Concept
Recognized Indemnity Situations
Contribution and indemnity among tortfeasors
Recognized Indemnity Situations
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 886B(2) follows its general unjust-enrichment principle with a list, and it introduces the list as illustrative: “Instances in which indemnity is granted under this principle include the following.”1 Subsection (1) supplies the test. When two persons are liable in tort to a third person for the same harm and one discharges the liability of both, that person is entitled to indemnity from the other if the other would be unjustly enriched at his expense by the discharge.2 Because the list says “include,” a relationship it does not name can still qualify, and the six instances mark the places where courts have most readily found the enrichment unjust.
The six look different on the surface. They involve an employer answering for a worker, a person who follows orders, a person who is deceived, a party who passes along someone else’s defect, a possessor who overlooks a hazard someone else made, and a party who has bargained for protection. Yet each has one shape: the payer’s exposure to the injured person traces back to the conduct, the relationship, or the promise of the party from whom it seeks reimbursement. That shape explains why the whole loss moves. Contribution divides a loss among tortfeasors who each carry some responsibility, while indemnity covers the case in which one party is liable for another’s tort and may recover the entire damages from the other.3
Each subsection below takes one instance in the Restatement’s order. It states the rule, gives the reason behind it, and sets two situations on either side of its line. Vicarious liability comes first because it fits the principle most plainly.
Vicarious Liability
The first recognized instance applies when the indemnitee was liable only vicariously for the conduct of the indemnitor.4 The indemnitee is the party that paid the judgment and wants reimbursement; the indemnitor is the party it wants reimbursement from. Vicarious liability is liability the law places on one person for another’s wrong because of the relationship between them, as when an employer answers under respondeat superior for its employee’s tort. It is truly derivative: it flows automatically from the employee’s tort, whatever care the employer used in selecting or supervising him.5
Take Metro, an employer, and Grant, its employee, whose negligence on the job injures Bergman. Bergman may sue either or both and collect her judgment once. If Metro pays, most courts let it recover the entire amount from Grant, because Grant’s negligence actually caused the injury and gave rise to the liability.6 The right is old. Even at common law, a defendant that paid a judgment only because of its relationship with the party who caused the harm could seek indemnification from that party.7
The reason lies in what Metro’s payment accomplishes. Respondeat superior gives the plaintiff a second source of payment; it promises the wrongdoer no protection. When Metro pays Bergman, the payment clears Grant’s primary debt along with Metro’s derivative one. Metro had no fault of its own to answer for, so leaving the loss with Metro would let Grant keep a benefit that Metro paid for, and that is the enrichment at the payer’s expense that subsection (1) asks about.8 Contribution fits when both parties are at fault, and here only Grant is.
Exam stems often reverse the payer, and the right then disappears. If Grant satisfies Bergman’s judgment, he has no claim against Metro, because Metro’s liability was derivative of his and Metro has nothing to repay. Nor does Metro’s liability excuse Grant. Respondeat superior adds a defendant for the plaintiff to reach, and it leaves the employee answerable for his own tort. The whole structure also depends on an actual tort. If Grant was not negligent, he is not a tortfeasor, Bergman cannot recover from him, and Metro, whose liability rests on his, is not liable either.9
The instance reaches beyond employment, because its text asks only whether the payer’s liability was vicarious for the indemnitor’s conduct. Procedure follows substance. A defendant sued alone may implead, under Rule 14(a), a person who may be liable to it for all or part of the plaintiff’s recovery, and an indemnity claim seeks all of that recovery where a contribution claim seeks part.10 In practice the right is seldom exercised. A suit against the employee is often futile because the employee cannot pay, one insurance policy frequently covers both employer and employee, and such suits do not make for positive employee relations.11 Those limits affect how often the right is used, and they leave unchanged who ought to bear the loss as between employer and employee.
