Concept
Who Decides Foreseeability
Proximate Cause: Foreseeability and Scope of the Risk
Who Decides Foreseeability
In Derdiarian v. Felix Contracting Corp., a contractor left a street excavation without a barrier, a driver suffering a seizure crashed into the work site, and a worker was injured. The contractor argued that an accident so freakish could not be a legal consequence of its negligence, and it asked the court to say so as a matter of law. The New York Court of Appeals refused to take the question from the jury. When a third person's act intervenes, the court explained, liability turns on whether that act is a normal or foreseeable consequence of the situation the defendant created. An extraordinary act, one not foreseeable in the normal course of events or far removed from the defendant's conduct, may be a superseding act that breaks the causal nexus. But what is foreseeable and what is normal can support varying inferences, as the question of negligence itself can, and these issues therefore are generally for the fact finder to resolve.1
Earlier sections asked what foreseeability requires. This one asks who answers, and the answer decides how most proximate cause disputes are won. The jury answers by default because the inquiry is the one that made the conduct negligent in the first place. Under the risk principle, a defendant answers for the consequences whose foreseeability made the conduct negligent, and to persons within the foreseeable zone of danger. So the test, as far as foreseeability limits go, is essentially the one used to decide whether the defendant was negligent at all.2 Negligence ordinarily goes to the jury, and a question built the same way goes with it. The jury can also weigh how remote the harm was from the defendant's act and whether the liability fits the wrong, without quantifying or explaining the weight each factor receives. The doctrine therefore calls for an instruction that asks the jury to do more than apply a mechanical rule: it must use its judgment in deciding whether the defendant was sufficiently blameworthy under all the circumstances.3
Foreseeability arises at two stages, and judge and jury hold different parts of it. At the duty stage, a foreseeable risk is a category of accidents, a general field of danger that a reasonable person would weigh in deciding whether to take a safety precaution, and the court establishes duty as a matter of law. A separate question then remains: whether the particular risk that actually caused the plaintiff's injury falls within that general category. A risk inside the category is necessarily foreseeable, but the issue is case specific, and it goes to the jury as a question of proximate cause.4 The categorical no-duty rules of the preceding section operate at the first stage. The ruling discussed here operates at the second, and it asks only whether the facts leave room for a jury to find the harm within the category.
Palsgraf shows what is at stake in placing the line between the stages. Andrews denied that duty runs only to the plaintiff as to whom harm might be expected. Harm to someone being the natural result of the act, he wrote, all those in fact injured may complain, even if they stood outside what would generally be thought the danger zone, because an unreasonable risk's consequences are not confined to those who might probably be hurt.5 On that view a plaintiff's position outside the zone of danger does not end the case at the duty stage.
The judge's part is therefore twofold. The judge states the legal standard to the jury, and the judge decides whether the question reaches the jury at all. Where the evidence permits only one inference, the judge decides the issue as a matter of law, and the Restatement places that power in the court: conduct may be held not to be a legal cause where, after the event and looking back from the harm to the negligent conduct, it appears to the court highly extraordinary that it should have brought about the harm.6 Decisions fall into three groups, according to who decides and for whom.
The first group favors the plaintiff. When the harm is the very risk that made the conduct negligent, the finding of negligence carries proximate cause with it. A driver who runs a red light and collides with a vehicle crossing the intersection is negligent because that conduct risks precisely this injury, so proximate cause is established as a matter of law and the jury is not asked about it.7
The middle group belongs to the jury. In Marshall v. Nugent the plaintiff was struck by the Nugent car after the defendant's servant, through negligence, created a traffic mix-up. The injury was not remote from the negligent conduct in time or place, and it occurred while the mix-up was still persisting, not after traffic flow had become normal again. The court found no error in leaving proximate cause to the jury.8
The third group favors the defendant. In Thomas v. Board of Trustees of Nebraska State Colleges a student was abducted, raped, and murdered while living in a dormitory room next to a student whose earlier misbehavior had drawn only dormitory discipline, and the court held as a matter of law that the crime was not foreseeable, so that no reasonable jury could find proximate cause. The contractor in Derdiarian sought the same kind of ruling and did not get it. The difference lies in how far the harm sits from the danger that made the defendant careless. An excavation is barricaded to keep vehicles out, so a vehicle entering the site is the hazard the barrier answers, and the seizure explains only how the vehicle arrived, a detail a jury could treat as a normal consequence. In Thomas, the court saw no link between the earlier misbehavior and the crime that a reasonable jury could find. An appellate court may also find a harm unforeseeable after the plaintiff has recovered in the trial court. A cover was knocked into a vat and caused no injury at the time, but a short time later molten liquid erupted from the vat and injured the plaintiff. His recovery was reversed, because a chemical reaction between the liquid and the lid had caused the eruption and there was no reason for anyone to expect it.9 A decision to send an issue to the jury, by contrast, says only that the inference is open and does not hold that proximate cause exists.
Whether the court or the jury decides, the question concerns type of harm and not detail. Where damage of the general type was foreseeable, courts usually hold defendants liable for the damage actually caused, even if it is greater than one might ordinarily expect.10 The Restatement agrees: if the actor's conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about harm, the fact that the actor neither foresaw nor should have foreseen the extent of the harm or the manner in which it occurred does not prevent liability.11 A motion that rests only on how odd the sequence looks therefore fails, while one that shows the harm lies outside the general type of risk can succeed.
What the jury is told matters as much as who tells it. One instruction in use defines the term this way: "When I use the expression 'proximate cause,' I mean a cause which, in a natural and continuous sequence, produces damage and without which the damage would not have occurred."12 That wording describes a but-for link in an unbroken sequence. It never asks what kind of harm made the conduct negligent, so a defendant whose best argument is the scope of the risk cannot count on the instruction to carry it. A charge that fits the doctrine asks instead whether the harm falls within the general field of danger that made the conduct negligent.13
Two errors recur in answers on this topic. One treats a decision to send the question to the jury as a holding that proximate cause exists, when it holds only that the inference is open. The other treats foreseeability as always a jury question, which ignores the court's power to hold a result highly extraordinary and so no legal cause.16