Concept
Cause in Fact Versus Legal Cause
Proximate Cause: Foreseeability and Scope of the Risk
Proximate Cause and Foreseeability
Cause in Fact Versus Legal Cause
Negligent defendants do not answer for every consequence of their conduct. Courts differ in how they draw the line, but all agree that a line must be drawn.1 Drawing it starts with keeping two causal questions apart. The first is factual: would the harm have happened without the defendant’s conduct? The second is a question of responsibility: granting that the conduct was a link in the chain, should the law impose liability for this harm? The Restatement (Second) of Torts uses the words “legal cause” for a causal sequence of the second kind, one for which the law holds the actor responsible unless some defense applies.2 Courts often call the second question “legal cause” or “scope of liability” to stress that the issue is whether liability should be imposed, not whether the defendant’s act was a cause in fact.3 That question arises only after the first has been answered yes.
Cause in fact is the but-for inquiry. Conduct is not a cause of an event if the event would have occurred without it; the conduct must be a necessary antecedent of the injury.4 A plaintiff who cannot show even that loses at once, because a court that finds no actual causation dismisses the case without reaching the policy question whether liability should follow.5
But-for causation cannot be the whole test, because nothing in it says where to stop. A frequently quoted passage shows why: a rule that made “would the effect have occurred without the cause” the basis of legal responsibility would soon prove unsatisfactory, since the injury also would not have happened had the injured person never been born. So courts ask another question: was the wrongful act the proximate cause?6 The Great Chicago Fire shows the same defect on the scale of a city. Mrs. O’Leary’s negligently placed lantern may or may not have been the principal factual cause of the blaze, but if it was, no court would impose liability on her for the full consequences.7 Factual causation sets a minimum and cannot set a limit, because every link in a long chain already satisfies it.
Smaller chains make the point at ordinary scale. A store owner leaves a box lid on the sidewalk. A pedestrian trips, skins her knee, stops for first aid, misses her train, and is injured when the later train crashes into another at a crossing. The lid is a but-for cause of the crash injury, since she would otherwise have been on the earlier train. Yet courts would balk at liability, because the injury is too unusual and too far removed from the harm a careless lid threatens.8 The refusal rests on no gap in actual causation. It rests on the distance between the harm that occurred and the harm the negligence made foreseeable.9
The red-light collision sits at the opposite end of the range. Running a red light is negligent precisely because an intersection collision is foreseeable, so the risk that makes the conduct wrongful is the very one that materialized. No proximate cause issue remains for the fact-finder: if the defendant was negligent and that negligence was a cause in fact of the injury, then as a matter of law it was also a proximate cause.10
What draws the line, then, is the reason the conduct was wrongful in the first place. Liability is confined to those consequences whose foreseeability made the conduct negligent and to persons within the foreseeable zone of danger. So far as foreseeability is concerned, the test for proximate cause is essentially the test for negligence itself, a rule known as the risk principle.11 Older cases drew the line in different words, asking whether the harm was the immediate or only the remote result of the negligence. In Ryan v. New York Central R.R. Co., the opinion concluded that the action could not be sustained because the damages were the remote, not the immediate, result of the defendants’ negligence: the immediate result was the destruction of the defendants’ own wood and sheds, and beyond that the harm was remote.12 The contest between that vocabulary and foreseeability gets its own section below.
The Restatement slots legal cause into a two-part test. The actor’s conduct must be a legal cause of the harm, and the actor must have no defense applicable to the particular claim.13 A defendant whose conduct is not a legal cause escapes liability, and one whose conduct is a legal cause can still escape through a defense. The same legal-cause rules also fix how far damages reach. One who tortiously harms the person or property of another is liable for the consequences of that harm in accordance with the rules on whether the conduct is a legal cause of those consequences.14 A single set of rules therefore answers two questions: whether liability attaches at all, and which downstream losses the plaintiff may recover.
The vocabulary has shifted, and the shift matters when you read cases. The Third Restatement dropped the term “legal cause,” in part because courts were not using it, and titled its Chapter 6 “Scope of Liability (Proximate Cause).” Most courts have kept “proximate cause,” and both labels are often used loosely enough to include cause in fact, a necessary predicate to the proximate cause inquiry.15 The Third Restatement’s chapter even carries a caveat expressing the hope that a future Restatement will not need the parenthetical. Whatever one thinks of the terminology, reading “proximate” as “nearest” misstates the doctrine, which asks whether more distant acts or events, in time or space, are causally connected to the particular injury.16
Courts add to the confusion in two ways. They have long blurred factual cause and proximate cause, and so did the earlier Restatements, which conflated the two concepts.17 They also say “not the proximate cause” when they mean something else: that the defendant was not negligent at all, or that the plaintiff’s own negligence, assumption of the risk, or misuse of a product was a superseding cause of the harm.18 A further twist belongs to scope of liability rather than to cause in fact. When the defendant’s negligence makes only a trivial contribution to multiple factual causes of the harm, the harm falls outside the scope of liability.19 When a court or an exam says “no proximate cause,” first ask which of these questions is actually being decided. The sections that follow take up the foreseeability limits on legal cause, beginning with the scope-of-the-risk principle.