Concept
Indemnity Versus Contribution
Contribution and indemnity among tortfeasors
Indemnity Versus Contribution
A defendant who pays a judgment that two tortfeasors owe together has two possible routes back to the money, and the law lets the defendant take at most one of them. Contribution returns part of the payment; indemnity returns all of it.1 When one tortfeasor has a right of indemnity against another, neither has a right of contribution against the other (Restatement (Second) of Torts § 886A(4)).2 A statute can say the same thing in terms: one contribution statute leaves existing indemnity rights intact and denies contribution between judgment debtors when one is entitled to indemnity from the other.3
Two negligent defendants, A at 60 percent and B at 40 percent, show contribution at work. They face a $100,000 judgment. Under joint and several liability, the plaintiff may collect the full amount from either defendant but only once; if A pays everything, A can call on B for the $40,000 B owes and keeps the remaining $60,000 as A's own share.4 Where several liability applies instead, the plaintiff collects $60,000 from A and $40,000 from B, so each defendant pays only its own share, and the plaintiff absorbs the loss if either cannot pay. In both settings, the paying defendant recovers a portion of the loss and never the whole of it.
Indemnity rests on a different premise. If two persons are liable to a third for the same harm and one discharges the liability of both, the payer is entitled to indemnity when the other would be unjustly enriched at the payer's expense by the discharge (Restatement (Second) of Torts § 886B(1)).5 Contribution assumes that each tortfeasor carries some responsibility for the harm and so should bear a share. Indemnity treats the loss as the other party's alone, so the payment leaves that party with a windfall unless it is repaid in full. One doctrine says the payer should absorb a share; the other says the payer should absorb none. They cannot govern the same pair of defendants, and a simple case shows why.
The bar applies only when a right of indemnity actually exists, and that right is narrow. In Safeway, Inc. v. Rooter 2000 Plumbing and Drain, a child was injured when a diaper-changing table collapsed in a Safeway restroom, and the jury found Safeway 40 percent responsible and the installer 60 percent responsible. Safeway could not obtain indemnity from the installer.6 The jury had found the store negligent, and indemnity is limited to cases premised on vicarious or derivative liability. The installer's larger percentage did not change that. Section 886A(4) therefore had nothing to operate on, and what remained was a question of sharing, which the jury's percentages measure. The other source of an indemnity right is agreement, often called a 'hold harmless' clause in a contract.7
Courts also attach the word indemnity to doctrines that are not traditional indemnity, and the label can mislead a student into applying the bar where it does not belong. The California Supreme Court adopted a doctrine of partial equitable indemnity at common law to permit apportionment of loss among codefendants on pure comparative principles, and it held that comparative negligence neither abolished nor limited joint and several liability.8 A doctrine that hands the payer only another defendant's percentage returns part of the loss, which is the work of contribution, whatever the court calls it. The test is what the doctrine does: a whole loss moved to one party is indemnity, and a loss divided by percentages is contribution.
The older vocabulary of active and passive negligence caused much of the confusion. Equitable indemnity premised on negligence once operated on an all-or-nothing basis and turned on separating the active negligence of one party from the passive negligence of the other. Courts that adopted comparative responsibility absorbed that distinction into the new system. Minnesota held, in Tolbert v. Gerber Industries, that contribution rather than equitable indemnity is the vehicle for allocating loss between a negligent manufacturer and a negligent installer. Tennessee held, in Owens v. Truckstops of America, that an indemnity claim can no longer rest on active-passive negligence, because comparative fault subsumed the distinction.9 Wyoming modified the all-or-nothing rule for equitable implied indemnity actions premised on negligence rather than discarding it, citing the Second Restatement's recognition of a doctrine of 'partial indemnity' under which responsibility follows the relative percentages of fault. It also removed the active-passive separation from the relative-fault determination.10 Where a state takes that course, a negligent indemnitee recovers a percentage, and the claim functions much like contribution. Full shifting survives where the indemnitee's liability is vicarious or derivative or rests on agreement.
Step four is where labels do their damage. A claim styled 'equitable' or 'partial' indemnity that divides the loss by percentages belongs at step five. A claim that shifts the whole loss belongs at step three only if an agreement or a recognized situation supports it.