Concept
The Scope-of-the-Risk Principle
Proximate Cause: Foreseeability and Scope of the Risk
The Scope-of-the-Risk Principle
But-for causation alone would make a negligent actor answer for every harm that would not have happened without the act, however remote. The scope-of-the-risk principle supplies the missing limit. Section 29 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts states it in a sentence: an actor's liability is limited to those harms that result from the risks that made the actor's conduct tortious.1
The principle works by comparison. On one side stands the set of risks that made the conduct negligent when the actor chose to act; on the other stands the harm the plaintiff suffered. A defendant who should have anticipated a particular risk at the time, and who negligently failed to avert it, is liable when that risk causes the plaintiff's harm.2 Harm that grows out of any other source falls outside the set. The defendant does not answer for it, even though the conduct was a but-for cause.
The comparison is simplest when the harm is the very risk that made the conduct careless. Running a red light is negligent precisely because it is foreseeable that the driver will cause an intersection collision. When such a collision follows, nothing remains for a jury to decide on proximate cause: if the driver was negligent and the negligence was a cause in fact of the injury, then as a matter of law it was a proximate cause too.3
The limit has three traditional justifications. It is more rational, because the factors that define negligence should also limit liability for negligence. It is easier to administer, because it fixes the nearest thing to a definite boundary of liability that is possible. And it is more just, because negligence may be only a slight deviation from community standards, free from moral blame, while its consequences may be catastrophic and out of all proportion to the fault.4
Economic analysis points the same way. An actor cannot plan around risks he does not anticipate, so a rule that makes him pay for unforeseeable harm will not change his choices about risky activity, and it will not make the world any safer or more efficient. Worse, the specter of liability for harm from risks defendants cannot anticipate might conceivably produce socially unwarranted overdeterrence.5
A simple device keeps the comparison anchored where it belongs. Picture a reasonable person standing beside the defendant at the instant of the careless act, and ask what warnings that person would give. Foreseeability is measured at that instant, not in hindsight.6 Beside a driver who speeds down a crowded street, the figure would warn of collisions that injure people in either car and of damage to property. Beside a storeowner who lets a box lid fall onto the sidewalk, the figure would warn that a pedestrian might trip, drop a package, or fall on the adjacent stairs.
The fourth step does its work on harm that follows the conduct but grows from a different danger. Suppose a negligent driver's crash sends a motorist to the hospital, where she is hurt three days later in a hospital fire. The crash is a but-for cause of her presence there, yet a hospital fire appears on no list that a reasonable person beside the driver would recite. The careless driving made a collision foreseeable and did nothing to make a fire foreseeable, so the fire injury lies outside the scope of the risk.
Decided cases draw the same line. In Metts v. Griglak, a bus driver drove at an unreasonable speed in a snowstorm. The risk that made his speed unreasonable was a collision with another vehicle; it did not include creating a snow swirl that would blind a driver following in his wake.7 In Berry v. Borough of Sugar Notch, a trolley traveling above the speed limit was struck by a falling tree, and the court held that the speeding was not a proximate cause of the injury. The excess speed did nothing to make a falling tree more dangerous; it merely placed the trolley at that spot at that moment. In Metts the speed itself produced the harmful event, but the event belonged to a different danger. In Berry the speed produced only a coincidence.
Foreseeability in this inquiry is objective. It does not depend on what the defendant subjectively expected or contemplated; it depends on what human experience indicates can happen. At common law, proximate causation does not turn on the actor's subjective awareness of risk or probable consequences.8
Foreseeability also attaches to the risk, not to the precise course the harm takes. Careless driving creates a bundle of risks that a little imagination can enlarge indefinitely. In a traffic mix-up caused by negligence, the events between the culpable act and the injury may be bizarre indeed, and the defendant may still be liable. No one in the defendant's position could predict in advance just how the negligent act would work out to another's injury, yet that is no bar to recovery.9
Courts apply the same reasoning when an accident unfolds in an unusual way. One court conceded that the manner of the accident was unusual but concluded that an explosion was exactly the type of accident to be anticipated from using a volatile, flammable liquid in a small room with an open flame, and it held the defendant liable.10 The Second Restatement states the broader rule: if the actor's conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about harm, the actor's failure to foresee the extent of the harm or the manner in which it occurred does not prevent liability.11
The principle guides judgment without mechanically deciding cases, because the same facts can be described as one risk or as another. Putting the inquiry in terms of risk furnishes no formula for an infinite variety of cases; flexibility survives in the need to define the risk narrowly or more broadly, as seems appropriate and just in the type of case.12 The description can err in either direction. If the risk of a dropped box lid were stated as 'personal injury' of some sort, a woman who tripped over the lid, missed her train, and was hurt when the later train crashed could recover, since the lid created a risk of personal injury and she suffered personal injury. That analysis is too broad, so the court must focus on the particular types of harm the defendant's act made likely.13 The opposite error is to get bogged down in the idiosyncratic details of the accident. A careless railroad conductor dislodges a passenger's package, which falls and breaks an antique inside. A court that demanded foresight of the antique would lose sight of the risk, which is damage to the passenger's property from a falling package. The antique's value goes to the extent of the harm, which the Second Restatement says need not have been foreseen.14
Tort law draws lines of this kind elsewhere, and where the line falls changes the outcome. In Stone v. York Haven Power Co., a statutory immunity covered a lake but not the dam that created it.15
For these reasons the scope-of-the-risk idea works best as an approach and not as a definitive test. It poses the problem in a way that directs the decision-maker's line of thought. And because it asks for a reasonably close relation between the risk created and the injury incurred, it takes the form of a standard instead of a rule, which makes plain the need to exercise discretion in applying it.16
The hard cases cluster into four kinds of unforeseeability: unforeseeable plaintiffs, unforeseeable extent of harm, unforeseeable types of harm, and unforeseeable manner of harm. Plaintiff unforeseeability matters a lot. Unforeseeability of extent or manner does not, and cases involving an unforeseeable type of harm are harder to generalize about.17 Palsgraf, taken up in its own section below, shows how the question of the plaintiff can decide whether a case even reaches the jury.18