The word only carries that result. An employer that is vicariously liable and also independently at fault answers to the plaintiff on two grounds, and the second ground is its own wrong. A stem that tells you the employer was itself negligent, as by entrusting a vehicle to an unfit driver, has told you to leave full indemnity behind.
This instance also completes a point about vicarious defendants. When one defendant’s liability is entirely imputed from another’s tortious conduct, the two are jointly responsible for a single share, and the vicariously liable defendant that pays that share to the plaintiff ordinarily has a right of indemnity from the other.12 Contribution therefore operates between that single share and any other tortfeasor’s, while indemnity operates inside the share.
Following Lawful-Seeming Directions
The second instance applies when the indemnitee acted pursuant to directions of the indemnitor and reasonably believed the directions to be lawful.14 Unlike the first instance, it reaches a payer that performed the injuring act itself and may be liable on its own account. What moves the loss is that the payer did the act at the other person’s instruction. The rule therefore has two parts: the directions must have come from the person against whom indemnity is sought, and the payer’s belief that they were lawful must have been reasonable.
The directions part rests on control. The person who tells another what to do chooses the conduct and so creates the exposure to the third person. If the follower pays and keeps the loss, the one who gave the order is released from a debt that the follower’s payment extinguished, which is the enrichment subsection (1) condemns.15 The reasonableness part keeps the right from licensing blind obedience. A follower told to do something plainly unlawful is no longer an innocent conduit. He can see the problem and can refuse, and indemnity would let people carry out wrongs on instruction and send the bill to whoever gave it. Reasonableness is measured by what a sensible person in the follower’s position knew or had reason to know, so the follower’s own claim to have trusted the orders settles nothing.
The reasonableness clause is where an exam problem usually turns, since the plea that the payer was only following orders does not by itself establish the right. The facts that matter are the ones bearing on what the follower knew, such as a marked boundary, an earlier warning, or an instruction whose illegality is obvious on its face.
Both landscapers received the same order and paid the same judgment, and only what each knew separates them. Both followed directions, so the first part of the rule does not distinguish them. The second part does, which is why a stem built on this instance always includes a fact about the follower’s state of knowledge.
Induced by Misrepresentation
The third instance applies when the indemnitee was induced to act by a misrepresentation on the part of the indemnitor, upon which the indemnitee justifiably relied.17 A misrepresentation is a false statement of fact, and the instance asks two questions about it: did the false statement come from the person against whom indemnity is sought, and was the payer entitled to rely on it? The previous instance turned on who controlled the conduct. This one turns on who supplied the information on which the conduct rested.
The reason begins with who created the risk. A person who gives another a false statement of fact chooses what the other will believe, and so has in effect selected the conduct that follows. Both persons must still be liable to the injured person; the deception matters between them, and the indemnity claim arises once the payer has discharged the liability. That payment also extinguishes the deceiver’s debt, a debt the deceit itself produced, so the deceiver walks away enriched at the payer’s expense.18 Contribution would divide the loss on the assumption that each party carried some responsibility. The deceived party’s exposure exists because of the deceiver’s statement, and leaving that party a share would reward the falsehood by letting the deceiver pass part of its cost to the person it misled.
The second requirement does subtler work than the first. Reliance is justifiable when the indemnitee was entitled to believe the statement in light of what it knew or had reason to know at the time, so the test looks to the indemnitee’s situation, and sincere trust alone settles nothing. Someone who proceeds despite visible signs of danger has chosen to accept part of the risk. The false statement is then no longer the only reason the harm happened, and the premise for shifting the whole loss, that the other party alone created the risk, no longer holds. The parties are left to the sharing rules that govern tortfeasors who each contributed to the harm.
Two features of the text control how a stem is read. The misrepresentation must be the indemnitor’s own, so a false assurance from some other source gives the payer no claim against the indemnitor. The reliance inquiry turns on what the payer saw, knew, or was told, such as visible wear or an earlier warning, and a stem that includes a fact of that kind is testing whether the reliance was justified.
