Concept
Intentional Wrongdoers
Proximate Cause: Foreseeability and Scope of the Risk
Intentional Wrongdoers
Everything earlier in this chapter assumed a careless defendant, and for a careless defendant the foreseeability of the harm marks the outer edge of liability. A defendant who acts deliberately is treated differently, and the difference arrives in two stages. When the defendant acted for the purpose of causing a particular harm, expectability stops mattering for that harm. When the defendant deliberately invaded the plaintiff's interests and something else resulted, the court weighs how culpable the defendant was against how unexpected the result was. The subsections below take the stages in that order.
Harm Intended by the Actor
The Restatement (Second) holds a person who commits a tort against another for the purpose of causing a particular harm liable for that harm if it results, whether or not it is expectable, unless the harm results from an outside force the risk of which the defendant's act did not increase.1 The rule has a core and a boundary. The core is that purpose replaces foreseeability: the question that governed negligence, what a reasonable person would have counted among the risks of the conduct, drops out when the defendant aimed at the harm itself. The boundary is the outside-force exception, which keeps purposed harm from making the actor answerable for every misfortune that later strikes the victim.
Expectability drops out because the reason for the foreseeability limit is missing. Confining a careless defendant to foreseeable harms protects someone who could not have weighed a danger nobody saw coming. A defendant who aimed at the harm saw it coming by definition, and a deliberate wrong carries more fault than a lapse of care. The words whether or not also cover the long shot: a defendant who pursues a harm against poor odds and succeeds gets no discount for the odds.
The standard illustration is a deliberate trip that ends in a worse fall than the tripper expected, where the tripper answers for every injury.2
Purposed harm still does not make the actor an insurer. If the harm the defendant aimed at in fact comes about through an outside force whose risk the defendant's act did not increase, the rule withholds liability for it.3 The victim would have faced the same danger had the defendant never acted, so the defendant neither chose that route to the harm nor made it likelier.
The exception turns on whether the act raised the risk that the outside force would reach the victim. It does not turn on how unusual the force was or how much time passed. It also differs from negligence's foreseeability limit: negligence asks whether the harm was among the risks that made the conduct careless, while the exception asks whether the conduct made the outside harm more likely.
The rule reaches the particular harm the actor purposed, and it does not make an intentional wrongdoer liable for every consequence. Applying negligence's foreseeability screen to purposed harm is the usual exam error, because it wrongly frees a deliberate wrongdoer whose result was merely surprising. Whether the defendant answers for harm other than what was purposed is the subject of the next subsection.
Unintended Harm From Intentional Torts
Purpose settles the harm the defendant aimed at. It does not settle what happens when the defendant deliberately invaded the plaintiff's interests and a different, unintended harm followed. For that case the Restatement (Second) offers considerations and no formula: the intention to commit an invasion, the degree of the defendant's moral wrong in acting, and the seriousness of the harm intended are important factors in deciding whether the defendant is liable for the resulting unintended harm.5
The factors share a theme: the more deliberate and serious the wrong, the less reason a court has to confine the defendant to the consequences a careful person would have foreseen. The intention to invade is the threshold, since it marks the case as a deliberate wrong against a victim who did nothing to invite the loss. A defendant whose act was a momentary outburst aimed at slight harm looks more like the negligent defendant, and the foreseeability screen probably regains its force.
Opinions often say flatly that intentional tortfeasors are liable for all the consequences of their torts, even unintended ones.6 The statement holds up for a greater-than-expected extent of the harm aimed at, as with Cassius and the stairs, but it overstates the law for a distinct and freakish harm that reaches the victim by an odd route. Courts often impose liability for unexpected consequences of intentional torts, yet there is probably some foreseeability limit in intentional tort cases too. The Third Restatement tells a court deciding whether to impose liability for unexpected harm from an intentional tort to consider the actor's moral culpability, the seriousness of the harm intended, and the degree to which the actor's conduct deviated from appropriate care.7 Had the defendant caused the original injury only negligently, proximate cause would probably bar recovery for a later, unforeseeable one, so the intentional character of the first wrong is what leaves the question open.8
Holding the freak event constant isolates what moved. Culpability and the seriousness of the intended harm are the important factors, and the court balances them against how unexpected the result was and how odd its route. Because the test is a weighing and no bright line, a mild wrong may still be charged with a modest unexpected consequence while a grave wrong may be charged with more, and no result is guaranteed in either direction.
Two shortcuts go wrong. A flat statement that intentional tortfeasors answer for every consequence skips step four, and an answer that applies the negligence foreseeability screen as though intent changed nothing skips step three.