of both, the payer is entitled to indemnity from the other if the other would be unjustly enriched at the payer's expense by the discharge.1 “Unjust enrichment” names the situation in which one person keeps a benefit that fairness says should have cost that person something. The earlier sections followed the sharing branch of multi-defendant liability. This section follows the shifting branch, which operates in a much narrower range of cases.
The rule has three working parts, and the first two repeat ideas from the contribution sections. Both persons must be liable to the same third person for the same harm, and one must have discharged the liability of both. The third part separates the two doctrines: the other person must be unjustly enriched at the payer's expense. Contribution asks whether the payer has paid more than an equitable share and, if so, lets the payer collect the excess from the other.2 Indemnity asks whether it would be unjust for the other person to keep the entire benefit of release from the plaintiff's claim, and when the answer is yes, the payer recovers everything.
The enrichment comes from the payment itself. When one tortfeasor pays the plaintiff, the payment also extinguishes the other's debt to the plaintiff, and the other is better off by the amount of that debt without having paid anything. Whether the gain is unjust depends on whether the debt was really the other's. Suppose Nash and Benchley, independent drivers who were equally careless, together injure Twain, and Nash pays Twain's judgment in full. Benchley's release from Twain's claim relieved him of a debt that was partly his own, so contribution makes him reimburse his share, and after that neither driver holds a windfall. Nash can go no further, because he was himself careless and indemnity is not available to a defendant found negligent.3
The analysis changes when the payer's liability to the plaintiff was only derivative of the other's wrong. The payer then had no fault of its own to set against the other's, and the other person, who should have borne the whole loss from the start, would pocket the full amount of the discharge. Contribution therefore assumes that both tortfeasors share responsibility, while indemnity assumes that only one does.
The employer and employee show the shifting side at work. An employer that is vicariously liable for its employee's tort has a right to indemnity from the employee.4 The employer's liability arose from the relationship and the employer committed no wrong of its own, so leaving the loss with the employer would let the employee keep the whole benefit of a discharge the employer paid for. In practice employers often did not pursue the claim, presumably because the employee was judgment-proof or because suing a worker was thought bad for workplace morale or likely to cause union problems.5 That reluctance does not erase the right.
The failing side of the line appears when the payer's own fault is part of the problem. In Safeway, Inc. v. Rooter 2000 Plumbing and Drain, a child was injured when a diaper-changing table collapsed in a Safeway restroom, and the jury found Safeway 40 percent responsible and the installer 60 percent responsible. Safeway could not obtain indemnity from the installer.6 The installer carried the larger share of fault, but that did not help the store. The store had been found negligent and was liable for its own fault, so paying the judgment did not clear a debt that belonged entirely to someone else. A store in that position that argues the other defendant was more to blame is making a contribution argument, and labeling it indemnity does not change that.
Because most co-tortfeasors are each at fault for their own conduct, indemnity is the exception. The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability § 22 confines it to cases premised on vicarious or derivative liability.7 The Second Restatement follows its general principle with a list of recognized instances, introduced by the words “include the following,” so the list illustrates the principle.8 The next section takes up those instances one at a time.
The principle is narrow in the payers it favors and broad in the torts it covers. It applies to all joint tortfeasors, meaning two or more persons liable to the same person for the same harm. They need not have acted in concert or under a common design, the person from whom indemnity is sought need not have been joined as a defendant, and the rule governs every basis of tort liability, including misrepresentation, defamation, injurious falsehood, and nuisance as well as negligence.9 Because the right turns on the payment and the shared liability, it does not depend on whom the plaintiff chose to sue.
Tort law is not the only source of a right to full reimbursement. A contract can create one, as when Third Party agrees to indemnify or “hold harmless” Defendant for liability Defendant incurs to Plaintiff in performing its contract with Third Party. An insurer that pays its policyholder's claim generally steps into the policyholder's rights against whoever injured the policyholder, a position called subrogation. Non-contract law supplies the right too, as the employer's claim against its employee shows.10 A problem that mentions a hold-harmless clause therefore calls for a look at the parties' agreement before any unjust-enrichment analysis begins.
Some courts once reached full shifting by another route. In states whose contribution statutes divided the loss pro rata even when one tortfeasor was far more culpable, courts developed “equitable indemnity,” which sometimes let a party that was only passively or secondarily negligent shift the loss to one that was actively or primarily negligent. The spread of comparative responsibility has largely ended that form of indemnity.11 Other courts have gone the opposite way and softened the all-or-nothing character of indemnity, adopting a “partial indemnity” under which a negligence-based claim divides the loss by relative fault. Wyoming did so in part to eliminate the confusing separation of active and passive negligence.12 A rule of that kind shares the loss by percentages, which is the work of contribution, whereas traditional indemnity moves the whole loss to one party.