Defective Chattels or Work
The fourth instance applies when the indemnitor supplied a defective chattel or performed defective work upon land or buildings, as a result of which both were liable to the third person, and the indemnitee innocently or negligently failed to discover the defect.20 A chattel is an item of movable personal property, which in practice means a product. The clause therefore reaches the manufacturer or wholesaler that puts a flawed product into commerce, and it reaches the contractor whose faulty work is built into a structure, such as wiring or a stair railing. The indemnitee is the party that paid the injured person, and the indemnitor is the party that supplied the defect.
The clause makes sense once you see who stands where in the chain. The indemnitor made the defect, and it controlled how the product was built or the work was done. The indemnitee stands downstream, as a retailer that resold the product or an owner that accepted the work, and it may answer to the injured person simply because the flawed thing passed through its hands, or because a reasonable inspection would have revealed the flaw. When the downstream party pays the judgment, the payment also wipes out the supplier’s debt to the injured person, a debt the supplier created. Contribution would divide that loss as though both shared responsibility for the harm. The clause instead puts the loss on the party that created the hazard and was best placed to prevent it, because the maker could have caught the flaw at the source while the downstream party could have found it, if at all, only by inspecting a finished item it had not designed.
The same chain explains why the clause tolerates a negligent failure to discover the defect. A downstream party that should have caught the flaw has some fault of its own, but the duty to look arises only because the supplier put a flawed item into the stream of commerce. The text accordingly protects an indemnitee whether its failure to discover was innocent or careless. It does not protect one that actually found the defect, since that party did not fail to discover it.
The traditional remedy is all-or-nothing, and some courts have softened it. In Schneider National, Inc. v. Holland Hitch Co., the Wyoming court recognized that equitable implied indemnity under § 886B may be premised on negligence, strict liability, or breach of warranty, and that the relief available differs with the theory of liability. It then noted that influential state courts have developed a doctrine of “partial indemnity,” with responsibility divided by the parties’ relative percentages of fault. For indemnity actions premised on negligence, it modified the all-or-nothing rule in that direction, and in doing so it eliminated the confusing separation of active and passive negligence from the relative-fault determination.21 In a state that follows that approach, a negligent downstream party recovers the part of the loss that matches the indemnitor’s share of fault instead of everything.
An exam stem that adds a fact about what the downstream party knew is testing the last part of the clause.
The knowledge line follows from the reason for the rule. A downstream party that has found the defect has stopped being a conduit for someone else’s flaw and has joined in creating the risk, so the premise that only the supplier created the hazard no longer holds.
Dangerous Conditions
The fifth instance applies when the indemnitor created a dangerous condition of land or chattels, as a result of which both were liable to the third person, and the indemnitee innocently or negligently failed to discover the defect.23 Like every item on the list, it applies the general principle of § 886B(1), under which a tortfeasor who discharges the liability of both may shift the whole loss to the other if the other would be unjustly enriched by the discharge.24 Here the payer’s exposure traces back to something the other party did, and the thing done is the making of a hazard.
The preceding clause and this one begin from different starting points. Defective chattels or work asks what the indemnitor supplied or built and passed down the chain. This clause asks what the indemnitor created in a place or an object, such as an opening left in a floor, whether or not the indemnitor ever delivered anything to the indemnitee. The two can overlap at the edges, and a stem may fit either. At the core of both, one party made the danger and the other failed to find it.
The reason for shifting the whole loss follows from who stands where. The party that creates a dangerous condition is the source of the risk, and the party that comes along later and fails to discover it did not make it. The second party’s liability to the injured person exists because a hazard was there to be found, so that liability follows from the first party’s act. When the second party pays the judgment, the payment also extinguishes the creator’s debt, a debt the creator’s own conduct produced. Contribution would split the loss on the assumption that both carried comparable responsibility. This clause treats the failure to discover as secondary to the creation, which is why the text protects an indemnitee whose failure was merely negligent as well as one whose failure was innocent.
