Concept
Superseding Cause Defined
Intervening and Superseding Causes: General Test
Superseding Cause Defined
A superseding cause is an act of a third person or other force which, by its intervention, prevents the actor from being liable for harm to another that the actor's antecedent negligence is a substantial factor in bringing about.1 The definition rewards a slow reading, because its last clause carries a premise: the actor's earlier negligence is a substantial factor in the harm. Cause in fact is already settled. The definition then adds two things, an intervening force (a third person's act or any other force) and an effect (the actor is not liable). Superseding cause therefore begins where cause in fact ends, and it can free a defendant who has lost the factual argument.
That sequence makes superseding cause a question of policy, not of causation. As Lynch v. Scheininger describes it, the problem on its face is whether a defendant who has in fact made a substantial contribution to an injury should answer for it when a later cause of independent origin, for which the defendant is not responsible, brings it about. In essence the problem concerns the extent of the defendant's original obligation, and it "does not arise until cause in fact is established."2 Legal usage describes the same thing from the other direction: a superseding cause is an intervening act or force that the law considers sufficient to override the cause for which the original tortfeasor was responsible, thereby exonerating that tortfeasor. The usage also goes by the name sole cause.3
The framing of that question has changed over time. Early courts followed a last-wrongdoer rule, under which only the second actor's negligence was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's harm.4 Two ideas supported the rule. One was the mechanical assumption of the early common law that a harm could have only one proximate cause. The other was that the first actor should not answer for the second actor's negligence. The rule disappeared long ago, but the second idea still lingers in the analysis of intervention and enablement cases.5 The older cases asked why a defendant should be held liable for harm brought about by something for which the defendant is not responsible. Later cases ask why a defendant should be relieved of liability for something as to which the defendant's conduct is a cause, along with other causes. The Restatement states the problem as one of superseding cause for that reason.6 Relief is what needs justifying.
Common statements about superseding cause, that it overrides the original cause or exonerates the original wrongdoer, describe a consequence and leave open the question of when it occurs. They state the legal result of classifying an intervening cause as superseding, and they supply no test for deciding whether a particular intervening cause belongs in that class. The term is a label, not a recipe.7 That is why an answer that says the third person's mistake was the real cause, so the defendant is not liable, falls short. It announces the outcome of the analysis and skips the analysis. Since the definition presupposes that the defendant's negligence was a substantial factor, the defendant's contribution is not in doubt, and the answer must explain why this later force should cut off a liability that would otherwise exist. The Restatement points to where that explanation comes from: whether the active operation of an intervening force prevents the actor's antecedent negligence from being a legal cause is determined by the rules stated in §§ 442-453.8 The sections that follow take up those rules, beginning with foreseeability.
Most intervening events do not end liability, however. A negligent driver who causes an accident is liable not only for the victim's broken leg but also for the amputated leg that results from the attending physician's negligence, because third-party negligence is usually regarded as foreseeable and therefore not superseding.10 The physician's error intervenes without superseding. Petrol's defiance of the firefighter's order shows that the label can follow a third party's negligence too, and what separates the two outcomes is the subject of the next sections.
Because the label brings complete relief, it cannot attach to every later contributor. A rule that excused a defendant whenever someone else also contributed would revive the last-wrongdoer rule under a new name, since later contributors are common. Modern apportionment adds a further wrinkle. Concurrent tortfeasors normally answer for a proportionate share of the plaintiff's damages, and each may owe at least some portion. In a products case, for example, a third party whose tortious conduct joins with a product defect is normally liable anyway, which makes the "intervening cause" classification superfluous unless something else is added.11 The definition supplies the vocabulary, and the next sections supply the test.