The partial-indemnity development described under the preceding clause reaches this one too. The rule of Schneider National, Inc. v. Holland Hitch Co. governs equitable implied indemnity under § 886B premised on negligence, so in a state that follows it an indemnitee that was negligent may recover only the part of the loss matching the indemnitor’s relative share of fault, while under the traditional rule the whole loss moves.25
The clause gives no help to a payer that stands on the creator’s side of the line. Suppose the owner’s own maintenance crew had cut the opening and covered it, and a contractor working nearby overlooked it and was held liable alongside the owner for the same fall. If the owner pays the judgment and asks the contractor for full indemnity, the claim fails. The contractor did not create the condition, and the owner, the party asking for reimbursement, did. The owner is itself the source of the risk, so leaving it with the loss gives the contractor no unjust windfall. The parties fall back on the sharing rules of the earlier sections, and the contractor owes at most its equitable share.
Two features of the text decide most stems. The indemnitor must be the one who created the condition, so a hazard that arose without anyone’s act, or one the indemnitee made, falls outside the clause. The indemnitee must also have failed to discover the defect, innocently or negligently, the same limit stated for the preceding clause. An indemnitee that found the condition and left it in place has joined in creating the risk and is left to the sharing rules.
Duty to Protect the Indemnitee
The sixth and last instance applies when the indemnitor was under a duty to the indemnitee to protect him against the liability to the third person.27 The earlier instances locate the injustice in the indemnitor’s connection to the harm: its employee’s tort, its instruction, its falsehood, its flawed product, its hazard. This one locates it in a commitment made before the harm occurred. A party that has undertaken to protect another from a liability has been assigned that loss in advance, so when the protected party pays the injured person, the payment relieves the protector of a burden it already owed. The foundation is again the principle of § 886B(1).28
The duty must come from an identifiable source, and contract is the usual one. A clause obligating a third party to indemnify, or “hold harmless,” a defendant for liability the defendant incurs to the plaintiff as a result of performing its contract with the third party creates the right to reimbursement. The same source adds that a right to indemnity can also be created by non-contract law.29 Because the duty exists by agreement, its terms mark its reach, and a court enforcing it applies the allocation the parties chose without weighing who was more careless.
A payer’s argument that the other tortfeasor was more at fault supplies no such source. Where two tortfeasors owe the plaintiff and neither has promised the other anything, the default is sharing: when joint and several liability applies, a defendant that pays the whole judgment can call on the other for contribution toward the other’s share.30 Relative fault tells you how the shares are measured, and it does not create a duty to protect.
Construction work shows the clause at its most practical. An owner that must pay for a contractor’s negligence is much more likely to seek indemnity than an employer is to pursue an employee, because a contractor is more likely to have the resources and insurance to cover the loss.31 The owner’s lawyer should therefore write into the contract a clause requiring evidence that the contractor is fully insured, so that the indemnity right protects the owner from absorbing losses the contractor’s negligence caused.32 A right to full reimbursement is worth only as much as the indemnitor can pay, and the insurance requirement puts a solvent source behind the promise.
Liability insurance applies the same idea in commercial form. When Napoleon sues Wellington and Wellington’s insurer, Lloyds of London, denies that the policy covers the claim, Wellington may implead Lloyds under Rule 14(a)(1) and seek indemnity for any judgment Napoleon recovers.33 Wellington seeks to pass on all of his liability, where a claim against a co-tortfeasor for contribution would pass on only part, and impleader lets the coverage dispute be decided in the same case in which his liability is tried. The reverse flow rests on the same footing: an insurer that pays its policyholder’s claim generally acquires, by subrogation, the policyholder’s rights against whoever injured the policyholder.34
Where a duty of this kind exists, the sharing rules drop out, and that holds for every instance in this list. When one tortfeasor has a right of indemnity against another, neither of them has a right of contribution against the other.36 The next section sets the two doctrines side by side.